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ABSTRACT 
This is a study of expertise and power relations in riverine resourcification processes. With 
a focus on the hydraulic infrastructuring and hydrosocial ordering efforts in the Mekong 
Region, I seek to contribute new perspectives to the analysis of water, energy and climate 
change governing. Through five published articles I examine different attempts to fix in 
place certain sets of biophysical, infrastructural, discursive and socio-political relations. I 
approach these fixing efforts as part of resource-making processes that seek to render the 
Mekong’s riverine flows and environments more ‘productive’, investable and exploitable, 
and governable and controllable. The waterscapes in the making form frontiers of             
(eco-)modernisation and expansion of capital circulation, as well as fixation of territorial 
state power. The constituent and constitutive power formations of resourcification include 
technoscientific, infrastructural, discursive, corporate and different aspects of state 
powers. I also analyse the socio-spatial configurations that emerge from resource-making 
processes. 
The research is grounded in the interpretive research tradition of the social sciences and 
situated at the interface of environmental and development studies. I build on Foucault-
inspired research especially in the field of political ecology. The central research question 
for my work has been how water resources are made and governed in the Mekong 
Region, through what kind of rationales, techniques and power relations, and with what 
effects, especially in terms of the consequent new power formations and implications 
for the lives of the Mekong’s riverine residents. This question is timely. Currently, the 
rivers in the region are being dammed and engineered at accelerating pace, making the 
Mekong Basin a scene for one of the most intensive hydropower developments in the 
world. Around two hundred large dams are at different stages of development in the 
mainstream and tributaries of the Mekong. The study has global relevance because the 
actors, rationales and techniques involved, epitomise those shaping the current resurgence 
of hydropower development and other large infrastructure projects in the global South. As 
I argue, the emergent governmental assemblages enabling the hydropower development 
are not only intensively present in the Mekong but also partially created there. 
My methodological choices have been guided by a commitment to understanding nature-
society relations in specific contexts, necessitating qualitative and field-based research 
methods. The fieldwork periods in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia comprised intensive and 
open-ended methods of querying research materials through observing, listening to and 
interviewing various experts and policy-makers, ministry, provincial, district and village 
officials, development practitioners and NGO staff members, and different groups 
of farmers and fishers. The aim of understanding governing rationales and techniques has 
involved the identification, collection and analysis of key policy documents and various 
technical reports. The research contributes to studies of hydrosocial relations by 
examining the continuities and changes in the rationalisations and techniques of Mekong’s 
water resourcification. It bridges the political-ecological research on water and climate 
change by examining how climate change-related governmental rationales and techniques 
have opened a new space for hydraulic infrastructuring. Moreover, it provides new 
insights on the co-constitutive relations between resources and power formations bearing 
relevance on recent political ecology discussions on resource- and state-making. The 
analysis of the ways technoscience and technical infrastructures are implicated in the 
possibilities of hydrosocial ordering also forges connections with science and technology 
studies. 
I begin the analysis with the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, the early colonial frontier for 
water resourcification that has since formed the part of the Mekong Basin where the plans 
of ‘full control’ with aspirations of ‘acclimatisation’ have been materialised to the fullest 
extent. I sketch out the main continuities and ruptures in the Delta’s intensive hydrosocial 
and agro-hydraulic ordering efforts, and outline their major effects. I then shift attention 
to the more recent hydropower boom in Laos and Cambodia, and the various elements 
enabling it in terms of knowledge production, the new sustainability standards of 
hydropower dams and climate change-related rationalisations and techniques. Finally, I 
bring to the fore how enclavistic, postneoliberal hydropower projects in Cambodia get 
entangled with other processes of resource-making, with illiberal processes of state 
formation and the intensification of Chinese influence.  
The study shows how the past and current modes of fixing hydrosocial relations have 
been shaped by a complex interplay of different rationales and techniques of governing. It 
also highlights the importance of the legacies of past hydraulic endeavours, their 
infrastructural powers, and those of fluvial waters. I identify two waves of hydraulic 
infrastructuring with differing patterns of water resourcification. Characteristic for the first 
wave is that the resourcification efforts tend to uniform and centrally coordinated 
hydrosocial orderings while the resourcification efforts of the second wave tend to exhibit 
more dispersed, corporate-led modes of hydrosocial orderings. A major change in 
hydraulic infrastructuring has been the increasing disjointedness between damming and 
river basin planning because of the proliferation of concessionary hydropower projects. 
The contradictory predicament of the current resurgence of hydropower is, that while 
large dams are being justified with multiplying purposes, from poverty alleviation to better 
governing of climate change, the concessionary dams are, in fact, geared almost solely 
towards optimising riverine affordances in terms of their hydroelectricity production. The 
concessionary governing mode through which the enclavistic, water-resourcification 
pattern of second wave dams has evolved is shown to be animated by neoliberal 
governing rationales but also shaped by illiberal governing logics. While the enclavistic 
dams strengthen corporate powers over hydrosocial relations and may limit the 
development of state hydraulic powers, the study highlights effects which overflow the 
enclave boundaries and strengthen other aspects of party-state rule in Laos and Cambodia. 
The resultant waterscapes of the various infrastructuring efforts analysed in this study are 
variegated: variously networked and with divergent power formations. There is also 
variation in the magnitude of the effects and in the mechanisms of how the benefits and 
adversities of the projects are distributed. Yet all of them, including the ‘sustainable’ dams 
with eco-modern safeguard policies, radically disrupt fluvial relationalities, diminish 
possibilities for diverse and decentralised river uses, tend toward more centralised control 
of hydrosocial relations, and make vulnerable those with the most intimate riverine 
connections. Despite these similar effects, a nuanced analysis of the ordering assemblages 
constituting each effort of fixing the fluid is relevant, as it enables more detailed reflection 
on the distributed responsibilities. Overall, the analysis illustrates how large-scale hydraulic 
infrastructures built and planned in the Mekong Region entail drastic alterations in 
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This is a study of expertise and power relations in riverine resourcification processes with 
a focus on hydraulic infrastructuring efforts in the Mekong Region. The study is timely 
because the rivers in the region are being dammed and engineered at an accelerating pace. 
Around two hundred large dams are at different stages of development in the mainstream 
and tributaries of the Mekong, and other rivers in the region are undergoing similar 
change (Geheb and Suhardiman 2019). This makes the Mekong Basin and the broader 
Mekong Region a scene for one of the most intensive hydropower developments in the 
world. The study also has global relevance because the actors, rationales and techniques 
involved, epitomise those shaping the current resurgence of hydropower development and 
other large infrastructure projects in the global South (Sneddon 2015, Ahlers et al. 2017, 
Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2019). Moreover, the emergent governmental assemblages 
enabling the hydropower development are not only intensively present in the Mekong but 
also partially created there. 
Through five articles I have explored different attempts to fix in place certain sets of 
biophysical, infrastructural, discursive and socio-political relations fuelled by a desire to 
control, arrest or regulate the fluid riverine environments and to rearrange and order 
hydro-social relations. I have approached these fixing efforts as elements of resource-
making processes that seek to render the Mekong’s riverine flows and environments more 
‘productive’, investable and exploitable, as well as governable and controllable. The central 
research question for my work has been how water resources are made and governed 
in the Mekong Region, through what kind of rationales, techniques and power relations, 
and with what effects, especially in terms of the consequent new power formations and 
implications for the lives of the Mekong’s riverine residents. To answer this the 
analysis covers various efforts fused with power relations that enable and shape water 
resourcification and result in new hydrosocial orderings. Hydropower development, while 
important, is only one of the examined modes of hydrosocial ordering. Others include 
hydraulic infrastructuring efforts in the form of flood and saline water control, as well as 
irrigation schemes, broader basin management schemes, technoscientific knowledge-
making and the attempts to govern climate change that materialise in hydraulic 
infrastructures. 
The study is grounded in a tradition of interpretive analytics and located at the interface of 
environmental and development studies. I have built my analysis on Foucault-inspired 
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research on development and environment, especially in the field of political ecology. 
Hence the focus on the governmental rationalities, discourses and technologies that shape 
water resourcification processes. Equally important is the interest in the consequential 
effects of these processes: the new power constellations, modes of hydrosocial ordering 
and relations of resource control. In other words, I have paid close attention to the 
reciprocally constitutive relations between resources and power formations. I have looked 
at how relations of power shape water resourcification, and on the other hand, how new 
relations of power are constituted and consolidated in relation to resource-making. The 
power formations (Li 2019) shaping and resulting from resource-making efforts include 
technoscientific, infrastructural, discursive, corporate and state powers. The analysis 
contributes to identification and untangling of the assemblages or the complex webs of 
relations shaping and forming the resourcification processes and thus also enables 
reflection on the distributed responsibilities at stake.  
The approach is also inspired by science and technology studies, taking seriously the 
importance of hydraulic expertise, technologies and infrastructures as well as the 
materiality of fluvial waters in the analysis of power formations. While fluvial 
environments and hydraulic infrastructures are, on the one hand, shaped by 
power/knowledge, they are not, on the other, entirely malleable, inhering instead 
potentialities to insert their own effects independent of the rationalities and intentionalities 
of the political authorities, planners and engineers. While the infrastructuring efforts often 
aim for ecological simplification, they may instead produce new socio-ecological 
complexities as well as newly volatile powers of water that may get further augmented by 
changing climate.  
The research contributes to studies of hydrosocial relations by examining the continuities 
and changes in Mekong water resourcification processes and their rationalisations and 
techniques. It also bridges the political-ecological research on water and climate change by 
examining how climate change-related discursive formations, techniques and policies have 
opened new space for hydraulic infrastructuring, especially hydropower dams. More 
broadly, the research provides new insights on the co-constitutive relations between 
resources and power formations as well as on the socio-spatial configurations that emerge 
from resource-making processes. This bears relevance on recent political ecology 
discussions on resource- and state-making (Bridge 2014, Lund 2016, Rasmussen and Lund 
2018) currently advanced also in the political ecology of water (Harris 2012; 2017, Menga 
and Swyngedouw 2018). It might also enrich frontier discussions which have evolved 
around transforming regimes of control over land and forests (e.g. Peluso and Lund 2011, 
Eilenberg 2014, Kelly and Peluso 2015) by exploring frontier dynamics in relation to water 
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resourcification. Moreover, the study responds to a recent call in studies of science and 
technology (Jasanoff 2015: 15) for studying more rigorously how technoscience and 
technical infrastructures are implicated in the possibilities of governing and thus in the 
formation and exercise of power.  
In the rest of this chapter I underline the importance of studying the entanglements of 
water and power and explain how I try to understand them by studying attempts at fixing 
the fluid, fluvial flows of water and riverine relationalities. I shed light on some of the key 
conceptualisations of this study, which are further elaborated in Chapter 2. I also sketch 
out global trajectories of damming rivers, explain why the Mekong offers an intriguing 
window onto understanding changing modes of hydraulic infrastructuring in the global 
South and highlight what is at stake with all these drastic changes. I then elaborate my 
research questions in more detail, explaining how they are addressed in each article of this 
study.  
1.1 HYDROSOCIAL ORDERING, WATER RESOURCIFICATION AND HYDRAULIC 
INFRASTRUCTURING  
Water is a condition of liveability. It is also integral to all economic activities, agricultural 
as well as industrial. The rendering/directing of water to these uses has increasingly 
implied resourcification and commodification. Because of its essentiality in all productive 
processes, water is susceptible to different attempts at political control over it (Krause and 
Strang 2013). Yet water’s fundamentality to life also means that the attempts to 
commodify and control it are continuously open to contestations and conflicts (Bakker 
2012), which, in turn, are often attempted to be stabilised, depoliticised and rendered 
governable with newly structured modes of hydrosocial ordering. Nonetheless, while 
water figures prominently in today’s headlines, it often does so within apolitical frames. 
One persistent water topic relates to concerns over a water crisis within the frames of 
increasing water scarcity (e.g. World Economic Forum 2011). Scarcity frames water in 
terms of absolute quantities while side-lining considerations on how it is distributed to 
different groups of people through different ways of governing it, and excluding ways of 
perceiving and approaching water as something other than an inert resource (Mehta 2005; 
2010). Water is increasingly topical also through climate change. The IPCC reports (Bates 
et al. 2008, IPCC 2018) highlight that climate change materialises most concretely through 
water: either there is too much of it and in the ‘wrong’ places, as in devastating floods, or 
there is too little as in distressing draughts. Yet often the climate change perspective 
naturalises these events, obscuring how many of them are not only caused by changing 
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climate but, rather, co-produced by previous decisions on water use and by efforts to 
govern water. The river systems in particular have been modified, engineered and 
infrastructured at an accelerated pace. According to Williams et al. (2014:61), ‘rivers have 
been more thoroughly re-engineered by humans than any other geomorphic feature’.  
Bringing hydrosocial relations to the centre of focus means approaching water flows 
through their various engagements with social and political relationships. It means that 
water flows are not something external and pre-given but continuously shaped by social, 
economic and political relationships and marked by power differentials: the ways water 
moves and gets distributed is socially, economically and politically inflicted, at the same 
time as socio-political formations are shaped by water (Swyngedouw 1999; 2009, Krause 
2017). In the circulation of water, nature and society are fused together. Accordingly, 
water flows through our societies (in more or less disrupted ways) not in hydrological but 
rather in hydrosocial cycles (Swyngedouw 2009, Linton and Budds 2014). With the 
concept of hydrosocial ordering I explicitly bring into focus the relations of power 
(including relations of governing and control as well as infrastructuring), and how ways of 
governing water are intimately connected to ways of governing people. I use the concept 
of ordering because it covers and bridges the vast array of power modalities that are at 
stake in this work from governmental to sovereign, and from the more discursive to the 
most materialised forms of arranging relations between people and things (Law 2003, 
Dean 2013). The hydrosocial relations at the centre in this study are riverine. With the 
concept of fluvial relationalities I refer to all kinds of riverine hydrosocial relations 
including the multispecies entanglements (Haraway 2016) between fluvial flows, 
sediments, fisheries, riverine people and modes of organising lives and livelihoods around 
river use. When rivers meet the sea, as for example in the Mekong Delta, fluvial 
relationalities also get entangled with marine or oceanic relationalities.  
In this study, I examine attempts to fix the fluid, to transform the fluidity characteristic of 
fluvial waters and fluvial relationalities, into a dependency on the fixed, and, in the case of 
most hydraulic infrastructuring efforts, into a dependency on solid built structures. I am 
especially interested in the processes that resourcify fluvial waters, which have a common 
aim of intervening, rearranging and fixing hydrosocial relations so that they are rendered 
more controllable, allowing the optimisation of certain, limited affordances of water to 
intensified productive uses. At its very core I approach resourcification as a condition for 
orderability and governability as well as a condition for commodification. Resourcification 
is thus a broader process than commodification, entailing processes that could be 
conceptualised as meta-commodification (Biggs 2008). Modern resourcification entails 
externalisation and objectification of water, and in the case of fluvial waters, alienation 
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(Tsing 2015) and disentanglement of water as H2O from its manifold riverine relations 
with sediments, fisheries and people, as well as from the multiple meanings attached to it 
(Bakker 2002, Linton 2010). Technoscientific inscription devices like hydrological models 
may enact this disentanglement abstractly while hydraulic infrastructuring like large dams 
or flood control dikes do this very materially. 
Techno-scientific knowledge production and hydraulic infrastructuring reorganise not 
only fluvial flows but also hydrosocial relations and are thus co-constitutive of new power 
formations (Swyngedouw 1999, Mitchell 2014, Morita 2016). Hydraulic infrastructure 
enables and stabilises particular kinds of hydrosocial orderings while often foreclosing 
others. Larger scale infrastructures re-scale power relations by creating new sites or nodes 
for authoritative decision-making. Hydraulic infrastructures also disrupt fluvial 
relationalities, thereby making obsolete previous ways of organising life around them, 
meanwhile suspending previous modes of controlling and making decisions over riverine 
uses. Thus they entangle with the establishment of new regimes of resource control also 
assisting in cementing them in place. Different modes of hydrosocial ordering and 
hydraulic infrastructuring thus rearrange power relations, and the large-scale water-works 
in particular are susceptible for opening new avenues for expert, state and corporate 
power formations. I also demonstrate that the ordering capacities inherent to hydraulic 
infrastructures can be multivalent, meaning that at times they may get newly geared to 
differing political and economic purposes.   
Efforts to fix the fluid and attempts to make ‘the fluid to depend on the solid’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 363) often imply a move from amphibious to terrestrial 
infrastructuring and environment-making. A major part of hydraulic engineering projects 
have centred on land reclamation, drainage and irrigation. The ‘hydraulic missions’ (Molle 
et al. 2009) that have transformed river basins through dams and large-scale irrigation 
schemes, especially in the early and mid-decades of the 20th century, were animated by a 
high-modern rationale (Scott 1998). They also epitomise what Jensen (2017: 225) has 
called attempts to manage ‘amphibious spaces through terrestrial approaches’ that are 
premised on impounding water and in demarcating clearly the boundaries between land 
and water (Lahiri-Dutt 2014), in contrast to more amphibious approaches that would 
organise life around moving waters and the constant variations in wetlands and other 
watery lands (Lahiri-Dutt 2014, Jensen 2017). Modern hydraulic infrastructuring efforts 
have thus centred on terrestrialising riverine relationalities (Morita 2016, Krause 2017, 
Richardson 2018). The fixing efforts never really achieve the aimed for fixity: the verbal 
form of fixing and infrastructuring draws attention to the on-goingness of the ordering 
efforts (Blok et al. 2016). 
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The terrestrialising hydraulic missions in the colonial or postcolonial contexts of the global 
South have often entailed ‘hydraulic Orientalism’ (Linton 2010: 123). In other words, 
attempts to resourcify rivers have been based on certain, often implicit and unexamined, 
assumptions about rivers in temperate European and North American climates. In the 
Mekong Region this has meant that the pulsating temporalities characteristic of monsoon 
rivers have appeared as something to be rectified and disciplined (Sneddon and Fox 2006, 
Sneddon 2015). Terrestrialising hydrosocial ordering and infrastructuring is thus 
combined with what I would call - inspired by Frewer (2016) - an acclimatising approach, 
which aims to temper, if not to omit, the seasonal climatic changes in water’s affordances 
to assist efforts to secure more stabilised systems of agro-industrial production. My 
research shows that, at the scale of the Mekong Delta, this fusion of terrestrialising and 
acclimatising attempts has materialised in infrastructures that aim to secure year-round 
separation of water and land by keeping floods or brackish water out of previous 
wetlands. I also demonstrate how the predominant ways of approaching climate change 
add new meanings and also new kind of plausibility for acclimatisation through hydraulic 
infrastructuring. In the next section, I discuss how dams have become central to changes 
in river-society relations and how damming rivers that in the past often aligned with 
acclimatisation efforts at the scale of the Basin, currently advance mostly through 
enclavistic projects that optimise the affordances of water principally in terms of electricity 
production. 
1.2 THE MEKONG AS MIRROR TO GLOBAL WAVES OF DAMMING RIVERS AND 
THE MORPHING OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 
Large dams are amongst the key technologies used for hydrosocial ordering and also 
amongst the most massive infrastructure projects worldwide (Nüsser and Baghel 2017). 
Large dams and the changes in how they are developed can be seen as epitomising 
broader changes in global development and environmental governance. Dams have 
morphed from triumphs of modernisation and ‘temples of modernity’, as India’s Prime 
Minister Nehru famously stated in the 1950s, to embodiments of the failures of high-
modernist schemes, only to be transformed again to contested carriers of sustainable 
development and climate change agendas (Scott 1998, Kaika 2006, Molle 2009). Changes 
in dam development also reflect the way infrastructure projects in the global South have 
been increasingly promoted as private and financialised assets (Hildyard 2016, Ahlers 
2020). Moreover, changes in dam development reflect changes in the geographies and 
geopolitics of global development (Sneddon 2015, Hirsch 2016, Mohan and Tan-Mullins 
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2019). While in the post-war period dams were intimately entwined with US Cold War 
geopolitics and rivalries between the US and the Soviet Union, the more recent re-
surgence of hydropower seems to reflect the end of the era dominated by the 
Washington-based Bretton Woods institutions and the ‘rise of China’. The dam 
development trajectories in the Mekong Region are illustrative of these changes. 
The first wave of resourcifying and damming rivers 
The first wave of damming rivers started in the early 20th century, rising and globalising 
steadily in the post-war period, peaking in the 1970s and continuing until the 1990s. By 
the end of the 20th century, 45,000 dams had been built in 140 countries (WCD 2000). 
The way dam plans entered the Mekong Region reflect how the 20th century damming of 
rivers evolved in many parts of the global South. An imagined geography of the Mekong 
as a ‘basin’ and its fluvial waters as a ‘resource’ with exploitable potential and in need of 
improvements through hydraulic infrastructuring started to take shape intensively at the 
end of the 1950s, with the decisive involvement of US experts and foreign policymakers 
(Bakker 1999, Sneddon 2015). The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which epitomised 
the unified river basin development rationale and technologies developed in the 1930s, 
evolved into a kind of flagship ‘export model’ of US post-war development aid and a 
template on the basis of which thousands of river basins were developed in the global 
South, the Mekong being one of them (Scott 1998: 170, Molle 2009, Sneddon 2015). In 
TVA-influenced schemes, large dams formed the key technology for bringing rivers under 
‘total control’ (Molle 2009; 2017) serving not only the production of hydroelectricity but 
also flood control and irrigation, thus fuelling agricultural modernisation, industrialisation 
and economic growth. The exported North American technoscientific expertise got 
deeply enmeshed with US foreign policy pursuits of extending and territorialising the US 
geopolitical power, perhaps nowhere as intensively as in the Mekong Region. There the 
American engineers and their riparian colleagues planned massive dam schemes with the 
aim of taming both the unruly fluvial waters of the monsoon climate and the unruly rural 
populations feared for their deemed potential to fuel the spread of communism.  
Technopolitical interventions, however, steadily evolved into more military ones, the 
region devolved into a series of wars and conflicts, and most projects got derailed. Until 
the 1990s the Mekong actually remained one of the least dammed large river basins in the 
world. From the 1960s to the 1980s only one major tributary dam, Nam Ngum in Laos, 
was built, along with some smaller scale tributary dams in Thailand. Other rivers in 
Thailand and Vietnam, however, were developed. Characteristic of the 20th century dams 
in the global South, they were supported by United States (in Thailand), Soviet Union (in 
Vietnam) or the World Bank (Pak Mun dam in Thailand), and they formed public assets in 
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the sense of being built and operated by host country state agencies (Hirsch 2010, Ahlers 
et al. 2017). 
While plans to turn Mekong into a regulated and fully controlled river system through a 
cascade of dams got shelved, the legacies of perceiving the Mekong as a basin that could 
be integrally managed and planned have been powerful. As discussed in Article I, the ‘full 
control’ idea materialised to the fullest sense in the Mekong Delta, although in a 
downscaled form without the upstream dams, through integrated systems of high dikes 
for flood control and saline water prevention. The image of the Mekong as ‘ripe for 
development and improvement if only the appropriate technologies and knowledge could 
be applied’ (Sneddon 2015: 122) has also partially persisted in a morphed, eco-modern 
form in the work of the current Mekong River Commission, as discussed in Article II. 
Furthermore, seeing the free-flowing Mekong tributaries and mainstream as untapped 
opportunities for hydroelectricity production and wealth creation could be seen as leaving 
a legacy to the current Mekong dam rush. 
In the 1990s, the global scene of dam development changed drastically as the result of the 
social movements of the 1980s all around the world, mobilising large and steadily 
converging campaigns against them. Large dams were no longer just emblems of progress; 
instead they became increasingly synonymous with destroyed riverine ecologies, 
development-induced displacements, impoverishment, corruption and people’s struggles 
for social and environmental justice (McCully 2001, Khagram 2004, Goldman 2005). One 
of the most prolific anti-dam campaigns was the Narmada movement against the Sardar 
Sardovar dam in India, which eventually forced its key supporter, the World Bank, to 
withdraw from the project. The contestations over dams culminated in the establishment 
of the World Commission on Dams (WCD). With the Commission’s influential report 
(WCD 2000), many of the problems related to large dams shifted from matters of 
counter-expertise to widely acknowledged facts (Khagram 2004). The WCD estimated 
that 40-80 million persons from 1960 to 1990 were displaced and famously noted that ‘In 
too many cases an unacceptable and often unnecessary price has been paid… especially in 
social and environmental terms, by people displaced, by communities downstream, by 
taxpayers and by the natural environment’ (WCD 2000: xxviii). Later research has 
complemented the figures showing that by 2010 nearly 500 million people had suffered 
from effects detrimental to river-based livelihoods, especially in terms of fisheries, that the 
WCD had partially overlooked (Richter et al. 2010). After the establishment of the 
Commission not only the World Bank but also other multilateral development banks that 
had been important supporters of dam development withdrew from many projects and 
the funding for dams dropped dramatically (Richter et al. 2010). It looked like the era of 
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damming rivers was coming to an end. The last project World Bank funded before its 
temporary exit from hydropower was the Pak Mun dam on a Mekong tributary in 
Thailand (Middleton 2018). It aroused one of the, thus far, most intensive anti-dam 
struggles in the Mekong region, with strong local mobilisation that perpetually 
transnationalised and was included in the projects that the WCD reviewed (Foran and 
Manorom 2009). 
The second wave of hydropower and the Mekong dam rush 
Now large-scale dams are making a come-back at a rapidly accelerating rate. Plans for 
large dams are proliferating, especially in the Amazon Basin, in various African river 
basins and in the Mekong Basin (Zarfl et al. 2015). If all the plans go forward, global 
hydropower capacity will be increased, rather strikingly, by over 70 percent (Zarfl et al. 
2015), the planet’s river volume affected by dams would increase from the current 48 to 
93 percent (Grill et al. 2015) while the damming of the three most biodiverse river basins 
– Mekong, Amazon and Congo – will put one-third of the world’s freshwater fisheries at 
risk (Winemiller et al. 2016). 
Map 1 illustrates the state of large dams in the mainstream and tributaries of the Mekong 
Basin. Almost all the constructed dams have been finished within the past ten years and 
the next decade is set to be marked by intensive further development. What is different 
now is that, firstly, the dam developers and financiers are more diverse; the private sector 
is more engaged and new countries, most importantly China, have moved to the centre 
stage. Secondly, the rationales, justificatory discourses and techno-scientific practices are 
also more diverse (Sneddon 2015, Ahlers et al. 2017). In an attempt to re-legitimise 
hydropower, dam proponents have discursively repurposed dams to serve poverty 
alleviation, environmental sustainability and climate change mitigation. At the same time, 
however, the era of multipurpose dams seems to be gone. The increasing private sector 
involvement gears the projects more forcefully towards optimisation of hydroelectricity 
sales. The multi-purposing of single purpose dams is contradictory, as will become evident 
through the analysis of this study. 
The changes in 21st century dams are not only intensively present in the Mekong but also 
partially created there. This is especially so of the new sustainability standards and 
mechanisms created in response to earlier condemnations of dams. The World Bank, 
together with other heavily criticised key proponents of hydropower like the International 
Hydropower Association, did not want to comply entirely with the recommendations of 
the World Commission on Dams nor give up on hydropower. Instead, they have 
attempted to make the development of hydropower consensual by developing their own 
more pro-corporate approaches, partially incorporating the pro-poor and environmentalist 
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objectives of their previous adversaries. The Bank re-entered hydropower with the Nam 
Theun 2 project in Laos, as examined in Article III. Two years after the inauguration of 
the dam, a World Bank representative announced that moving away from large 
hydropower was a mistake, boldly summarising: ‘That was then. This is now. We are 
back.’ (Schneider 2013). Nam Theun 2 has come to symbolise the revival of the 
hydropower industry globally. It has also become a key reference point for attempts to 
authorise claims that large dams can be built sustainably (Middleton 2018). Nam Theun 2 
has thus been central not only in the creation of a new justificatory discourse of 
‘sustainable hydropower’ but also in the attempts of various hydropower proponents to 
validate the claims of sustainable hydropower. Resonating with the thesis of Boltanski and 
Chiapello (2007: 27) that the survival and robustness of capitalism rest on its continuous 
capacity to discover ‘routes to its survival in critiques of it’, the World Bank, a kind of 
‘cadre organisation’ of capitalist order, was not decisively weakened by the attacks against 
it but instead managed to renew itself through associations it built with its opposition and 
through a partial incorporation of the environmentalist agenda (Goldman 2005).  
The second factor contributing to the building momentum for the large dam come-back is 
climate change.  It figures centrally in attempts to move hydropower beyond disputes. 
Articles III and IV demonstrate how the ways climate change is rendered governable 
relate to the consensualisation of large dams and other large-scale hydraulic 
infrastructuring. On the one hand, the attempts to portray dams as key technologies for 
the climate change combat seem conditioned by the ability of dam proponents to 
demonstrate that large dams can be fixed; on the other, climate frames tend to override 
and governance mechanisms obfuscate the adverse social and environmental effects of 
dams that were so central in the 1990s dam debate. The climate change mitigation efforts 
materialising in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) dams have turned dams into 
producers of tradable emission reductions. By the end of 2019, 2,185 hydropower CDM 
projects had been registered producing the mechanism’s highest share of emission 
reductions (UNEP DTU 2019). In the Mekong, the relation between hydroelectricity and 
emission reduction production is equally tight. For example, in Cambodia and Laos most 
of the CDM projects are hydropower projects and they produce the highest emission 
reduction share, and concomitantly, a high share of the recently built hydropower projects 
are CDM projects.   
Thirdly, 21st century dams are increasingly private assets (Merme et al. 2014, Ahlers 2020). 
The World Bank and other development banks have promoted their own decentering 
through the neoliberal privatisation and investor-friendly policies they have advanced. 
With the promotion of Public Private Partnership-based concessionary contracts, they 
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have aimed to make infrastructure, including hydropower dams, an attractive asset class 
for private investors (Romero 2015, Hildyard 2016). In the hydropower sector this 
concessionary approach most commonly materialises in the Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) model. In Laos and Cambodia all of the post-1990s, second-wave large dams are 
BOT projects. It practically means that rivers are made investable by concessioning them 
for 25-45 years for different types of business consortiums motivated by maximisation of 
revenues from electricity sales. With the rise of investor friendly concessionary dams, it 
seems that the 20th century amalgamation of river basin planning and the large dam 
development, eloquently examined by Sneddon (2015), is increasingly disjointed. The 
individual hydropower projects going ahead do not have much to do with integrated basin 
management plans which are still promoted by the Mekong River Commission. Instead 
they are separate enclavistic projects and their operation mode is determined by the 
motivations of their concessionaires. 
Fourthly, the capacities and resources to build dams are now differently distributed, as 
well as newly concentrated. In Brazil and India, dam development has become a more 
domestic affair. China, which dammed its rivers at the highest rate globally during the 
1970s and 1980s (WCD 2000), has evolved into a global powerhouse for hydropower 
development. In fact, hydropower is one of the key sectors in which the ‘rise of China’ has 
very concretely materialised in the Mekong Region as well as globally. Dams have formed 
a central part of China’s ‘Going Out’ strategy and the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. Currently 
Chinese companies and banks are the biggest builders and financiers of hydropower dams 
in the global South while the largest share of the projects is concentrated in Southeast 
Asia, particularly in the Mekong Region (Urban et al. 2018, Siciliano et al. 2019). At least 
40 percent of the on-going or proposed tributary and mainstream Lower Mekong dam 
projects are to be carried out by Chinese state-owned companies (Hirsch 2011, IR 2014). 
In Cambodia, which has become China’s closest ally in Southeast Asia, all the large dams 
have been, thus far at least, concessioned to Chinese companies. The projects have, in 
fact, presented a formative experience for the Chinese hydropower industry in 
undertaking large, long-term overseas BOT hydropower projects (Urban et al. 2018, 
Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2019). In Laos the dam concessionaires are diverse, importantly 
including private Thai and state-owned Vietnamese companies, and in a lesser quantity of 
other Asian and European companies. Also Chinese investors and developers are 
increasingly involved in the Lao hydropower sector (Matthews and Motta 2015, Tan 
2015). While the Chinese investors and developers make use of the neoliberal, private-
sector-oriented concessionary mode of developing dams, they effectively also blur 
public/private boundaries through the dominating role of state-owned enterprises and 
export credit agencies. Article V demonstrates how concessionary deals get entangled with 
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bilateral Sino-Cambodian relations, showing that concessionary dams do not only 
concentrate corporate powers but also end up furthering new concentrations of China’s 





Map 1: Existing and planned large dams in the Mekong Basin in 2019. In Laos all the dam projects are within the basin. In 
Cambodia there are also 5 large dam projects situated in rivers outside of the Basin. These are marked in the map as ‘Other 
dams’. The dam projects in Thailand and Vietnam outside of the Basin are not marked here as they are not examined in this 
study. The dam projects examined or mentioned in this study are labelled with their name. (The map is created by Matti Kummu) 
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1.3 WHAT IS AT STAKE?  
The 4,763-km-long Mekong is the 8th largest (by flow) and 12th longest river in the world 
(MRC 2019). It starts its course in the Tibetan Plateau and meets the South China Sea in 
the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. The river gives its name not only to the Mekong Basin 
(Map 1), but also to the broader Mekong Region, often considered to consist of Yunnan 
province in China, and the whole territories of Myanmar/Burma, Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia and Vietnam through which the river runs through1. The basin, especially the 
parts in Laos and Cambodia, has recently emerged as a frontier for intensive water 
resourcification and hydraulic infrastructuring. New large-scale irrigation schemes are 
being planned in both countries (Blake and Barney 2018, Blake 2019), but even more 
consequential are the massive damming efforts (MRC 2019).  Around 200 large-scale (>15 
MW) dam projects are in various stages of development (78 commissioned, 33 under 
construction and 89 proposed), most of which are situated in Laos (Geheb and 
Suhardiman 2019, WLE 2018). The way the affordances of the Mekong are increasingly 
reduced to hydroelectricity production puts at stake its sustenance of one of the world’s 
richest, if not the richest, inland fisheries, and one of the richest rice production areas in 
the world, and thus the ways the Mekong sustains the livelihoods of the Basin’s riverine 
people and the food security of the whole region (Sabo et al. 2017).  
The Basin is often divided into two parts: the Upper and Lower Mekong Basins. The 
mountainous Upper Mekong Basin or Lancang is situated in China with a small part 
shared with Myanmar. It comprises a third of the Basin and contributes 6 percent of its 
wet season and 24 percent of its dry season flows. Of the total hydropower potential of 
the Mekong Basin, estimated at 53,000 MW (MRC 2010) or 60,000 MW (T. Räsänen et al. 
2018), around 23 000 MW is in the upper section. A major part of that potential has been 
recently realised by a cascade of 11 mainstream, and 8 more are likely to be accomplished 
in the near future. The Lower Mekong Basin, comprising the main share of the Basin and 
characterised more by lowlands and floodplains, hosts around 60 million people in 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.  
The Thai portion in the northeast of the country contains mainly rural areas and has been 
targeted by ambitious but only partially realised irrigation schemes (Floch and Molle 
2013). Laos is almost completely within the Basin. Its rugged topography provides the 
highest hydropower potential of the Lower Basin, with estimates ranging from 18,000 
 
1 The Mekong Region does not have very strict definition but its use has become common through the more specific ‘geo-
economic’ (Hirsch 2016) construction of Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) which, in addition to Yunnan includes also the 
province of Guangxi. It is a program of economic regionalisation fostered and supported by the Asian Development Bank 
and the World Bank, materialising especially in different infrastructural projects that advance regional connectivity.  
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MW up to 27,000 MW of which 5,308 MW had been developed by 2018 (IHA 2019). 
From the perspective of the Thai energy sector and investors, the high affordances of 
these riverine flows if converted into electricity are not only conveniently close-by but also 
expediently situated in a strictly controlled political environment where mass mobilisations 
against dams, as previously experienced in Thailand, are far less unlikely. The largest 
hydropower projects in Laos have thus far been developed by Thai investors and 
companies and they mainly feed the Thai electricity grid. In some cases, the Lao grid has 
been bypassed entirely. By 2025 Laos expects to export 9,000 MW of electricity (mainly 
hydroelectricity) annually to Thailand and 5,000 MW to Vietnam, and by 2030 the 
government estimates the export to amount to 20,000 MW (Vientiane Times/ANN 
2020). At the same time, the Mekong and its tributaries in many ways sustain the 
agriculture and fisheries-based livelihoods of the country’s predominantly rural, riverine 
residents.  
Cambodia also lies almost entirely within the Basin. It is here that the Mekong fisheries 
are of highest relative importance, both in terms of subsistence and commercially, with an 
18 percent contribution to the GDP, which is higher than contribution from rice 
production (MRC 2018). The flood-pulse based ecology of the Tonle Sap Lake and its 
flooded forests sustain remarkably rich fisheries, making the Mekong’s inland fisheries the 
largest in the world estimated to account for 40 percent of world’s total inland fisheries 
(MRC 2018). Cambodian hydropower potential within the Basin amounts to up to 9,000 
MW (ADB 2018), of which 400 MW is now built through the Lower Sesan II tributary 
dam. Most of the potential outside of the basin has already been built (1,380 MW), as the 
Kamchay and the Tatay, Atay and Russei Churum dams analysed in Article V, have been 
accomplished. The remaining pressure for future hydropower is, thus, mainly on the 
Mekong, including the highly controversial mainstream dam, Sambor (2,600 MW) that is 
at least temporarily suspended. In Vietnam, part of the Basin resides on the highlands, 
where tributary dams have been built, but the Vietnamese part mostly consists of the 
Mekong Delta, the main rice growing and aquaculture area of the country and of the 
whole Basin. 
While the affordances of the Mekong are diverse in different parts of the Basin, and also 
somewhat differently valued by the riparian states, Cambodia and especially Vietnam 
being most concerned on upstream dam developments, on a certain level the 
developmental aspirations of the riparian states seem to converge in how they are geared 
towards large-scale infrastructuring that optimises only very limited affordances of water 
either to hydroelectricity or industrial agriculture while disallowing or doing away many 
other affordances capable of sustaining various livelihoods by complex fluvial 
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relationalities, most importantly in the form of fisheries. As explained in Article II, at 
times agencies such as the Mekong River Commission conceived that the maximisation of 
hydroelectricity and industrial agriculture could be made mutually supportive or 
compatible but now even the Commission’s assessments (MRC 2017) indicate that the 
maximisation of hydroelectricity excludes almost all other affordances of riverine flows.  
The mosaics of livelihoods of the 60 million predominantly rural riverine people in the 
Lower Mekong Basin are those most threatened by the hydropower development. The 
tens of thousands of people adjacent to planned dams are at risk of being displaced with 
little prospects of getting their livelihoods restored. People further away from the actual 
dam sites, in turn, are affected with the cascading effects of the dams especially 
accumulating in Cambodia and Vietnam. The dams, particularly the tributary dams with 
largest water detention capacities, cumulatively produce drastic water flow alterations 
(Lauri et al. 2012, Cochrane et al. 2014, Räsänen et al. 2017)	which, for example, threaten 
to unsettle the Tonle Sap hydro-ecologies and damage its exceptionally rich fisheries (Ziv 
et al. 2012, Arias et al. 2014). Moreover, the dams hold back not only water but also 
sediment and fish migrations and thus disrupt fluvial relationalities in fundamental ways. 
Together the flow-altering and fish-migration-blocking effects of the mainstream and 
tributary dams pose a serious threat to the fisheries (Baran and Myschowoda 2009, Ziv et 
al. 2012, Stone 2016). If they go ahead unabated, the result may amount to a 40 percent 
loss of the Basin’s fisheries by 2030 (ICEM 2010) and 40-80 percent by 2040, seriously 
injuring the lives of the 40 million people involved in fisheries (MRC 2017), as well as the 
food security in Laos and Cambodia where most of the protein comes from Mekong fish 
(Orr et al. 2012).  
The way the dams trap sediment is, in turn, most consequential for the Mekong Delta 
(Kummu et al. 2010, Kondolf et al. 2014, T. Räsänen et al. 2018), the world’s third largest 
delta, which sustains around 20 million people, produces half of Vietnam’s food and 
forms one of the world’s most productive rice growing areas. Currently most of Vietnam’s 
rice is produced there, of which a large part is exported to Southeast Asia (Anthony et al. 
2015). By separating fluvial waters from sediments, the dams threaten to weaken the delta-
building powers of fluvial waters drastically, especially in relation to oceanic waters 
empowered by climate change (Chapman et al. 2016). The dams thus amplify the effects 
of climate change (MRC 2017) and further vulnerabilise an area often ranked among the 
top ten most vulnerable to climate change (Germanwatch 2019). In addition to dams, the 
increasing sand mining in different parts of the river, including within the delta, also starve 
fluvial waters of sediment (Kondolf et al. 2018). This resonates with how, on a smaller 
scale, another highly climate-vulnerable coastal area of the Mekong Region, the 
17 
 
Cambodian southwestern coast, is further vulnerabilised by a combination of dams and 
sand mining, as explained in Article V. In the Mekong Delta of Vietnam the picture is 
further complicated by the powers of the existing large-scale hydraulic infrastructure, as 
discussed in Article I, which exert their own effects on how upstream impacts, and 
climatic change co-produce, new deltaic vulnerabilities.   
At stake is also the autonomy of riverine people to decide on their own modes of using 
the rivers, organising livelihoods and relating and living with the rivers. Large-scale dams, 
and often other large-scale hydraulic infrastructures as well, are almost by definition 
dispossessory as they radically alter riverine ecologies, diminish the possibilities of diverse 
and decentralised river use and re-scale power relations, tending toward more centralised 
control of riverine resources (Boelens et al. 2016, Ahlers et al. 2017). 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE OF THE (SYN)THESIS 
The main objective of this thesis has been the tracing and analysis of different aspects and 
consequences of water resourcification and hydro-social ordering efforts in the Mekong 
Region. My overarching question – ‘How are water resources made and governed in the 
Mekong Region and with what effects?’ – implies, on the one hand, attention to how 
changing relations of power, including power/knowledge relations, shape the 
development of hydraulic infrastructures. This entails analysis of the changing 
governmental assemblages that shape hydraulic development. One of the key arguments 
of the thesis is that there is no single rationale that could explain the current dynamics but, 
rather, an interplay of different rationales, practices and techniques in which the legacies 
of past plans, decisions and endeavours also play a role, as do pre-existing water 
infrastructures and the powers of fluvial waters. On the other hand, the question implies 
attention to how, in turn, the new hydraulic schemes rearrange relations of power and 
change the lives of riverine people. Sub-questions that contribute to the overarching 
question of the thesis are addressed in separate articles and are as follows: 
1) How have the hydrosocial relations in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam been 
ordered and rendered governable, and with what effects? (Article I) 
2) How is the Mekong Basin assembled and rendered knowable, and with what 
effects? (Article II)  
3) How is the new model of sustainable hydropower produced, in what kinds of 
projects does it materialise and how does it enable new hydropower 
development? (Article III) 
4) How does climate change figure in and enable the development of hydraulic 
infrastructure, including hydropower dams? (Articles III, IV and V)  
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5) What kinds of governing logics shape the turning of rivers into producers of 
hydroelectricity in Cambodia, how do hydropower projects get entangled with 
other processes of resource-making, and with what effects? (Article V) 
 
I examine the first sub-question in Article I by looking at how the Delta’s hydrosocial 
relations have been ordered by different rounds of hydraulic infrastructuring efforts, often 
planned from afar and with aspirations not only limited to land reclamation and the 
optimisation of the water’s affordances to rice mono-cropping, but also at taming the 
Delta’s residents who are often perceived as unruly. I look at how attempts to establish 
simplified hydrological and social governability from a distance have resulted instead in 
increased socio-ecological complexity. I also discuss how the initially bracketed ‘side-
effects’ have accumulated to the point that they problematise the successfulness of 
attempted terrestrialisation and acclimatisation of agriculture through large-scale hydraulic 
control schemes. I am also attentive to the powers of techno-scientific inscriptions, as well 
as those of infrastructures and fluvial waters. Moreover, I highlight how hydraulic 
infrastructuring schemes can be re-purposed to serve differing socio-political aims.  
The second sub-question is addressed in Article II in which I examine the Mekong River 
Commission’s (MRC) knowledge production.  I analyse how assessments based on 
hydrological models enact the Basin as an object of governing and turn riverine flows into 
a(n orderly) manageable resource. Article II looks at how Basin development is rendered 
technical via expert knowledge and participation which together have attempted to 
produce and guarantee a realm for Basin-wide development planning beyond disputes. 
Overall, it explains how the MRC has contributed in constituting the Mekong as a frontier 
for ‘sustainable’ water resourcification via establishing facts on its development potential.  
The third sub-question is addressed in Article III by looking at how a model of 
‘sustainable hydropower’ has been constructed in the project of Nam Theun 2, the largest 
Mekong tributary dam situated in Laos. I especially examine the role of the World Bank 
and its will to improve and fix hydropower with new techniques of assessments, 
monitoring and compensation in order to contain previous critique and to consensualise 
hydropower. I show how the Nam Theun 2 has at the same time succeeded in resulting in 
a more ‘benign’ project than most of its predecessors while failing to deliver on the 
promises that would make the project qualify as sustainable and pro-poor. I argue that, in 
Laos, Nam Theun 2 has remained a ‘sustainability enclave’ (Whitington 2012) but also 
paved the way for the current dam rush of projects with much less sustainable safeguard 
mechanisms. Nam Theun 2 has also contributed to the resurgence of hydropower globally 
(Middleton 2018). While the Nam Theun 2 has failed in delivering the ‘sustainability’ it 
promised and continues to be contested, it has been sustainable enough to be used in 
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potent re-legitimation attempts by hydropower proponents to validate the new 
justificatory discourse of ‘sustainable hydropower’.  
The fourth sub-question is addressed in Articles III, IV and V. Article III looks at how the 
re-legitimisation efforts of hydropower entangle with the rise of climate change agendas 
and how the World Bank has tried to consensualise its energy work, large dams in 
particular, by framing it as climate-friendly. Article IV, in turn, focuses on Cambodia and 
looks at how climate change approaches themselves are rendered technical and consensual 
in ways that create space for large-scale hydraulic infrastructure projects: irrigation 
schemes in adaptation and large-scale hydropower in mitigation. The analysis of how 
climate change governance connects with hydropower development through Clean 
Development Mechanisms begins in Article VI and is further elaborated in Article V 
through an examination of three CDM hydropower projects in the Southwest Cambodia. 
Articles IV and V both problematise the carbon reductionism of global carbon markets. 
Article V in particular shows how traded carbon commodities conceal the socio-ecological 
relations of their production, which in this case included histories of unconsulted and 
dispossessed fishers, exploited and maltreated construction workers, violent logging 
tycoons and intimidated forest communities.  
The fifth sub-question is addressed in Article V by looking at the interplay of different 
governing logics that shape hydropower projects in Cambodia and by examining how 
hydropower projects get entangled with other processes of resource-making and how 
these intersections are constitutive of new power formations. Article V explains how the 
concessionary mode of developing large hydropower dams materialises in enclaves of 
heightened corporate powers in which the de facto authority is concessioned to Chinese 
state-owned hydropower companies; it also shows how concessionary dams may 
contribute to state power consolidation, which in this case importantly happens through 
the ways the dams form part of broader Sino-Cambodian relations and how they interact 
with other schemes of resource control. The conceptualisation of overlapping zones of 
exclusion developed in Article V, enables to come to grips with the interactions between 
heterogeneous schemes of resource control that are often present and consequential in 
Southeast Asian resource-rich frontier sites but easily remain invisible.  
The outline for the rest of this synthesis is the following. The key concepts and theoretical 
approaches that organise the thinking and analysis throughout the thesis, especially in this 
summarising synthesis, are discussed in Chapter 2. The conceptualisations are discussed 
in a context-specific way, bringing forth the shaping of resource-making processes in the 
Mekong Region. The research materials and the methods of assembling and analysing 
them are presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the key findings of the composite 
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articles while also containing contextualising elements which assist in situating each article 
within the broader dynamics of resource-making in the Mekong Region. Chapter 5 puts 
the findings in closer dialogue with each other and further develops the connections 




2. KEY CONCEPTS AND RELATED 
THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS 
As I have already introduced key concepts that are directly linked to the analysis of 
hydrosocial relations—fluvial relationalities, hydrosocial ordering, water resourcification 
and hydraulic infrastructuring—this chapter moves on to the concepts and 
conceptualisations I use and develop to make sense of socio-ecological changes in the 
Mekong Region, addressing conceptual work which has relevance for analysis of recursive 
or co-constitutive relations between resources and power formations. The discussions 
here are not limited to water, although I concretise the arguments most explicitly in 
relation to rivers. At focus are the concepts of resource-making, governing rationales and 
techniques, frontiers, assemblages, and power effects: the analytical work they enable, how 
I understand the relations between them, and how this understanding is informed and 
inspired by related theoretical discussions.    
Early debates in political ecology revolved around questions of access to and control over 
resources (Watts 2000; 2015, Paulson et al. 2003), questions which are also significant in 
this study. More importantly, however, I am interested in complicating the question of 
resources by asking how riverine waters are produced as resources to be governed or 
exploited in the first place, and how the processes of water resourcification relate to 
changing regimes of exclusion from, access to and control over fluvial waters, fisheries 
and watery, riverine lands. In this way I take part in more recent political-ecological 
discussions that have increasingly expanded the meaning of the political in political 
ecology, a shift that is partly influenced by Foucauldian modes of inquiry drawing 
attention to knowledge-making processes and how they shape and enable certain modes 
of governing the environment while foreclosing on others (Fairhead and Leach 2003, 
Forsyth 2003, Rutherford 2007, Li 2007a). Resource-making is a pre-condition for 
commodification but it is also about the production of orderability and governability, 
which involves power/knowledge relations as well as material technologies and 
infrastructures that make ordering or governing ‘at a distance’ possible. This is what 
makes the Foucault and Latour-influenced analytics of governing (e.g. Rose and Miller 
1992) helpful in attempts to understand resource-making processes.  
In certain ways, my attempt of opening resourcification processes to closer examination is 
also connected to the recent ontological turn in political-ecological debates (Blaser 2009, 
Escobar 2010). The making of water resources creates conditions of possibility for very 
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specific human-water relations while excluding others (Linton 2010), thus also diminishing 
the space for other water ontologies (Yates et al. 2017). For example, some of the 
governing rationalisations and accounting and assessment techniques shaping resource-
making depoliticise and enable abstractions and commensurations in ways that obscure 
that at stake are not only questions of access to, and control over the same riverine 
resources but also differences in understanding, viewing, experiencing and enacting what 
rivers are. My analysis challenges the production of fixity in approaches that enact riverine 
waters rather exclusively as resources; it thus contributes to creating space for more fluid, 
diverse, situated, less over-riding and exclusive—as well as constantly evolving—
worldings and meaning-making processes connected with rivers and fluvial environments. 
2.1 RESOURCE-MAKING AND POWER FORMATIONS 
I start by focusing on resources and their making—that is, resourcification— highlighting 
and differentiating between the following key aspects: the production of resources as 
externalised nature; the production of orderable and governable resources (amenable to 
state control); the production of commodifiable and investable resources; and the making 
of exclusionary regimes that (hydro)territorially organise relations between people and 
resources. By discussing the ways they relate to each other I bring into focus the 
relationalities between technoscience, state and capital in resource-making processes. I 
also draw attention to relevant governing rationales and techniques, as well as modalities 
of power, that relate to or may accompany each of these aspects. Finally I elaborate more 
explicitly on the conceptualisation of recursive resources and power formations. The 
conceptual work in this section draws from and also establishes connections between 
scholarly discussions on the co-production of nature and society (Latour 1993) or science 
and social order (Fairhead and Leach 2003, Jasanoff 2004), of governmental rationalities 
and techniques (Rose and Miller 1992) and of resources and states (Bridge 2014, Lund 
2016).  
Resources are not entities or substances that just exist in the world, waiting to become 
utilised; they need to be made and brought into being (Bakker and Bridge 2006, Linton 
2010, Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014). At its core, resource-making entails an activity 
that could be termed the externalisation of nature, resulting in the modern bifurcation of 
the natural and social worlds, the object and subject, and science and politics (Latour 
1993; 2004). This externalisation takes place through forms of knowledge and 
technologies that reveal nature as a mechanical order of fixed laws and predictabilities: in 
Spinoza’s terms as fixed ‘natura naturata’ as opposed to ‘natura naturans’ consisting of 
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animate matter and beings that ceaselessly generate new forms and continuous occurrence 
through their entanglements (Bennet 2010: 117). Externalisation also allows a position of 
working upon ‘nature’ as opposed to working on socionatural relations from within them. 
In terms of resourcification of fluvial waters, the science of hydrology and technologies 
such as hydrological models have been essential in carving out rivers as water flows 
purified of, and excluded and abstracted from, their multispecies entanglements (Haraway 
2016) representing them as assessable and orderable fields of reality in which interventions 
can be planned (Linton 2010). This is how the complexity of fluvial relationalities gets 
reduced and simplified to manageable/orderable dimensions while enabling more or less 
limited modes of engaging with the enacted resources that range from extraction to 
conservation. The produced legibility of ‘nature’ or rivers is what makes ordering ‘at a 
distance’ possible. The ways in which rivers reveal themselves as orderable also affect 
ordering aspirations, creating positions for planners, engineers and administrators as 
ordering subjects. The technoscientific dimensions of resource-making establish pre-
conditions for producing ‘nature’ that both the state (Scott 1998) and capital (Ferguson 
2005) can see, and are formative of a range of assumptions about the possibilities and 
limits of resource controllability. The aspiration to produce controllable and orderable 
resources enabled by tools of simplification (Scott 1998) could be termed the 
technoscientific modernist rationality.  
In the most material terms, water resources come to exist through hydraulic 
infrastructuring, which also fixes and solidifies their orderability or, in other words, assists 
in stabilising particular orderings. Engineering and infrastructuring schemes enable and 
call for new ways of organising power relations: the larger the scale of the ordering and 
infrastructuring schemes, the more that centralised coordination and control are called 
upon and on offer. Yet it is important to note that hydraulic infrastructures do not imply 
any automatic or straightforward change in power formations as, for example, suggested 
by Wittfogel (1957) in his thesis on ‘hydraulic despotism’ and ‘total power’ (Banister 2014, 
Ley and Krause 2019).  
In the heyday of the Cold War, technoscientific modernist rationality took the form of 
high-modernism with an amended credo of rationally planned societal improvement 
schemes (Scott 1998). Embodiments of this includes the model of full river-basin control 
which was enabled and made plausible by advances in hydrological knowledge and 
infrastructural technologies (Linton 2010, Sneddon 2015). It was thus co-produced by 
high-modernist rationality and new techniques of governing rivers. As noted earlier, in the 
Mekong Basin this model of river basin development pursued terrestrialisation and 
acclimatisation of riverine modes of production. Technoscientific water resourcification, 
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especially in its high-modernist forms (Scott 1998), lends itself to expert power formations 
and hydraulic statecraft (Molle et al. 2009) if or when the concentrated abilities to control 
from a distance accrue to hydraulic planners within state bureaucracies in the form of new 
ordering competences. When technoscientific capacities are mobilised for hydraulic 
statecraft, the task of hydraulic knowledge production may become geared to the 
production of a river that ‘the state can see’ and thus govern (Scott 1998, Sneddon 2015). 
Large-scale hydraulic infrastructures, such as large dams, also provide the ‘means to 
demonstrate the strength of the modern state as a techno-economic power’ (Mitchell 
2002: 21) and provide the state with the appearance of a separate realm that orders nature 
and society (Harris 2012).  
Another aspect of resource-making relates to the creation of marketable entities or 
commodities. Resourcification is a pre-requirement for turning things into ‘capitalist 
assets’. For certain (socio)natural affordances to become tradeable entities they need to be 
turned into ‘stand-alone objects’ alienated from their ‘living-space entanglements’ and 
detached from their situated social relations (Tsing 2015: 5). In terms of technoscientific 
knowledge production, the metrics of simplification need to be tuned to producing 
externalised nature that ‘capital can see’ (Robertson 2006: 368, Ferguson 2005; 2006) by 
reducing the ‘grids’ of legibility and orderability to measurable and calculable qualities that 
make sense in terms of profitability. This entails assessment techniques and feasibility 
studies that estimate the economic value of the resources, such as those carried out on 
hydropower dams in the course of fluvial commodification. Efforts to commodify riverine 
flows often focus on only one riverine affordance at a time, as in the case of commercial 
hydropower dams which radically simplify rivers into a single commodity: hydroelectricity. 
The processes tuned to producing commodifiable resources are often less concerned 
about the broader orderability of riverine flows to different uses unless they threaten to 
diminish the affordances of the commodified resource.  
To become a commodity the economically valuable resource needs to be rendered 
investable, which, in addition to technoscientific tools of simplification, requires a 
property regime that enables and secures privatised forms of resource control (Li 2014). 
In the recent past the commodification of resources has been most forcefully advanced by 
the neoliberal governing rationale manifested in legislative and regulatory reforms that 
facilitate privatisation and corporate access to resources in market-based, investor-friendly 
ways (Castree 2003; 2008, Mansfield 2004, Bakker 2005). In many contexts, however, 
advancements in resource-based wealth creation are also mobilised through illiberal 
governing rationales. In Southeast Asia, and particularly in the Mekong Region, the 
formation of resources as wealth creating assets can be less market-based and more guided 
25 
 
or sanctioned by authoritarian or neopatrimonial rulings, for example (Nevins and Peluso 
2008, Barney 2017). The commodification processes often give birth not only to new 
concentrations of private wealth, but also to spaces of rule within which de facto authority 
is exercised by corporates (Ferguson 2006, Ong 2006).  
An example of a riverine property arrangement advanced through neoliberal reasoning, 
and also central to this study, is the concessionary BOT contract model for hydropower 
dams which is designed to turn the construction and operation of dam infrastructure into 
a profitable investment asset (Bakker 1999, Johns 2015). In this arrangement, conditions 
for profitability include an optimal concession period (often 25-45 years) so that the 
concessionaire is provided with a considerable number of profitable dam-operation years 
after the loan pay-back period (which often amounts to 10 years), while handing the dam 
over to state authority takes place before dam productivity decreases and maintenance 
costs of decaying infrastructure increase. Another condition is high autonomy in terms of 
altering riverine flows to create a flow regime that is optimal for maximised electricity 
sales. The contracts also frequently include clauses to exclude or pre-empt other riverine 
uses and changes in regulations that could threaten the profitability of the dam operations. 
In the case of the concessionary dams, the centralised nodes of ordering that the large 
infrastructures provide, lend to strengthened corporate powers over riverine flows and 
hydrosocial relations. 
Both the technoscientific modernist rationality of producing orderable resources and the 
neoliberal rationale advancing production of commodified resources have morphed into 
different variants of a consensualising eco-modern rationale as a result of earlier 
contestations. The variant of eco-modernism which entails continuation of the 
technoscientific modernist rationality has been termed by some as ‘green governmentality’ 
(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; 2016). This equals with a technomanagerial approach to 
solving environmental (including climate) problems with more precise and comprehensive 
knowledge production and standardised expertise-based control, accompanied by the 
strengthened ordering capacities of technical experts and administrative state or 
international organisations. Technomanagerial ecomodernism thus entails an assumption 
of a linear science-policy model (Keeley and Scoones 2003) and is co-produced by new 
techniques of governing such as advanced impact assessment techniques and modeling 
technologies (e.g. hydrological models or the climate change related general circulation 
model). An example of this in riverine resourcification is the rationale of Integrated Water 
Resource Management (IWRM) which, compared to the high-modern rationale of united 
or total river basin management, attempts to render calculable and orderable previously 
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excluded aspects of, for example, river ecology, and is exercised through national or 
intergovernmental river basin organisations (Molle 2008; 2009; 2017).  
Another variant of eco-modernism is a more market-oriented rationale entailing the 
continuation of neoliberal reasoning, which has been termed ‘market environmentalism’ 
(Bakker 2004), ‘green neoliberalism’ (Goldman 2005) or a ‘weak version of ecological 
modernisation’ (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006). This variant builds on projected 
synergies between wealth accumulation and environmental (including climate) protection, 
drawing on corporate-friendly mechanisms of internalising externalities or further 
commodifying nature by creating ecosystem services, biodiversity offsets and carbon 
credits designed to replace or flexibilise direct regulation of administrative organisations 
(Robertson 2006, Castree 2008, Bakker 2009, Fletcher and Büscher 2017, Dunlap and 
Sullivan 2019). These are exemplified in riverine resourcification by corporate-friendly 
sustainability standards for hydropower that aim for the internalisation of externalities 
without altering the core mode of riverine engagement, which is to extract and maximise 
profits from hydroelectricity. The riverine commodification may also intersect with the 
production of new environmental commodities, for example, when the dam’s upstream 
watershed is attempted to be conserved through payment for ecosystem services (PES) 
schemes or when hydropower companies look for or are offered new opportunities to sell 
not only hydroelectricity but also carbon credits through the CDM.  
Common to both variants of eco-modernism is that the detrimental socioenvironmental 
effects and related contestations that have arisen from previous resourcification attempts 
are addressed with further resourcification. This is done by treating the encountered 
problems as externalities that can be internalised either with more comprehensive 
assessments and fixed ordering technologies—as in the technoscientific variant—or 
through corporate-friendly sustainability standards (that also entail more comprehensive 
assessment processes) and new market mechanisms that are co-produced by or dependent 
on new measurement techniques and calculations of commensuration, as in the neoliberal 
variant of eco-modernism (Rutherford 1999, Goldman 2005, Robertson 2006, MacKenzie 
2009, Sullivan 2018).  
As mentioned above, the making of commodified resources is dependent on a secured 
property regime. This brings us to the final aspect of resource-making discussed here, 
which is related to but still separable from technoscientific ordering2 and the pursuit of 
commodification, as well as from their eco-modern variants: the making of spatial regimes 
of exclusion from and access to resources (Hall et al. 2011, Li 2014, Lund 2016). This is 
 
2 Technoscientific tools of legibility most importantly in the form of mapping exercises often co-constitute or form relevant 
pre-conditions for spatially exclusive resource-ordering schemes (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). 
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constitutive of both the resources and the authorities deciding on their control. Here 
modalities of power are tied to the logics of sovereignty (Lund 2016) but also to ‘practices 
of government’ (Rose and Miller 1992, Li 2007a: 10-12; 2014) when the exclusionary 
processes are attempted to be rendered consensual and governable without coercion. 
Claims to have exclusive rights to use certain resources invoke questions of who has the 
‘ability to create and enforce collectively binding rules’ on resource use and, thus, exercise 
sovereign political authority (Lund 2011: 886). In the case of large-scale resource control 
schemes, the usual agency expected to inhere in these abilities is that of the state. Foreign 
investors and companies, for example, are often unwilling to negotiate with multiple 
parties and thus expect the state to guarantee resource availability and, when required, to 
execute and secure the necessary resource appropriations and evictions (Emel et al. 2011, 
Levien 2012). 
It could perhaps be said that the more intensively commodified a resource, the more 
evidently necessary it becomes for the state to decide on and guarantee property rights 
(Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). Customary arrangements are often deemed as too fluid, 
especially for large-scale, fixed capital investments. The ways that resource appropriations 
are constitutive of laws and state sovereignty are acute questions in many resource-making 
processes.3 The state may not have the requisite sovereign qualities prior to the making 
and enforcement of an exclusionary regime, especially in the contexts of postcolonial 
institutional pluralism and/or post-conflict situations; consequently, the processes of 
creating resource availability protected by exclusive rights (for extraction or conservation) 
often demand the (re)organisation of the state and legislation and are thus formative of 
state sovereign (and administrative) powers (Peluso and Lund 2011, Lund 2016). The 
sovereignty is also relational here in the sense that state sovereignty is enacted through 
recognition. People whose previous socionatural relations and access arrangements are 
dismantled (willingly or unwillingly) as a result of state-enforced appropriations, are made 
to recognise the state as authoritative in organising relations between people and 
resources, and themselves as subject to state power (Lund 2011; 2016). For example, in 
the case of large dams, the state’s authority to decide over hydrosocial relations is 
actualised in the lives of riverine people when the state grants permission for the dam to 
be built. In addition to state, there are often also transnational regulative entities that try to 
intervene in how relations between people and the formed resources are organised 
through exclusionary regimes (Li 2014). For example, the World Bank has promoted the 
BOT template in many countries and frequently tried to intervene in how possible 
 
3 This continuing relevance of appropriations is something not easily grasped by Foucauldian power conceptualisations 
which enact ‘a liberal forgetting of appropriation’ (Dean 2007: 246) and the Schmittian notion of arbitrary violence as a basis 
of order. As Dean (2013: 132) notes ‘no form of governmentality is elaborated in relation to processes of appropriation’ and 
Foucault does not seriously engage with the sovereign modalities of power (Dean 2013: 132).  
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evictions and resettlements should be arranged and how those whose ways of using the 
river are excluded by the dam should be compensated.  
The aspects and rationales of resource-making discussed above are often interrelated but 
should not be conflated; they may align with each other in mutually supportive ways but 
can also be in tension. The tension arising between the modernist technoscientific 
rationale and the advancement of commodification, for example, is illustrated by how the 
high-modernist, river-basin management model partially originates in attempts to control 
disparate and accelerating commercial extractive activities (Linton 2006). As I argue in this 
thesis, a similar tension can currently be observed between the rationalist, eco-modern, 
river-basin management approach and the (more or less) green neoliberal or post-
neoliberal concessionary modes of governing hydropower dams, as the latter has 
increasingly uncoupled dam development from river basin planning. The (neo)liberal 
rationale, on the other hand, embodies a certain suspicion towards modernism’s credo of 
rationalist planning (especially of high-modernism’s ‘total planning’) and the rendering of 
uncertainties calculable (O’Malley 2015), while the highmoderinist rationale may align 
more readily with authoritarian modes of governing (Scott 1998, Blake and Barney 2018). 
In some cases the technoscientific knowledge production can at the same time be 
formative to commodification while retaining uneasy relations with it, as exemplified by 
the making of carbon credits (MacKenzie 2009) and wetland banking (Robertson 2006) 
when the market requirements for commensurate commodity values overwhelm the 
capacities of technoscientific knowledge production. 
The argument in the making here is that the key dimensions of resourcification—1) 
technoscientific attempts to create orderable nature with the will to master it; 2) attempts 
to commodify resources with the will to facilitate profit extraction and capital 
accumulation; and 3) the creation of exclusionary property or resource control regimes 
with the will to territorially organise people/resources relations—while often co-
constitutive or aligned, are not entirely reducible to each other.  
Another important point is that while resource-making is shaped by shifting and effective 
assemblages of powerful agencies, rationales and techniques, resource-making processes 
are concurrently constitutive of new power formations and they may strengthen or 
weaken the agents involved. Here I expand the conceptual lens provided by the notion of 
the co-production of resources and states (Bridge 2014, Lund 2016) to subsume the co-
production of resources and power formations more broadly. Resources and states are, as 
Robbins (2008) and Bridge (2014: 119; emphasis added) have noted, both ‘products and 
tools of socionatural ordering’ (or, in the case of water resourcification, of hydrosocial 
ordering) and can thus be seen both as shapers as well as effects of processes in which 
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socionatural relations are re-organised. This reciprocity and emergence has remained 
somewhat un-articulated in Scott’s (1998) approach in which the state is viewed as a 
powerful organiser of socionatural relations, as well as in accounts of state 
territorialisation (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995) where the state appears as a rather ready-
made constituent in terms of organising spatial relations between people and resources. At 
the same time, this mutually recursive relationship is not only limited to resources and 
state powers but also at work between resources and other power formations. For 
example, the power of experts does not simply exist prior to resource-making but is 
formed in the course of the process (Mitchell 2002, Carroll 2012); the same could be said 
of corporate power (Welker 2014). Moreover, different aspects of resource-making may 
strengthen different aspects of state power: large-scale resource-ordering schemes that 
employ experts from state bureaucracies may strengthen the socioenvironmental 
engineering competences and administrative capacities of the involved agencies and thus 
foster technoscientific state formation (Carroll 2012); intensified commodification 
(depending on ownership and royalty arrangements) may accumulate state fiscal wealth 
and thus strengthen governing capacities not limited to socionatural (or in case of water 
resourcification, hydrosocial) relations; and resource schemes or investments requiring 
exclusionary property rights may invoke and consolidate sovereign and territorial state 
powers (Lund 2011; 2016).  
In addition to the expert, state and corporate powers explicitly discussed in the above 
characterisation of resource-making, resourcification processes may also invoke power 
effects more loosely tied to a specific institutional ordering agency. For example, power 
formations may be embedded in the materiality of the infrastructures so that, after the 
construction is accomplished, they continue to order externalised ‘nature’ and socionatural 
(or hydrosocial) relations in ways that are no longer entirely malleable by future (human) 
ordering decisions (Biggs 2010, Li 2018; 2019). In addition to infrastructural powers, 
engineering blueprints as technoscientific inscription devices may also carry potency that 
is effective independently of the original ordering agencies (Sneddon 2015). The same 
goes for the discursive powers that, for example, are assembled to justify and 
consensualise certain resource-making processes and the accompanying new exclusionary 
regimes (Li 2014).  
Resource materialities simultaneously shape and may resist4 resourcification and 
commodification processes (Bakker and Bridge 2006, Braun 2008, Richardson and 
Weszkalnys 2014), while also bearing on the exclusionary spatial and temporal dimensions 
 
4 For example, it has been argued that the fluid properties of water resist attempts to commodify water supply and sewerage 
systems (Bakker 2005). 
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of the property regimes.5 Different material qualities call upon different kinds of 
technologies, expertise, investment regimes and exclusionary arrangements. They thus also 
bear on the possible power effects. For example, in Laos and Cambodia, domestic 
constituencies may more readily have the capacities required for certain forms of riverine 
resource-making and extraction, like river sand mining (Lamb et al. 2019), while other 
forms, such as the large-scale production of hydroelectricity, are more dependent on 
external expertise and finances and are thus likely to entangle differently with transnational 
power formations.  
The concept of ordering that I use in this work, as in hydrosocial ordering, refers to both 
the constituent and constitutive powers of resourcification. As mentioned earlier, I find 
the concept of ordering useful and potent because it covers the various modes of power at 
stake, from sovereign acts of ordering to more governmentalised modes of power (Dean 
2013); it also encompasses discursive and material aspects as well as their entwining in 
technoscientific or sociotechnical modes of ordering (Law 2003).   
In this study, (eco-)modernist technoscientific resource-making together with expert 
power formations and the powers of technoscientific inscriptions have most interpretive 
valence in the basin and delta-wide ordering schemes discussed in Articles I and II. 
Hydraulic infrastructuring efforts in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta after the unification of 
the country are also discussed as examples of an alignment, or rather entanglement, of 
state territorialisation and hydraulic/technoscientific state formation. The neoliberal 
rationale of advancing resource commodification and the neoliberal variant of eco-
modernism are particularly relevant for understanding the Nam Theun 2 case of 
‘sustainable hydropower’ (Article III). Article IV discusses how climate change is rendered 
governable. In much the same way as resources are made by producing externalised 
nature, the premises of dominant climate governance initiatives are set by climate science 
that constructs climate as a realm that is external to human society (Swyngedouw 2010, 
Hulme 2011). The technoscientific approach primarily attributes climate risk to shocks 
caused by climate-induced bio-physical changes, thus provoking preventive adjustments 
principally in the form of technofixes and infrastructural solutions (Ribot 2014, Taylor 
2015). Externalising climate change thus makes it plausible to think that climate measures 
do not require alterations in the development status quo, even if its associated political-
 
5 Transforming fluvial affordances into hydroelectricity, for example, requires significant expert and financial capacities and 
invokes a highly concentrated and exclusionary resource regime (compared, for example, with logging. which is much less 
capital-intensive and less readily exclusive, as discussed in Article V). But while the dam itself is easily ’fenced off’ and the 
dams with reservoirs may themselves entail immediate evictions and definite displacements of previous land and water uses, 
the exclusion of other riverine uses in downstream areas, such as fisheries or agriculture-related livelihoods, are less 
immediate and occur over longer periods of time in the form of diminished opportunities. The differences in intensities and 
temporalities of exclusions may in turn mean differing intensities and patterns of resistance. 
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economic and political-ecological processes produce climate vulnerabilities. This also 
enhances the plausibility of rationalising climate measures in terms of synergies between 
prevalent economic growth pursuits and climate mitigation instead of recognising their 
antagonisms (Swyngedouw 2010). Together, externalising climate and eco-modernist 
reasoning result in a kind of anti-politics of climate change that creates space for situating 
large hydraulic infrastructures as central elements in climate responses.  
In order to make sense of the concessionary CDM Cardamom dams and how they 
interact with other schemes of resource control (Article V) all of the different aspects of 
resource-making discussed above are pertinent.  
2.2 MEKONG FRONTIER CONSTELLATIONS 
In this section I elaborate on the above discussion on resources, governing rationales and 
power formations in a more context-specific manner, invoking the concept of frontier, 
one that is relevant to this study as frontiers can be understood as sites or spaces where 
resources (and thus technoscientific assessments and inventories, resource management 
schemes and property regimes) are being worked out in the contemporary moment. It 
thus draws attention to the situated resourcification dynamics in particular places and 
times, thereby also calling for attentiveness to the various socio-spatial configurations that 
emerge from resource-making processes. I focus here on the more recent frontier 
developments in Laos and Cambodia. These assist in situating the ‘dam rush’ as part of 
the broader ‘opening up’ of these countries to foreign investors which, since the 1990s, 
has entailed intensive resource-making processes of various kinds: from conservation to 
mines and tree and agro-industrial plantations. Many ‘resource-rich’ sites, including those 
with rivers to be dammed, form complex frontier constellations for various, overlapping 
resource control and extraction efforts (Barney 2009, Baird and Barney 2017), as well as 
for state-making efforts (Lund 2011, Dwyer 2014). To make sense of these dynamics I 
begin by discussing relevant frontier studies (e.g. Tsing 2005, Barney 2009, Eilenberg 
2014, Rasmussen and Lund 2018) which I then connect with studies of enclaved spaces of 
governing (Ong 2006, Sidaway 2007, Nyíri 2012, Whitington 2012; 2019) due to their 
relevance in making sense of emergent socio-spatial formations in contemporary Lao and 
Cambodian frontiers. 
Frontiers are often approached as sites of new opportunities for commodity markets and 
may thus experience rushes in logging, mining or conversion of land to cash-cropping 
(Nevins and Peluso 2008), generating violent looting, dispossession and degradation as 
previous social and territorial orders get dissolved (Tsing 2005). Yet they are also locations 
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where new arrangements, regulations and legal reforms governing resource use and 
property rights are attempted. Thus, while the frontier dynamics can be dramatically 
dispossessive and disordering, frontiers are also spaces for new ordering efforts (Barney 
2009) as well as sites where the violence embodied by property laws (Blomely 2003) often 
becomes evident. Resource and commodity frontiers also entail active making: investors 
are attracted by depictions of untapped potentialities which may either erase from sight 
already existing uses or frame them as inefficient or even destructive (as for example 
swidden agriculture is often framed), thereby providing legitimacy for the new ventures 
(Barney 2009, Li 2014).  
In commodity frontier studies the focus is often on the advances of the capitalist order, 
but frontiers have also been approached as political borderlands at the margins of state 
control that are intended for inclusion in the space of state sovereign rule (Hagmann and 
Korf 2012, Watts 2018). Some recent studies (Eilenberg 2014, Korf et al. 2015, Kelly and 
Peluso 2015, Rasmussen and Lund 2018) have attempted to capture explicitly the 
concomitant expansion of resource commodification and the formation of state authority 
in frontier spaces. Eilenberg (2014), for example, highlights how, in the resource-rich 
borderlands of Indonesian Kalimantan, both capitalist agrarian encroachment and the 
territorial expansion of state authority and its securitisation are taking place 
simultaneously. Rasmussen and Lund (2018) suggest that frontiers are liminal spaces 
where new opportunities for commodification dismantle previous socionatural and 
resource control relations invoking (re-)territorialisation and new relations of authority, 
including state formation.  
The frontier studies discussed above have all been formative for my analysis. In this work 
I also approach and cast frontiers as sites at the edge of (eco)modernisation with 
unfulfilled promises of mastering and administering externalised ‘nature’, and the potential 
for rationally planned improvement schemes. The technoscientific aspects of 
resourcification are also important in terms of inscription devices (inventories, maps, 
statistics, models) that may enable legibility for expanding wealth creation and/or power 
consolidation efforts. In fact, all the key aspects of resource-making outlined in the 
previous section are often contemporaneous and at least partially co-constitutive. For 
example, in the Cold War period before the Vietnam War, the Mekong was perceived as a 
frontier for river modernisation and American technopolitics; these were seen as 
facilitating more commodified forms of production and as opening up commercial dam 
construction opportunities, particularly for American firms, while the hydraulic 
infrastructuring schemes in the Mekong Delta were to enable territorialisation of the 
political authority of the Saigon regime (Biggs 2010, Sneddon 2015). In this work the 
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various Mekong frontier constellations at stake thus involve not only commodification 
and changes in relations of (hydro)territorial authority but also technoscientific (hydraulic) 
modernisation, which is particularly relevant for the first wave of water resourcification, as 
discussed in Article I. The second wave, in turn, has been partially enabled and shaped by 
eco-modernist knowledge schemes in its technocratic and neoliberal variants, as argued in 
Articles II, III and IV. Something that seems generic to all kinds of resource frontiers 
within and beyond this work is that they are emergent spaces confronting a new encoding 
regime which provokes both de- and re-territorialisation of pre-existing socionatural 
orderings. Thus, in the broadest sense, frontiers are, as Milne and Mahanty (2015: 6) put it, 
sites of transformation ‘where change processes are particularly intensive’. 
Compared with much commodity frontier literature my own approach builds somewhat 
more on Foucauldian studies, not only in the sense of highlighting the role of knowledge-
making processes but also in that I do not necessarily analyse capitalist dynamics as such 
but, rather, the different governing rationales (and techniques) that make capitalist, 
political-economic formations possible. Thus, when trying to make sense of the second 
wave of water resourcification in Mekong, particularly in Laos and Cambodia, both 
marked by a combined post-conflict and post-socialist predicament, two differing 
governing rationales are particularly important for understanding the frontier dynamics at 
stake: the securing of global circulation and territorial fixation (Foucault 2007; 2008). The 
latter can be understood to include the rationales of both establishing the sovereign 
territorial authority of the state and its exclusivity, and strengthening state capacities to 
control resources and people within this territory. The liberal rationale of securing global 
circulation, in contrast, includes the establishment of ‘conditions for the organization of 
world market’ (Foucault 2008: 56) and, thus, the globalising operations of capital, which in 
recent times has taken the form of the neoliberal governing rationale. Their key difference 
lies in sociospatial orientation. The rationale of territorial fixation is about the centripetal 
logics of spatial ordering geared towards the state, with unlimited ‘reason of state’, which 
may easily align with authoritarian modes of governing.6 The rationale of securing global 
circulation, on the other hand, is about centrifugal logics of spatial ordering geared 
towards enabling global circulation and the formation and expansion of global systems, 
accompanied by the liberal ‘reason of least state’ (Foucault 2007: 44–45; 2008: 52, also 
Sassen 2006), which currently manifests in neoliberal governing modes. At the same time, 
however, the circulation is dependent on various kinds of territorially fixed spaces of 
connection, such as corporate enclaves (Ferguson 2006), infrastructure corridors or special 
 
6 Foucault’s own work, however, is more oriented towards the analysis of (neo)liberal arts of governing while the rendering 
of contemporary illiberal modes of governing (as well as sovereign modalities of power) intelligible are left on the sidelines 
(Dean 2013).  
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economic zones (Ong 2006, Bach 2011) and other forms of global territoriality (Opitz and 
Tellman 2012), as well on territorially fixed sovereign state powers (Emel et al. 2011). 
Although advancements of global circulation may invoke images of fluidity in contrast to 
territorial fixation, this is somewhat problematic as ‘flows’ of capital are preconditioned by 
constructed connectivities that require substantial informational, infrastructural, regulatory 
and institutional fixation; nor would they be possible without forms of global territoriality 
(Opitz and Tellman 2012). In the Mekong Region the advancements of markets and the 
opening up of Laos and Cambodia to global circuits of capital is, therefore, perhaps not so 
well captured by ‘all that is solid melts into air’ (Marx and Engels 1998[1848]: 38), and 
rather better, to put it bluntly, by ‘all that was fluid is disrupted and newly fixed’ to allow 
for capital and new commodities (such as hydroelectricity) to circulate. The thesis title 
‘fixing the fluid’ thus also connotes, not only hydrosocial ordering efforts, but also 
broader fixing efforts directed at the ‘opened up’, ‘unfixed’ frontier spaces. 
The opening up of Laos and Cambodia—particularly their ‘resource-rich’ upland or 
hinterland areas—as resource frontiers, has been facilitated by transnational governing 
entities such as the ADB and the World Bank. Guided by neoliberal governing rationales, 
since the 1990s such entities have aimed to transition the Mekong Region ‘battlefield to 
marketplace’ and (re-)connect Laos and Cambodia to global circuits of capital after years 
of wars, insurgencies and socialist experiments (Goldman 2005, Barney 2009, Glassman 
2010). The proliferation of large dams, mines, forestry schemes and agro-industrial 
plantations have been foregrounded by numerous resource inventories, forest 
classification and feasibility studies, and legislative and regulatory reforms concerning 
property rights, including the facilitation of Economic Land Concessions and BOT dam 
contracts. (Re-)connecting to global circuits of capital has also generated the Greater 
Mekong Subregion Programme, with its schemes for regional infrastructure corridors, 
including roads and electricity transmission lines, that have opened up the possibilities of 
developing hydropower projects in previously remote areas. Most of the preparatory work 
for intensive resource extraction and commodification has been funded and guided by the 
development banks as well as by other development donors. Most recently, Chinese 
investors and developers have made use of the established property and concessionary 
investment arrangements to elicit reconfigured spatial patterns of global and regional 
connectivity with China’s own infrastructural initiatives (Sidaway and Woon 2017, Nyíri 
and Tan 2017); furthermore, also the GMS corridors are now increasingly geared to 
China’s ‘orbit’ (Dwyer 2020). 
Not all the fixing efforts are, however, merely about facilitating foreign capital; post-
conflict, state consolidation efforts also entail their own territorial fixing logics. As Dwyer 
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notes (2011), both sides of the equation battlefield-to-marketplace are important: the 
‘marketplace’ for opening up resources for wealth accumulation and the ‘battlefield’ for 
consolidating fragmented sovereign powers and territorial state control (Lund 2011). The 
civil wars and insurgencies left legacies of different ‘unruly’ areas in both countries up 
until very recent times, as well as several fractions competing for political authority, 
including ruling party leaders, the military, provincial strongmen and business tycoons. At 
the same time, the multiplicity of rule is not only a result of the ‘battlefield’ period but also 
characteristic of the early modern political history that preceded it (for Laos, see Evans 
2002). In Laos, particularly, there has also been a longer-term, persistent suspicion on the 
part of lowland state authorities vis-à-vis upland, semi-nomadic, swidden agriculturalists 
which dates back to pre-colonial and colonial times (Evrard and Goudineau 2004, Scott 
2009). Thus, as the countries, and especially their ‘resource-rich’ peripheral areas, have 
been opened up to investors (or conservationists), the state authorities have concomitantly 
tried to establish their rule over areas they have perceived as unruly or ungovernable 
simultaneously taking over or undermining pre-existing customary arrangements and more 
autonomous modes of deciding over socionatural relations. The forming and 
territorialising of Lao and Cambodian state power has mostly been pursued through a 
combination of authoritarian and neopatrimonial modes of governing while the persuasive 
elements have consisted of promises of stability, progress and modernity (Blake and 
Barney 2018).  Central for power consolidation has thus been the governing through fear 
and rule of force amalgamated with the assembling of networks of loyalty and reciprocal 
favours which importantly have centred on resource deals and concessions, particularly 
involving timber and land (Singh 2012, Creak and Barney 2018 for Laos; Le Billon 2002; 
Hughes 2009; Hughes and Un 2011; Verver and Dahles 2015; Milne 2015, Mahanty 2019 
for Cambodia). In fact, the capacity of the Lao and Cambodian party-states to act from a 
distance is in part built around reciprocal exchange of political loyalty and access to key 
resources, the centralising of which strengthens the sovereign powers of the party-states in 
both countries. These centralised powers are also a precondition for arranging resource 
availability for foreign or domestic investors, particularly if forceful evictions are required. 
At the same time, illiberal state consolidation and territorialisation have also been 
advanced through the more transnational spaces of neoliberal governing. 
The predicament of the co-presence of the heterogeneous territorialisation of global 
capital and the regulations of transnational governing entities, together with centralising 
party-states actively engaged in attracting—and in certain resource-developments, such as 
large hydropower, dependent on—foreign investors, render the frontier constellations 
particularly complex. Indeed, the multiplicity of agencies, resource agendas and governing 
rationales means that there are diverse frontiers at work at the same time. Furthermore, 
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neither resource-based, wealth-creation efforts nor territorialising state powers are 
advanced by encompassing or covering space contiguously but rather in a form of 
‘patchworked’ frontiers (Barney 2009: 152). Importantly, this is because the key socio-
spatial formation through which resources are extracted and governed in contemporary 
Laos and Cambodia is the enclave (Nyíri 2012, Diepart and Schoenberger 2017, 
Whitington 2019). In both countries in addition to Special Economic Zones (SEZ) also 
resource-extraction arrangements for industrial plantations, mines and dams tend to form 
exceptional spaces of governing, carved out from national terrain and disembedded from 
surrounding society, often entailing exemptions from state regulatory oversight. In some 
cases the exemptions may result in the enclaves’ surpassing the regulatory norms—as in 
the ‘sustainability enclaves’ (Whitington 2012; 2019) manifested by the Nam Theun 2, 
discussed in Article III—while in other cases exemptions entail falling short of them, as in 
the case of the Cardamom dams discussed in Article V. Conservation zones have also, 
albeit often only initially, formed partially exceptional spaces of rule because of co-
governing arrangements with international conservation organisations. The ‘patchworked’ 
frontiers thus materialise in a ‘chequered geography’ resonating with Ong’s (2006) notion 
of ‘postdevelopmental’ governing. Unlike the developmentalist mode, this geography does 
not treat state ‘territory as a uniform political space’ but instead induces coordination with 
investors and their demands for corporate-friendliness, so that developmental decisions 
favour fragmentation of the national space into various non-contiguous zones (Ong 2006: 
77).  
Unlike the extractive enclaves Ferguson (2005; 2006) discusses, which principally manifest 
territorialisation of global capital, the enclaves in Cambodia and Laos are also embedded 
in state consolidation efforts. While enclavistic resource geography implies state 
subordination to the demands of foreign investors and the neoliberal prescriptions of 
transnational regulatory agencies, the state’s role is not necessarily limited to the exercise 
of its sovereign authority to grant concessions, as in the extractive enclaves Ferguson 
(2006) or Emel et al. (2011) discuss in Africa. The Lao and Cambodian states have also 
managed to leverage the concessions to consolidate their hold over previously inaccessible 
areas and ungovernable people (Dwyer 2014, Tan 2017 for Laos), or managed to use the 
concessions, particularly those granted to Chinese corporations, to strengthen state 
patronage relations (Milne 2015, Nyíri 2017, Verver 2019 for Cambodia). This resonates 
with how the state authorities have attempted, or managed, to gear various donor-
supported efforts to serve their ends. In Laos, for example, foreign-funded land titling 
programs and forest policies in the 1990s were aligned with the state objectives to 
sedentarise upland people through forced resettlements and to gain control over ethnic 
groups, especially those with insurgent pasts or previous alliances with the US during the 
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war (Vandergeest 2003, Evrard and Goudineau 2004, Baird and Shoemaker 2007, Lund 
2011). In this, as in enclavistic resource schemes, the consolidation of state sovereign 
powers and their territoriality is advanced through ‘borrowed means’ and through 
conditions that are not of the states’ own choosing. What is particular to the enclavistic 
resource schemes is that state consolidation takes place through allowing ambiguous and 
heterogeneous spaces of graduated sovereignty (Ong 2006). 
Interestingly, it seems that the Chinese agencies which are increasingly engaged in 
enclavistic investment projects in Cambodia and Laos are turning their own past 
experiences with special economic zones (see Ong 2006) into export models (Bach 2016). 
They seem to be eliciting acceptance for this approach by referring to their own 
development path that entailed socioenvironmental sacrifices and exceptional spaces of 
rule (including not only SEZs but also BOT projects) with rules imposed from outside. 
This is claimed to have resulted eventually in progress without undermining the 
centralising of state authority (Nyíri 2012; 2013, Bach 2016; 2019). Scepticism about the 
repeat of this trajectory in Cambodia (Yamada 2019) or Laos (Laungaramsri 2019) 
prevails, however. While the Lao and Cambodian state authorities are far from ‘passive 
victims’, highly selectively deploying neoliberal governing techniques introduced earlier 
and current post-neoliberal resource arrangements with the Chinese, the power 
asymmetries at stake seem more than provisional or temporal, while the dispossessive 
effects of the extractive enclaves problematise notions of progress. Certainly, the new 
opportunities and adversities are differentially distributed. In Cambodia, for example, the 
chequered geography of resource concessions is accompanied by ‘graduated citizenship’ 
(Ong 2006) in which okhnyas – business tycoons with state guarantees for preferential 
treatment – enjoy special privileges and state protection in resource deals, while workers 
within the concessions or those adversely affected by them often get denied state 
protection (Milne 2015, Schoenberger and Beban 2018, Verver 2019, also Article V). 
The different conceptualisations of frontiers together with enclaved spaces discussed in 
this section have been particularly important for my analysis in Article V, in which I 
advance understanding of the consequential intersecting and interacting of hydropower 
enclaves with various other distinct resource control schemes. I also attempt to add new 
perspectives to the multi-dimensionalities of sociospatial organisation by highlighting 
interaction between the governing rationales of territorial fixation and global circulation, 
thus contributing to the literature on complex frontier constellations. 
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2.3 ASSEMBLAGES AND EFFECTS 
The concept or analytic of assemblage draws attention to ordering arrangements as 
complex and unstable entities that are composed of heterogeneous elements and forces 
whose coming together in relationship with each other renders their ensuing gathering 
newly capable of producing effects. It is relevant to the analysis in this thesis in at least 
two senses: firstly, in how governability is attempted through pulling together various 
distinct elements (arrays of agents, objectives, discourses, practices) and by bringing them 
more or less deliberately into alignment with each other, as in Tania Li’s concept of 
governmental assemblage (Li 2007b); and secondly, in how disparate elements, such as 
divergent governing rationales and techniques, come to intersect and interact 
consequentially in ways that are less deliberately intended or planned.  
The concept of governmental assemblage is particularly relevant when trying to 
understand the role and modes of operating of development actors and donors, 
particularly from Western contexts, as well as of more donor-supported organisations. 
Their presence in Laos and Cambodia has been intensive, especially in the 1990s and up 
until the mid-2000s (Hughes 2009, Phraxayavong 2009, Sato et al. 2011, Ear 2013), and 
they are still relevant when trying to understand how resource-making processes or 
climate-change measures are rationalised, particularly in the public transcripts of different 
environmental governance and development strategies. These development actors bring 
the liberal arts of governing (Rose and Mille 1993) to bear on the ordering attempts of 
Mekong hydrosocial relations. Their modalities of power almost by definition exclude 
coercion, oppression and use of force, as well as ‘practices of politics’ and thus must 
attempt to govern through ‘rendering technical’ and a fixing mentality (Li 2007a). The 
rendering technical evolves through co-constitutive relations between governing rationales 
and technologies (Rose and Miller 1992, Miller 1993, Rose 1999, Rose et al. 2006) and as 
Li (2007a; b) suggests entails practices of government that aim at closing down opened 
fronts of contestation by containing  previous critique, by recoursing to expert knowledge 
and by problem framings that match with apolitical or technical solutions and through 
which the proposed action seems synergetic for all parties involved. To achieve this, often 
rather unlikely components are assembled together and their holding together requires 
continuous work (Li 2007b). The governmental assemblage importantly emerges from 
constitutive exclusions of contentious elements, processes requiring political resolution 
and anything else that would upset the possibility of the assembled win-win propositions. 
One of the relevant governmental assemblages in this study is the model of ‘sustainable 
hydropower’ of which the Nam Theun 2 project in Laos has been constitutive.  
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Assemblage in the sense of a less intentional, more contingent but still consequential 
ensemble of heterogeneous elements (Ong and Collier 2005, Sassen 2006) has drawn my 
attention to the interplay of divergent governing rationales and techniques in resource-
making. Ong and Collier (2005) discuss global assemblages as results of interacting global 
forms, such as neoliberal logics and more ‘situated political regimes’ (Ong 2007: 8). This 
led me to approach the concessionary governing mode of resources, including the dam 
concessions in Cambodia and Laos, as assemblages that result from the interacting of 
global neoliberal and locally situated authoritarian and neopatrimonial governing logics 
(together with colonial legacies). In the context of Laos and Cambodia I find that overall, 
some important analyses of resource-making processes have overtly encoded, or 
somewhat over-coded, these processes either as being about neoliberalisation (Goldman 
2005, Springer 2009, Johns 2015) or about strengthening authoritarianism (Blake 2019). 
The optics of ordering assemblages as products of ‘multiple determinations that are not 
reducible to one single logic’ (Collier and Ong 2006: 12), in turn, allows for analysis that 
looks at how these and other divergent projects may interactively shape resource-making 
processes without collapsing them into one another.  
Moreover, the assemblage, perhaps in its most Deleuzian or Latourian sense, highlights 
not only the effective gatherings of divergent human projects but also their coming 
together with non-human or more-than-human entities and processes. In this sense the 
produced ‘resourceness’ (Li 2014, Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014) of fluvial affordances  
or hydraulic infrastructures such as large dams (Sneddon 2015) (or infrastructured 
waterscapes), can themselves be understood as assemblages and thus composed of 
heterogeneous human and non-human, discursive and material elements. These also bind 
together and gather around them interacting forces, determinations and inclinations of 
knowledge, technologies, capital, state authorities and biophysical processes among others. 
Approaching hydraulic infrastructures as assemblages assists in recognising not only the 
richness but also the variance in the arrays of elements and agents that gather around 
different efforts made to fix fluvial flows. Attuning to this richness assists in 
understanding why the outcomes of hydraulic infrastructuring often differ from those 
intended by each of the composite agencies, and how they are only partially coordinated 
by human determinations. The acknowledgement of diffused agency, however, does not 
exclude attentiveness to distributed responsibilities that assists in identifying those parties 
that could be held accountable for detrimental and unjust effects. Attuning to the 
forcefulness of the non-human elements in the case of large-scale hydraulic 
infrastructures, such as large dams, however, does facilitate enhanced understanding of 
how the properties of the material elements provide the dam assemblages with a certain 
stability. Despite the great variation in the composition and effects of large dams, they 
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seem to bring about similar disruptions of fluvial relationalities as well as (multivalent) 
concentrations of hydrosocial ordering powers. 
Overall, the concept of assemblage facilitates a mode of inquiry that takes note of the 
possibilities that things external to each other may open up new capacities ‘not inherent in 
the original things’ by coming into relations with each other (Rabinow 2011: 123). It aligns 
with what Foucault (2008:42) has called a strategic logic, that is ‘to establish connections 
between disparate terms which remain disparate’ and thus ‘the logic of connections 
between the heterogeneous and not the logic of homogenization of the contradictory’. 
Importantly, assemblage guides an inquiry that is attentive to relationalities, emergence 
and indeterminacy. This also means that the intersecting and interacting human and non-
human entities, governing rationales and devices can bring about effects that are not entirely 
intended by any of the involved parties. The concept of assemblage is thus also 
interrelated with my attention to the effects of the water resourcification processes.  
The Foucauldian optics of ‘effects’ also allows entities such as the state, often taken as 
pre-given, to be approached as relational and continuously in the making. Foucault’s 
prime interest was not so much the state itself but, rather, the governing processes that 
produce it. As he noted, ‘[t]he state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source 
of power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a 
perpetual statification (étatisation) or statifications’ (Foucault 2008: 77). While this study is 
not essentially about state formation it still draws from studies that approach state 
formation as an on-going process (Mitchell 1991, Hansen and Stepputat 2006, Lund 2011; 
2016) and highlight the state as ‘emergent effects of multiple projects, practices, and 
attempts to institutionalise power relations’ (Jessop 2007). Common to the concepts of 
assemblage and effects is how they steer the mode of inquiry into a processual approach 
that also aligns with my symmetrical interest in looking at, on the one hand, how power 
relations shape resource-making processes, and, on the other, how new relations of power 
are formed around, in and through these processes.  
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3. FIELDWORK, ASSEMBLED MATERIALS AND 
MODE OF ANALYSIS  
My approach to assembling research materials and analysing findings is grounded in an 
interpretive research tradition in the social sciences, or in other words in tradition of 
‘interpretive analytics’ as Rabinow (2011: 209) terms it7. The decisions on methods have 
been guided by a commitment to understanding nature-society relations in specific 
contexts, which implies qualitative and field-based research methods. This means that the 
modes of acquiring materials have been fieldwork intensive. In this chapter I first clarify 
what kinds of spatial areas the composite articles cover and then explain more in detail 
how the fieldwork for each article was carried out and how the materials were gathered. 
This also means opening up the ways my research has evolved along and through the 
different research projects for which I have worked. I then explain briefly how I have 
analysed the materials, especially the policy documents and expert interviews, after which I 
explicate how I have synthesised the findings of the composite articles in ways that make 
them cohere with each other conceptually, while also allowing for abstractions that were 
not possible before carrying out research for each of them. Finally, I briefly reflect on the 
ethics of my research work.    
3.1 THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE CASES  
The cases on which I have based the composite articles of this thesis cover hydrosocial 
ordering and infrastructuring efforts on different spatial and temporal scales and also in 
different parts of the Mekong Region (Map 2). Most of the case areas are within the 
Lower Mekong Basin. The focus of Article I is the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. It covers 
key hydraulic infrastructuring efforts that have made the Delta one of the most engineered 
deltaic waterscapes globally. Article II looks at the role of the Mekong River Commission 
and the assessment work of its Secretariat, which covers the whole of the Lower Mekong 
Basin. Article III shifts focus to another important organisation, the World Bank, and its 
energy support in Laos. In a sense Article III covers the whole of Laos but it is especially 
focused on the country’s frontal dam project, the Nam Theun 2, situated in the Nakai 
 
77 Rabinow prefers ‘interpretive analytics’ because the term ‘social sciences’ carries an unproblematised take on the concept 
of ‘social’. The same applies to the meaning of ‘human’ in the term ‘human sciences’. This is an appropriate note especially 
for studies trying to highlight the limitations and problems of being too human-centered and parting from the position that 
the ‘social’ in social sciences has long been excessively social.  
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Plateau in Khammouane province in Central Laos. Article III also examines the World 
Bank-supported solar home systems project, again in Khammouane province but also in 
Champasak province, Southern Laos.  
Article IV shifts focus from Laos to Cambodia. It analyses how climate change has been 
rendered governable in Cambodia in ways that make hydraulic infrastructuring in the form 
of large dams and irrigation schemes seem desirable. Article V keeps the focus on 
Cambodia while zooming into three CDM hydropower projects situated in the Cardamom 
Mountains, Southwestern Cambodia. The Cardamom Mountains are partly within the 
Mekong Basin. They form an important watershed area for the tributary rivers that flow 
into the Tonle Sap Lake. At the same time it is also a watershed area for rivers flowing in 
the opposite direction, to coastal Cambodia, and meeting the sea in the Gulf of Thailand. 
Two of these latter rivers are now dammed by the studied Atay, Russei Chrum and Tatay 
hydropower projects (see Map 1). Although these dams do not influence the Mekong 
Basin directly, their concessionary governing mode is representative of the other two large 
dams in Cambodia, one of which, the Lower Sesan 2, is within the Basin. The 
concessionary governing mode also applies to large dams in Laos, all of which are within 
the Basin. In addition, the dynamics related to the CDM are likely to be similar for the 
more recent Lao CDM dams, of which the most controversial projects form a cascade of 
dams on the Mekong tributary of Nam Ou in northern Laos. Furthermore, the way the 
Cardamom dams triggered timber logging has relevance not only to the Cambodian Lower 
Sesan 2 but also, to some extent, to many Lao dam projects, including the Nam Theun 2 





Map 2: The geographical areas covered by each of the composite articles. 
3.2 ASSEMBLED RESEARCH MATERIALS 
The fieldwork periods have consisted of intensive and open-ended methods of querying 
data through observing, listening to and interviewing various experts, policy-makers, 
ministry, provincial, district and village officials, development practitioners, consultants 
and NGO staff members, as well as different groups of farmers and fishers. Fieldwork has 
also involved the collection of different policy and project documents that would be 
difficult to acquire from afar. Importantly, fieldwork and the collection of research 
material for the dissertation’s articles are entwined with various research projects in which 
44 
 
I have worked during the past. My involvement with these projects has meant that my 
PhD journey, including data collection and analysis, has not always been as 
straightforward as one might wish, but it has provided me with valuable opportunities, 
formative experiences and engagements with multiple actors from farmers and fishers to 
experts on hydrological models that I would not have easily gained otherwise. My time 
spent in the Mekong Region consists of several separate trips that often lasted 1-2 months 
but also includes two longer stays of 7 months in Vietnam and 6 months in Cambodia. In 
total the various trips add up to 7 months in Vietnam, 9-10 months in Cambodia, 4-5 
months in Laos and 1-2 months in Thailand. I describe below in more detail the fieldwork 
periods and timings that have been most important for the thesis. 
The first project that took me to the Mekong Region was the ‘Lower Mekong Modelling 
Project’ (WUP-FIN2), a consultancy project undertaken by the Helsinki University of 
Technology and the Finnish Environment Institute that developed hydrological, 
environmental and socio-economic assessment tools for the Mekong River Commission. 
During that project I carried out research in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam and the 
primary research material collected during 7 months in 2004-2005 also served as data for 
Article I. The fieldwork covered three case study areas: high dyke systems in the upper 
delta of An Giang province, coastal salinity protection systems in Tien Giang province 
and the Plain of Reeds floodplains in Long An province. The research material included 
interviews with key officials at the province, district, commune and hamlet level as well as 
16 group discussions and 20 household interviews with farmers. Our research team from 
Can Tho University was always escorted by someone from the province and/or local 
police staff, which evidently curbed most direct criticism of government policies, but in 
the more relaxed moments there was space to share more critical reflections. The primary 
materials are not analysed in detail in Article I but they inform the overall analysis and 
interpretation. In its final form, Article I draws mainly from secondary sources, including 
reports and research literature, but it would have been impossible to grasp what is going 
on in the delta without the intensive fieldwork period. By visiting different villages and 
observing daily routines I experienced how fluvial waters are part of people’s everyday life 
in the Delta. The guiding interest was to trace the continuities and changes in water 
control efforts and to understand how hydraulic and social ordering relate to each other. 
Through the WUP-FIN2 project I also familiarised myself with the work of the Mekong 
River Commission, its experts, assessment work and hydrological models. This laid the 
ground for the dissertation’s Article II. The project enabled me to identify the key 
experts, to gain insights into the various knowledge-production processes and to observe 
how different programs in the Commission’s Secretariat work. Moreover, it facilitated 
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interview access to some of the key experts. During 2006 and 2008 I carried out 18 
interviews with experts in the secretariat of the Mekong River Commission, including 
interviews with hydrologists and modellers. The most important policy documents and 
technical reports analysed include the World Bank modelling report (World Bank 2004), 
the strategy paper of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, (World Bank and 
ADB 2006), and the various responses to these reports by different research and civil 
society networks.  
Material for Article III was collected as part of the University of Turku project, ‘Why 
Renewable Energy Projects Fail? Design and Implementation of Energy Assistance 
Projects in Cambodia and Lao PDR (DREAM)’, funded by the Academy of Finland. Key 
research materials included various policy, strategy and project documents, most 
importantly from the World Bank as well as reports produced by advocacy groups critical 
of the World Bank. The fieldwork was mainly carried out in January and February 2010. It 
included interviews with informants from the World Bank and the Laotian Ministry of 
Energy and Mines, as well as with consultants that have worked for the Nam Theun 2 
project. Background interviews in Vientiane were also carried out with representatives 
from various development organisations and NGOs. The interviews in Champasak 
province with village heads and staff from the Provincial Department of Energy and 
Mines focused solely on the World Bank funded solar panel program; there were also six 
focus group discussions in the villages. In the district of Nakai, Khammouane province, 
we collected materials regarding both the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project and the solar 
panel program and interviewed representatives from the Nam Theun 2 Watershed 
Management and Protection Authority (WMPA), as well as district authorities. An 
interview with the village head and seven focus group interviews were carried out in the 
villages situated along the Nam Theun River, upstream from the reservoir, as well as in a 
resettlement village situated on the shore of the reservoir. We were not able to do detailed 
work in the Xe Bang Fai downstream areas as our research permits did not allow it. A 
chance to do research in these areas emerged much later through fieldwork for University 
of Helsinki project, ‘Environmental vulnerability, social resilience and multi-scale 
governance’ in 2015 and 2016. This time the research was framed by flood related 
vulnerabilities. While impacts of Nam Theun 2 are highly sensitive, the flood dynamics are 
less so even though they are closely related to alterations in flow regimes, caused by Nam 
Theun 2. In the actual field interviews and discussions we were able to address dam 
related changes also more broadly. This provided me with updates and I was also enabled 
to develop more in-depth insights on the Nam Theun 2 dam and its effects in terms of 
downstream hydrosocial changes. This, in turn, has given me perspective to elaborate the 
findings of Article III further in the broader discussions of the thesis synthesis.  
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The fieldwork for Article IV was carried out within two University of Turku projects:  a 
commissioned study to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ‘Adequacy of Climate Change 
Mitigation Initiatives in Laos and Cambodia: Comparing Options and Analysing Obstacles 
in Local Context’ and an Academy of Finland-funded, ‘Redefining Energy and Climate 
Policy in the Least Developed Countries: Analysing Institutions and Initiatives in the 
Mekong Region (RECLAIM)’. The material consists of policy documents and 23 key 
informant interviews that I carried out mostly in Phnom Penh in 2011 and 2013. The 
documents analysed included the Cambodian Climate Change Strategic Plan (RGC 2013), 
CDM project development documents, adaptation-related project documents and 
assessments related to vulnerability and adaptation. The interviewees included officials 
from the Ministry of Environment as well as representatives from the donor community 
and civil society organisations. In addition I made use of field visits carried out in May-
June 2011 to five different CDM projects which included interviews with staff of the 
CDM projects when possible, and six group interviews in host or adjacent communities. 
At the beginning of 2013 I made follow-up visits to three of these projects: Angkor Bio 
Cogen, Siang Phong biogas and Kamchay hydropower projects.  
I collected the materials for Article IV partly before the Cardamom dams in the southwest 
of Cambodia gained CDM status and without the possibility to visit these sites. These 
projects thus remained without detailed analysis in Article IV. The Atay, Tatay and Russei 
Chrum dams gained CDM status rather rapidly and perhaps also surprisingly. I became 
increasingly interested in them and eventually these dams became the focus of the Article 
V. Unlike the much studied Nam Theun 2, these dams were strikingly under-researched. 
The more I tried to grasp what was going on with these dams, the more evident it became 
that my interest would not be limited only to the ways hydropower and carbon trade are 
connected but would extend to the ways climate mitigation initiatives and hydropower 
projects get entangled with other resource control schemes. The research materials I 
gathered formed a kind of a factual assemblage that enabled me to establish connections 
between the conservation and logging zones and how they were related to the three 
hydropower projects. This factual assemblage consisted of elements from policy and 
project documents, newspaper articles and fieldwork interviews carried out mainly in 
March 2013 and February-March 2014. The interviews also provided more detailed 
understanding of the different perceptions, experiences and ways of making sense of the 
key events and dynamics that the different projects had set in motion. The informants of 
the 23 thematic interviews included relevant ministry officials (especially those with 
connections to the CDM projects) and journalists, as well as NGO staff and activists 
engaged in conservation and human rights. Most of these interviews were carried out in 
Phnom Penh and Khemara Phoumin, the capital of Koh Kong province. Despite various 
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attempts we could not gain interview access to representatives of the hydropower 
companies. During the two and half months of fieldwork, in total around eight days were 
spent in dam-affected villages. The community-level group discussions with villagers and 
interviews with local ex-workers in dam construction and village chiefs (38 interviewees in 
total) were carried out in two communes in the province of Koh Kong where most of the 
dams’ downstream impacts are experienced. Ultimately, the article by Milne (2015) and the 
report of Global Witness (2015) were important in confirming many of the connections in 
my speculations about which I would otherwise had doubts. 
3.3 MODE OF ANALYSIS 
My mode of analysis has been ‘eclectic’ in the sense that it has been oriented towards 
understanding particular sets of dynamics in specific places. Thus, I have drawn on several 
theoretical frameworks that speak to the dynamics I have observed (Bridge et al. 2015: 5). 
This is related to my intention of not letting a theoretical approach over-code and over-
determine empirical findings but, rather, using it to assist in revealing and learning 
something new. Ideally, I think, fieldwork should allow for a co-constitutive relationship 
between the more theoretical conceptualisations and the empirical findings. The last article 
(Article V), in particular, puts considerable effort into working with and elaborating 
conceptualisations, along with making sense of the empirical findings. Similarly, when 
synthesising findings from the composite articles, I have tried to re-work the 
conceptualisations in order to develop lines of arguments that make the connections and 
complementarities between the empirical cases visible.    
In my analysis I have also tried to avoid overt determinism by following a Foucauldian 
approach to the analysed processes as open-ended, in which something new is in the 
making and something fluid is being coagulated and turned into something solid (Foucault 
2007: 248). While I have looked at how certain power formations shape resource-making 
processes, I have also been interested how these processes have in turn been formative of 
new power constellations. This has meant paying attention to the effects of the analysed 
processes, especially the power effects, in a way that is attentive to the heterogeneous 
elements that might interact in unintentional and yet consequential ways. This is also 
consistent with the Latourian proposal to study power effects (Latour 1987, Mitchell 
2002). The openness to seeing the observed solidifications as effects of processes that may 
be shaped by multiple forces, rationalities and practices is what has made the concept of 
assemblage relevant to the analysis. But assemblage also has another meaning in relation 
to my work and the mode of analysis. The thesis is composed of articles in a manner that 
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makes the thesis itself resemble an assemblage. The articles are interrelated but they also 
remain external to each. At the same time, their coming together produces something 
new. Not all lines of arguments in the synthesis were entirely predictable when working on 
the composite cases. The establishment of interrelations has also required re-worked 
conceptualisations. This goes back to the co-constitutive relationship between the more 
theoretical conceptualisations and the empirical findings. 
Analysis of the research materials 
In my analysis of the research materials I have drawn most importantly on the analytical 
strategies that are in line or in complementary relation with Foucauldian inspired research 
on political ecology. The concord with governmentality studies has been most evident in 
the analysis for Articles II, III and IV and in the ways I have analysed both policy 
documents and the interviews of experts, officials, managers and practitioners involved in 
policy-making processes. The development actors and transnational regulatory agencies 
such as the World Bank operate through the arts of liberal governing and their powers of 
governing are deeply entwined with how successfully the fields they attempt to govern are 
rendered technical (Li 2007a). In these cases I have approached the policy documents as 
part of the intellectual machinery through which abstract ideas and rationales of 
government are translated into a domain of calculability and implementation (Foucault 
1991, Rose and Miller 1992, Gottweiss 2003). In terms of the expert interviews, I have 
paid attention to the kind of truth claims certain experts advance. I have also tried to trace 
the rationales that have guided their attention and the ways they interpret results from 
certain knowledge-making processes and assessments (Anderssen 2003).  
When analysing the documents and interviews (especially for Articles III and IV), I have 
paid special attention to attempts to render contradictive and antagonistic objectives 
synergistic through different win-win storylines and to other similar discursive work aimed 
at consensualisation. I have tried to understand the role of these efforts in attempts to 
close down spaces of contestation, and thus in the production of governability. At the 
same time, the production of resources and their governability is not only about discursive 
ordering devices and rationales but also about different techniques, practices and very 
material technologies. Thus my analysis is equally attentive to the ordering capacities of 
hydraulic infrastructures (such as dams and different systems of embankments, sluice 
gates and canals), Basin-wide and Delta-wide Master Plans (Article I), technical inscription 
devices like hydrological models (Article II), impact assessments (Articles II, IV and V) 




Governing, at least in its liberal form, is ‘a problematizing activity’ (Rose and Miller 1992: 
181). To understand how governability is produced and its effects is to understand how 
certain problematisations are constituted and how they work, what do they do, the kind of 
governing mechanisms and technologies they elicit, what they enable and what they 
simultaneously exclude and foreclose. In order to understand how certain 
problematisations and problem spaces are bounded and constituted I have paid attention 
to framing. Framing, in turn, involves choices about which elements, relationships, 
linkages and dynamics are included and accounted for and which are to be excluded from 
consideration and hence rendered more invisible. The ways in which problems are 
bounded and constituted through framing are closely related to particular policy 
narratives, as different framings produce very different narratives about what is to be 
solved, how and by whom (Leach et al. 2010). Hence, especially in Article IV, I have 
traced certain discursive policy story-lines and tried to analyse the specific interventions 
they justify, the kinds of experts, mechanisms and technologies they call upon or enable 
and the options they simultaneously side-line, obscure or render invisible (Hajer 1995: 56-
50, Fairhead and Leach 2003, Leach 2008).  
Again, however, attention to different techniques and practices of governing has been 
equally central. They too shape and frame problem domains and create boundaries for 
fields of vision, and are, overall, central in making certain kinds of governing and 
reasoning possible. When analysing techniques such as hydrological models, 
environmental impact assessments, vulnerability assessments and carbon accounting 
techniques I have paid attention to what is being accounted for and what is simultaneously 
excluded from consideration and the field of vision. In regard to, for example, carbon 
accounting techniques, I have further reflected on how the practices and techniques of 
accounting create and result in certain relations of accountabilities and responsibilities 
while pre-empting and precluding others. This attention to both discursive and technical 
ordering and framing attempts means that I have tried to understand how certain 
governing rationales and techniques mutually support each other, how they are co-
constitutively formative of certain problem domains and how certain problem domains, in 
turn, call upon them for certain reasonings, policies, expertise, techniques and 
technologies (Rose and Miller 1992).  
My motivation for this kind of analysis has stemmed from the wish to unsettle some of 
the dominant assumptions and problem closures by bringing visibility to what has been 
excluded or obscured from the constituted fields of vision. If governing is centrally a 
problematising activity, then analytics of governing is centrally about problematising 
problematisations. The intention behind this mode of analysis is thus to pave the way for 
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new openings, understandings and problematisations. While the analysis has partly 
evolved through identifying and dissecting key policy documents and technical reports, 
the value of combining this kind of analysis with fieldwork and interviews and the 
empirical research or reports of others lies especially in how this combination enables the 
tracing of ’disjunctures between the programmatic statements of policy and the messiness 
of actuality’ (Barry 2001:21). Examining and revealing what is actually going on when 
certain policies are implemented or certain techniques applied has also allowed me to 
explore and question potentially powerful consensualisation attempts by, for example, 
highlighting how elements presented as synergistic in policy discourses actually appear 
antagonistic. 
Mode of synthesising 
Herein I briefly explicate how I have synthesised the findings from the composite articles, 
which represent distinct empirical cases, in this thesis summary. Analysis of the cases for 
this synthesis is influenced by Flyvbjerg’s (2006) and Lund’s (2014) encouragement to 
think carefully and systematically ‘of what is this a case’. After I assembled the cases they 
resonated in ways that I was not necessarily fully anticipating at the time of writing each of 
the separate articles. I needed to re-think the kind of conceptualisations and framings that 
would allow me to articulate this resonation most meaningfully. I needed, once again, to 
go through the ‘analytical movements’ (Lund 2014: 225) between the specific and general 
as well as the concrete and abstract of each of the cases. Ultimately, in this synthesis the 
work for each of the articles is a case of something slightly different than what I have 
made of it in the published articles. The synthesising work has been in some ways my own 
attempt at fixing the fluid, in the sense of trying to reduce heterogeneities, contingencies 
and fluidities between and within the cases, while trying to make them legible in ways that 
conceptualise resonating patterns between them. This process has enabled and solidified 
more general arguments and allowed for generalisation. At the same time, I have tried to 
remain congruent with my critical take on the analysed fixing attempts and to avoid 
overtly deterministic conceptual fixations. 
Through these analytical movements I have synthesised my research by highlighting how 
each of the cases brings forth different aspects of water resourcification and hydrosocial 
ordering processes in the Mekong Region in ways that allow generalisations on the co-
constitutive relations between resources and power formations. Again, this has meant that 
not all of the arguments central to the separate articles are quite so central when 
synthesising their findings and highlighting their interconnections and complementarities. 
Some observations or findings, in turn, that remained rather implicit or under-
conceptualised in the published articles began to take shape as more explicit arguments or 
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were somewhat differently conceptualised when bringing the findings from the composite 
articles together. For example, some of the resonation between the Nam Theun 2 (Article 
III) and the Cardamom dams (Article V) became evident only when taking a new look at 
Nam Theun 2, after writing Article V. Consequently, I discuss Nam Theun 2 more 
forcefully as a concessionary and enclavistic project in this synthesis than I did in Article 
III. The framework I developed in Article V, on the other hand, provided me with 
conceptual lenses that helped me in making findings from earlier articles cohere 
meaningfully in terms of viewing them as different cases of frontier dynamics shaped by 
multiple interacting rationales and techniques of governing.  
3.4 ETHICAL REFLECTIONS 
I have followed the ethical principles common to empirical social science research. The 
interviews are based on informed consent and I have sought to protect the informants’ 
anonymity. This is pronouncedly relevant in the contexts of Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia, where criticism of state policies is restricted and can also be sanctioned. 
Especially in Laos, hydropower dams are one of the most restricted topics in public 
discussion, but it seems to be increasingly so also in Cambodia. Likewise, the logging and 
the connections between timber tycoons and party-state authorities touched upon in 
Article V is sensitive. I have not, however, kept the sites of field work anonymous as that 
allows better evaluation of the relevance of the study. At the same time, I have been 
careful not to use the information of informants in such detailed ways that they could be 
identified, or in ways that could bring them harm. 
A pertinent question for Northern researchers working in the so-called global South, 
especially on topics related to resource extractivism, is how to avoid being extractivist in 
one’s own knowledge-making practices. With this in mind, I have at least tried to share the 
‘results’ in meaningful ways, presenting findings not only in academic forums, but also in 
those of policy-makers and activists, some of which I have taken part in organising.  In 
relation to policy-makers, the challenge, of course is that my analysis does not provide any 
immediate, alternative solutions to the problems or challenges exposed. In terms of 
activism, my analysis is more focused on practices of producing closures than on practices 
of contestations, more on processes that lead to, rather than challenge, the centralising of 
resource control, so perhaps not always immediately helpful or relevant. But at the same 
time, I believe analysis that problematises attempts at closures or highlights the multiple 
actors and rationales involved, and the complex ways responsibilities are distributed – for 
example, in the damming of Mekong – is supportive of those directly involved in creating 
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space to configure the current river-society relations and power formations differently (Li 
2019: 31). I have also carried out more activist-oriented work in parallel with the research 
work, for example, in raising public debate about the role of Finnish actors in the 
Mekong’s resource politics or supporting the complaint process against the Finnish 
engineering company, Pöyry Group, which was alleged to have violated OECD guidelines 
for multinational companies in how it advanced the Xayaburi project, the first mainstream 




4. MAIN FINDINGS: THE MAKING OF 
ORDERABLE AND INVESTABLE WATERSCAPES  
This chapter presents the main arguments and findings from the five composite articles. 
The analysis addresses attempts to produce controllable and investable waterscapes as well 
as their effects, paying special attention to the continuities and ruptures in these efforts. It 
starts from the Mekong Delta, the early frontier for the colonial, export-oriented, rice 
plantation economy and for colonial state rule. After the Indochina Wars it evolved into a 
frontier of agro-hydraulic modernisation firstly advanced by American Cold War 
technopolitics and subsequently by the North Vietnamese socialist government (Article I, 
discussed in Section 5.1). It was in the Mekong Delta that the basin-wide plans of ‘full 
control’ acclimatisation materialised to the fullest extent, although in a downscaled form.  
Attention then shifts to the more recent intensification of water resourcification in Laos 
and Cambodia and to key elements enabling this development in terms of techno-
scientific knowledge production and new sustainability standards. Both the MRC-
produced, Basin-wide knowledge (addressed in Article II and discussed in Section 5.2), 
and sustainability mechanisms produced by the World Bank through the Nam Theun 2 
(addressed in Article III and discussed in Section 5.3) have supported the re-legitimation 
of hydropower by holding out hopes that with adequate expertise and techniques the old 
problems related to large dams can be fixed and the externalities internalised. Thus they 
have both contributed to efforts to transform the Mekong into a frontier of eco-
modernisation.  
The analysis then moves on to elaborate connections between water resourcification and 
the rationales and techniques of governing climate change, synthesising key findings from 
Articles III, IV and V (Section 5.4). Findings from Article V are further presented in 
Section 5.5. which highlights how the concessionary governing mode through which dams 
in the Mekong Region are advanced, is shaped by neoliberal and authoritarian governing 
rationales, and how it furthers ‘postneoliberal’ corporate power formations over riverine 
hydrosocial relations. It also highlights how the projects entangle with multipurpose Sino-
Cambodian dealings as well as with other schemes of resource governing.  
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4.1 ASSEMBLING AN ACCLIMATISED AND CONTROLLABLE MEKONG DELTA  
Article I sketches out the main continuities and ruptures in the Mekong Delta’s intensive 
hydro-social and agro-hydraulic ordering efforts, outlines their major effects in ecological 
and social terms and finally scopes the possibilities for alternative approaches. The 
Vietnamese part of the Delta is one of Mekong’s most engineered and infrastructured 
waterscapes, whose water resourcification entails attempts to enhance and optimise water 
control for agricultural purposes, especially in the form of rice monocultures: first in the 
form of a web of canals to drain the wetlands, and secondly in the form of irrigation and 
flood and salinity prevention systems to intensify agricultural production on the drained 
lands. One of the important continuities in hydrosocial ordering efforts relates to how the 
Delta has been perceived simultaneously as a frontier for water resourcification and 
political control for changing regimes of planners and rulers from afar. Efforts to enhance 
the controllability of the Delta’s waters have thus often coalesced with efforts to enhance 
the controllability of the Delta’s residents. Another continuity relates to the acclimatisation 
aspirations embedded in the Mekong’s hydrosocial ordering efforts. It was in the Delta 
that the Basin-wide scheme of modernising and acclimatising hydroagricultural production 
modes, got translated into its most actualisable forms – albeit without the large-scale 
upstream dams, decades later than initially intended and with the transposed political-
economic purposes of the North Vietnamese socialist government. Based on Article I, I 
synthesise below how water has been resourcified and hydrosocial relations ordered in the 
Mekong Delta, and with what effects. The resultant power formations of the various 
hydraulic efforts remained somewhat implicit or underanalysed in the original version of 
Article I and thus I augment it, giving more consideration to these aspects with the help of 
more recent literature.   
Article I describes how major water-works in the Mekong Delta started in precolonial 
times in the form of canal excavations. These made it accessible for Chinese merchants 
and the Vietnamese Nguyen Empire, which then extended its reach over most parts of the 
loosely Khmer-ruled swampy and forested delta. During colonial times the French 
administration continued to open up the marshes and wetland forests with a network of 
canals but more intensively, with the help of new steam-powered dredging techniques. 
This was one of the world’s largest hydraulic endeavours at the time, resulting in 
thousands of kilometres of canals (Biggs 2010), a fourfold increase in rice-growing areas 
and threefold increase in population (Miller 2003: 176). During this time the Delta was a 
land frontier being transformed into an export-oriented rice plantation economy that 
accrued profits to the colonial landlords. The water works also provided the main 
transport system and rendered previously inaccessible marshy areas accessible to the 
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colonial rulers and their political ordering and taxation efforts. Water and waterworks 
were clearly made as state domain which they continue to be today.  Most water 
management decisions apart from canal dredging, however, remained at the farm level 
(Miller 2003), using techniques that were amphibious in the sense of being attuned to tidal 
and seasonal changes in the confluence of the fluvial and marine waters. 
A qualitatively different round of hydraulic infrastructuring commenced in the 1950s and 
1960s. This time water was resourcified in order to intensify agricultural production on the 
drained lands by optimising water’s affordances to year-round, intensive, multicropping 
rice monocultures. The seasonal changes in water flows were from this perspective a 
hindrance to be mitigated by creating year-round separation between water and 
agricultural lands, and conditions to controllably water the lands when needed. The 
hydraulic infrastructuring was a way to make the fluid depend on the solid. The previous 
floodplains of the Upper Delta were to be protected from flood waters and coastal areas 
from salinity intrusion. These new efforts, aiming at the acclimatisation (Frewer 2016) and 
terrestrialisation of agriculture (Morita 2016), evolved first techno-scientifically under the 
auspices of the Mekong Committee at the Basin scale, with the guidance of the American 
experts (Miller 2003, Biggs 2008, Sneddon 2015).8 The Basin-wide schemes were, 
however, deemed unfeasible for various reasons including financial barriers and escalating 
conflicts. At the same time the focus of American aid programs shifted from the whole of 
Lower Mekong Basin to South Vietnam, materialising importantly in the Mekong Delta 
Program (1968) drafted by the Tennessee Valley Architect David Lilienthal and his team 
together with Vietnamese officials. The Basin-wide scheme of acclimatisation was thus 
downscaled to the Mekong Delta of Vietnam without the colossal and costly upstream 
Mekong dams.  
In addition to rehabilitating and enlarging existing but badly silted canals, the water works 
were to consist of integrated systems of high dikes, sluice gates and canals for flood and 
salinity control in order to ‘close off’ (Miller 2003: 187) the Delta from their influence.  
Again, the hydrosocial ordering efforts also entailed aspirations to enhance socio-political 
controllability from a distance. The water works formed an essential part of the American 
strategy to win the hearts and minds of the revolutionary peasants and they became 
entangled with the anti-insurgency measures of the Saigon regime (Biggs 2010). Even the 
Delta-scale master plans were, however, eventually shelved when the area developed into a 
full war zone. Yet, as emphasised in Article I, the assessments, mappings and calculations 
in the Delta-wide plans have proved to be powerful techno-scientific inscriptions in the 
 
8 There were in the Delta, however, already plans and experiments on a smaller scale of enclosed dike systems during the 
Indochina Wars (Biggs et al. 2009), but the schemes of acclimatisation at Basin and Delta-scale got initiated during this time. 
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sense of informing the new governing regimes of what could be possible, and have thus 
been persistent in invoking the desire to produce hydrosocial orderability ‘freed’ from 
seasonally changing water conditions on a Delta scale via large-scale hydraulic 
infrastructuring. 
After the unification of the country, the Mekong Delta was again perceived as a hydraulic 
development frontier for planners of a regime with ambitions to produce hydrosocial 
governability from a distance. The new reunified Socialist Republic of Vietnam led by the 
Communist Party was de facto dominated by the North Vietnamese who saw Mekong 
Delta as lagging behind the Northern Red River Delta, at the time much more regulated 
(Benedikter 2014). The war damage, dilapidated hydraulic structures due to lack of 
maintenance, the remaining marshes and forests, and hydroagricultural systems that were 
still largely amphibious and attuned to the seasonal and tidal flow variations all seemed to 
lack the hydraulic improvements and modernisation that the new regime was ready to 
provide. The resources to undertake major water-works, however, remained scarce for the 
next decades. The hydraulic mission led by Northern engineers and bureaucrats – their 
‘tunnel vision’ (Scott 1998: 11) set on rice-production maximisation – was first advanced 
through the mass mobilisation of people to dig canals manually, although gradually more 
mechanical works were conducted to both reclaim new lands, and to establish isolated 
flood and salinity prevention systems (Miller 2003, Benedikter 2014). As explained in 
Article I, it was only after the 1986 doi moi policy and the increased availability of foreign 
funds that the plans of ‘closing off’ the Delta started to materialise in more integrated 
ways. The continuity of the large-scale acclimatisation plans can be interpreted as a 
demonstration of the latent power of technoscientific inscriptions (Sneddon 2015: 126), as 
they may become actualisable much later than initially planned and as part of a 
governmental assemblage quite different from the original one.  
What needed more attention in Article I, is that the ‘closing off’ efforts that eventually 
materialised were not simply the application of a model inherited from the US advisors of 
the Saigon regime; they were also shaped by the experiences of the North Vietnamese 
hydraulic planners and engineers from the Red River Delta a decade earlier. Benedikter 
(2014), who also uses Article I (Käkönen 2008), has developed this line of inquiry 
demonstrating how the Northern engineers read the Southern waterscape based on their 
experience from very different hydro-ecological-agricultural-social conditions of the Red 
River Delta and perceived the Mekong Delta floods as an adversity to combat.9 The same 
engineers and experts that had been developing dike-enclosed systems a decade earlier in 
 
9 Unlike the calmer and more slowly rising Mekong Delta floods that are disastrous only exceptionally (Ehlert 2012), the 
Northern flash floods are associated with disasters, and perceived as something to fight against (Benedikter 2014). 
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the Red River Delta could easily find an alignment between their approach and the 
previous Mekong Delta Master Plans of full control. They also shared a similar position of 
planning and controlling from afar through schemes developed in other contexts, 
overlooking the local specificities and differences. Another element copied from North 
Vietnam was the centralised organisational format that was to carry out the water-works. 
There was an already existing ‘socialist hydraulic bureaucracy’ (Benedikter 2014), an 
administrative grid consisting of tightly connected state planning and management 
agencies as well as state-owned companies that now extended their operations to the 
South. 
As noted in Article I, the move towards larger-scale hydraulic control structures, first in 
the form of more isolated, enclosed dike systems and then in the larger, more integrated 
flood and salinity control systems, re-scaled water-related decision-making; sluice gate 
operation and pumping stations, for example, required new authoritative coordination 
‘above’ the farm scale. This elucidates the potential of water works to re-scale power 
relations and thus to produce power effects. When combined with the study of Benedikter 
(2014) it becomes possible to construct a more explicit argument on how this re-scaling of 
power relations gets entwined with the efforts of the Northern regime to establish and 
consolidate its rule in the South in a manner that resembles a process that I would call as 
state ‘hydro-territorialisation’. For the Northern state officials and hydraulic experts, the 
Mekong Delta was not only a frontier for agricultural modernisation that required water 
resourcification via hydraulic infrastructuring, but also a political frontier with suspicious 
and potentially disloyal anti-communists that needed to be brought under the control of 
the Northern regime. During the post-unification period, all authoritative posts in the 
emerging organisational infrastructure were staffed by Northern officials and engineers 
known to be loyal to the socialist government (Benedikter 2014). It was, importantly, the 
water-works through which the Delta’s watery terrains and people were incorporated into 
the administrative grid of the new socialist regime.  As noted in Article I, land 
collectivisation was fiercely and successfully resisted, but hydraulic infrastructuring and the 
accompanying re-scaled powers to decide water management were not. Thus it seems that 
state territorialisation was more successful through hydro-social ordering efforts than 
through the ordering of land tenure relations. Yet the Northern state regime should not be 
seen simply as an already powerful authority that extended its reach via water-works. 
Instead hydraulic infrastructuring enabled new power constellations that built and 
strengthened state capacities to do this. In sum, when augmenting the analysis in Article I 
with that of Benedikter (2014), and the broader discussions in this thesis, Mekong Delta 
forms an interesting case of the co-production of resources and states (Bridge 2014) in 
which the technoscientific statecraft is entangled with the territorialisation of sovereign 
58 
 
and administrative state powers. It also exemplifies how resourcified waters and hydraulic 
state formations are both the tools of hydrosocial ordering, and the effects of formative 
processes in which hydrosocial relations are rearranged.  
The efforts to radically simplify the Delta’s seasonally varying hydro-ecological conditions 
and agricultural patterns into acclimatised and terrestrialised rice monocropping areas 
were not at least an immediate failure. Article I highlights how the hydraulic 
infrastructuring efforts that increased the orderability of water were an important element 
(together with the new doi moi policies) in facilitating the astounding increase in the Delta’s 
agricultural productivity through which Vietnam was not only able to achieve its own 
national food security targets but also became one of the leading rice exporters globally. 
The bracketed side-effects of hydraulic infrastructuring, in the form of new water-related 
risks, vulnerabilities and environmental degradation, have, however, started to haunt the 
success story. Furthermore, while the efforts to produce governability from a distance and 
secure rule over the Delta’s watery lands and people through hydraulic works had the goal 
of simplified legibility and controllability (Scott 1998) they have, rather, resulted in 
increasing socio-ecological complexity (Robbins 2008), and the ruled waters in one place 
have created unruly waters in another.  
Article I outlines many of the bracketed side-effects and newly created complexities 
resulting from the terrestrialising project of producing year-round multicropping 
monocultures, and more recent studies have further elaborated and underlined their 
relevance. The flood protection systems have shifted flood waters to unprotected areas 
that were previously flood-free (Dang et al. 2016); the reduced water detention capacity 
because of the flood prevention systems together with the increased irrigation in the dry 
season has strengthened the saline water intrusion (Tran et al. 2018a); the intensive 
cropping systems require greater quantities of agrochemicals which deteriorate water 
quality and land fertility; previous fluvial multispecies entanglements have been 
disconnected and disturbed as the high dike systems have, for example, created barriers 
for fisheries and diminished floodplain and brackish fish habitats; more biodiverse 
agrarian ecologies have been displaced. Meanwhile, the increased separation of water and 
land in the Upper Delta means that fluvial sediments are no longer swept onto previous 
floodplains. The soils are thus deprived of the nutrients bound to the sediments and of 
the flushing out of agro-chemical induced toxins and pests (Chapman et al. 2016). There is 
increasing evidence (Tran and Weger 2018, Tran et al. 2018b) that in the long term this 
will mean rising production costs and reduced economic returns for the farmers even to 
the point that triple rice cropping will mean lower earnings compared to more flood-based 
and diversified agricultural production. As underlined in Article I, the landless and land 
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poor whose livelihoods were most tuned to the rhythms of the amphibious Delta have 
suffered the most as they have often found it difficult to find replacements for previously 
easily accessed water, plants, fisheries and nutrient sediments of which they have now 
been deprived or excluded. Article I also highlights that the more the bracketed effects 
negatively affect the productionist goals themselves, the more attention they gain. 
Some of the produced socio-ecological complexities relate to the persistently destabilising 
effects on the ordering attempts by water. The fluid is constantly escaping and un-making 
the fixed; the canals are continuously silted up, the dykes continuously eroded. To 
maintain an infrastructurally controlled waterscape means a lot of on-going work against 
forces that incessantly threaten to un-make the engineered system (Biggs 2010). The 
attempts to counter this un-making of the terrestrialised delta have invited ever-extending 
engineering solutions, thereby creating new forms of fluid unruliness as well as new 
patterns of water-risk distribution and water-related vulnerabilities.10 Climate change is 
adding unpredictability to the powers of fluvial and marine waters and how they meet in 
the Delta, further complicating future hydrosocial ordering efforts. This constant 
unruliness underlines that hydrosocial relations are only partially controlled by humans; 
fluvial waters have a certain agency in the sense of bringing about effects independent of 
the intentionality of the designers and promoters of hydro-social ordering (Latour 1999, 
Mitchell 2002, Biggs 2010, Sneddon 2015). The powers of water are constantly shaping as 
well as undermining new attempts to fix the fluid.11 
There are also increasing concerns that maintaining the acclimatised and terrestrialised 
monocropping may become cost-prohibitive because of mounting maintenance and repair 
costs, the high price of compensating for the reductions in soil fertility (due to the 
inhibiting of the entanglements of soil and alluvial waters that result in soil fertility for 
agriculture) and the inflexibility of the centralised structures with regard to livelihood 
diversification. Article I noted alternative initiatives that I then called ‘adaptive 
approaches’ but from the perspective of hydrosocial ordering and hydraulic 
infrastructuring I now refer to as ‘amphibious approaches’ (Morita 2016, Krause 2017). In 
contrast to previous terrestrial infrastructuring that aimed to close off the Delta, such 
approaches are more appreciative of fluvial temporalities and tuned into making use of 
 
10 The opening up of the Delta via a massive web of canals introduced floods and saline intrusion to new areas, which the 
high dikes aimed to fix, resulting, in turn, in the shifting of floods and saline waters to new areas.  And the more flood 
prevention dikes are built the stronger the eroding power of the accelerated water flows and the costlier the maintenance. 
11Article I also notes that the Delta’s residents have continuously resisted many of the hydrosocial ordering efforts from 
afar. What was not so carefully articulated is that often this resistance was aided by the powers of water and the watery 
landscape. For example, the reach of the French and the subsequent Saigon regime was mostly limited to the major canals 
they dredged whereas the complex, ‘illegible’ networks of smaller waterways and tidal creeks, as well as the remaining 




seasonal variation in the affordances of fluvial and marine waters and their confluence.12 
Recently, these have gained increasing traction (Smjagl et al. 2015, Tran et al 2018b, T.A. 
Tran and Tuan 2020), with even some of the newer Delta-wide development plans, like 
the Dutch and Vietnamese-funded Mekong Delta Plan (2013), no longer insisting on full 
flood or salinity prevention, rather fostering flood-based agriculture in the Upper Delta 
and brackish water-based livelihoods in the coastal areas (Seijger et al. 2019, Hasan et al. 
2019). More amphibious hydrosocial ordering could potentially make room for more 
biodiverse agrarian ecologies, but not necessarily; the Mekong Delta Plan, for example, 
advocates further agroindustrialisation which, instead of questioning, promotes the 
environmentally destructive shrimp industry in coastal areas. 
Shifting from terrestrial to more amphibious approaches is, however, difficult for various 
reasons. Present and future infrastructuring efforts are not only challenged by the powers 
of water but also by those built into the infrastructures themselves, potentially 
constraining present and future decisions and limiting the realm of the possible (Biggs 
2008, Sneddon 2015: 126). In other words, the decades of intensive waterworks have 
resulted in power formations embedded in the materiality of the built environment (Li 
2019), which are not easily altered by the changing rationales of hydrosocial ordering. 
Even if more amphibious approaches were increasingly desired by different groups of 
people there is no easy way to unmake the already made ‘Delta machine’ (Biggs et al. 
2009): firstly, the partial unmaking of a complex infrastructural system may produce new, 
unpredictable and undesired effects, especially when the new threats and uncertainties 
related to climate change are factored in (Smajgl et al. 2015); secondly, the infrastructure 
has enabled new modes of terrestrial living which cannot be easily made amphibious 
again. This is especially so in the Upper Delta where flood prevention schemes have 
turned ‘high-incidence, low consequence’ floods into ‘low-incidence, high consequence’ 
floods (Warner et al. 2018). It is not easy to make people who now have more flood-
vulnerable ‘assets’ to become again ‘friends with the floods’ (Biggs et al. 2009:221); yet, 
due to climate change, it will be increasingly difficult to keep flood water at bay as 
exceptionally strong floods likely to exceed the dikes may increase. Lastly, past hydraulic 
efforts have produced effects in the form of entangled infrastructural and bureaucratic 
power formations. The grandiose hydraulic schemes have been conducive to producing 
 
12 I now find the concept of adaptation problematic as it invokes teleological system-thinking (Watts 2015) and an image of 
passively adjusting to an already existing environment, thus undermining the creativity of human (and non-human) actors as 
constant environment makers (Moore 2015:44-50, Latour 2017: 98-101). Thus, in contrast to control-oriented terrestrial 
infrastructuring and environment-making, the amphibious approach is about making an environment in tune with the 
fluctuating waters, thereby making use of the ebbs and flows of water, and not simply adjusting to them. The concept of 
adaptation has also become problematic in the current climate change lexicon. It enacts externalisation of climate change 
and provokes techno-scientific status-quo responses instead of status-quo-altering, socio-ecological and political-economic 
responses (Ribot 2014, Taylor 2015). 
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tightly connected and powerful groups of hydraulic planners and companies (military, 
state-owned or privatised) who have vested interests in keeping up large-scale 
infrastructuring efforts and have thus far rather successfully resisted more amphibious and 
less infrastructure-intensive approaches (Biggs et al. 2009, Evers and Benedikter 2009, 
Hasan et al. 2019).  
Overall, Article I lays out significant changes and continuities in the Delta’s hydrosocial 
ordering efforts. Insurgencies and wars including World War II, the First and Second 
Indochina Wars and the American Wars have all meant ruptures to these hydrosocial 
ordering efforts, while changing ruling regimes have altered the rationales and purposes of 
hydrosocial ordering. In colonial times canal excavations aimed to open the Delta to the 
world economy by draining and reclaiming watery lands for export-oriented, agricultural 
plantations, meanwhile making the Delta accessible to colonial state rule. In postcolonial 
times the waterworks have not only aimed at land reclamation but also at the 
intensification of agricultural production on the drained lands. This has marked a shift 
towards acclimatising and terrestrial infrastructuring. During the American-backed Saigon 
regime, hydraulic schemes aimed not only to prevent floods and salinity but also 
rebellions, as part of counterinsurgency strategies and the geopolitical goal of taming 
communists. After the unification of the country, plans for hydrosocial ordering remained 
geared towards acclimatisation and terrestrialisation of agriculture but the political and 
economic purposes shifted. The hydraulic works were to assist the country to achieve 
food security and the new Northern socialist government to establish its rule in the 
Southern Delta. The residents now deemed unruly and in need of taming consisted of 
anticommunists. The continuities and changes in this latest turn also bring forth the 
lingering power effects of hydraulic technoscientific inscriptions and a certain 
multivalence of hydraulic infrastructures in the sense of the hydrosocial ordering potential 
of the schemes, which is, to some extent, transposable in relation to changing political-
economic rationales.  
Despite ruptures caused by conflicts and wars, and changes in political and economic 
purposes, there have been no reversals in the attempts to intensify the resourcification of 
water through hydraulic infrastructuring in the region. The hydrosocial ordering schemes 
have been rather consistently planned from afar and based on templates developed in 
other contexts (Tennessee Valley, Dutch Delta, Red River Delta) that overlook the fluvial 
relationalities unique to the Mekong Delta. The large-scale waterworks have been 
conducive to governing at a distance and also lent themselves to state-making processes. 
In this case the centralising water control has had centralising power effects. Yet the 
powers of water and often also those of riverine people have continuously undermined or 
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exerted their own effects on the ordering schemes. Meanwhile, water’s powers and the 
legacies of previous water works have locked hydraulic infrastructuring into the high-cost 
work of fixing the effects of unruly, fluid waters that is increasingly cost-prohibitive (Biggs 
et al. 2009), and the unintended effects of disrupting previous fluvial relationalities in the 
form of new or shifted water risks and lost fisheries, soil fertility and clean water have 
started to problematise the success of terrestrialised agriculture. Although there are now 
attempts to shift to more amphibious approaches more appreciative to the monsoon 
rhythms of Mekong, the infrastructural power formations of previous hydraulic work has 
thus far slowed down these shifts. Furthermore, the changing climate - the likelihood of 
more devastating floods and increased salinity due to rising sea levels - invokes newly 
assembled support for acclimatising infrastructures. Water resourcification in the sense of 
making a manageable and agriculturally productive water system subject to the will of 
human agency is still pursued, although the limitations on human agency posed by the 
powers of water and infrastructure are increasingly recognised. 
4.2 THE MAKING OF AN ASSESSABLE AND ‘SUSTAINABLY’ GOVERNABLE 
BASIN 
Article II looks at the techno-scientific aspects of water resourcification. By highlighting 
the co-production of knowledge and governing it brings forth how the very act of 
knowledge making enacts the Basin as an object of planning susceptible to interventions. 
Instead of analysing material hydraulic infrastructures, the focus is on the establishment of 
a certain kind of information infrastructure (Blok et al. 2016) that precedes more concrete 
infrastructuring. The geographic focus in Article II is at the scale of the Lower Mekong 
Basin. In fact, the article details how, within the auspices of the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC), the Basin scale is conjured up via certain techniques and practices of 
knowledge production as an object for technical hydro-social ordering which includes 
large-scale hydraulic projects. The MRC and especially its Secretariat (MRCS) is where 
information on fluvial flows, and tools and expertise for transboundary and cumulative 
assessments are accumulated. Efforts to strengthening the Secretariat could be interpreted 
as attempts to form a centre of calculation (Latour 1987, Rose and Miller 1992) which 
would enable hydrosocial ordering ‘at a distance’ and at a Basin scale.  
Under the Mekong Committee (1957-1975), the predecessor of the MRC and the main 
agent for resourcifying Mekong flows at the time, high-modern, Basin-wide hydraulic 
development schemes were planned and eventually largely shelved without materialisation 
in major hydraulic works. So when the MRC was founded in 1995 the Mekong Basin was 
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still one of the world’s least engineered major rivers. At that time the Mekong was 
produced and perceived by many national and international development actors and 
investors as a frontier of hydraulic development with significant untapped potential. This 
was, however, also when high-modernist hydraulic schemes, especially in the form of 
large-scale dams, were being seriously questioned internationally. A major task for the 
MRC has thus been to help determine how the Mekong’s underused potential could be 
exploited ‘sustainably’, and is thus a central agent in constituting the Mekong as a frontier 
for ‘sustainable’ development of water resources. 
The MRC is an intergovernmental organisation which derives its rules and procedures of 
cooperation from the UN Watercourse Convention. From this derives a certain kind of 
state-centric envisioning of the river with focus on the quantities of water that should be 
equitably allocated between the member states (Sneddon and Fox 2006). A key objective 
of the MRC has been to plan how water can be optimally allocated to different water uses 
as prioritised by the member states. As with the Mekong Committee the Basin continues 
to be seen as the main unit for integrated management, and the scale at which water 
resource development should be planned and optimised. But unlike before the procuring 
of finances and developing of projects are no longer under the MRC mandate.  The 
rationale of united river basin management has evolved to Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) and the new role is centred on knowledge production without 
materialisation in concrete hydraulic infrastructures. The technical arm of the Commission 
is its Secretariat where most of the actual activities are carried out and funds spent. As 
explained in Article II, the task of the Secretariat is to produce knowledge, tools and 
capacities required to inform negotiations over projects with transboundary impacts, to 
evaluate the cumulative impacts of different development projects and scenarios, to 
provide the knowledge base for the development of a Basin-wide development plan, and 
to establish the ‘limits’ or ‘acceptable changes’ for sustainable development.  
Up until recent times the MRC was heavily donor-funded. Thus its objectives and 
practices have not only been shaped by its member countries and their developmental 
aspirations but also by donors such as the national development agencies of Denmark, 
Australia, Germany, Japan, France, Belgium, Sweden and Finland, as well as development 
banks. Hence the public transcripts (Scott 1990) were guided by liberal rationales of 
governing and aligned with the international development discourse of sustainability. 
Accordingly, many elements previously excluded from the TVA-influenced Mekong 
Committee assessment and ordering schemes have to be now accounted for and rendered 
calculable, entailing more attention to environmental and social impact assessments and, 
for example, to the fisheries. The MRC has been described as a holding out the promise 
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of sustainable development and ecological modernisation in the developing world 
(Sonnenfeld and Mol 2002), and, indeed, the efforts of the MRC’s main donors could be 
perceived as attempts to institutionalise sustainable development and ecological 
modernisation as the governing rationales of water management in the Lower Mekong 
Basin. This does not occur only through shaping the public transcripts but by supporting 
the development of technical devices and capacities that enable the operationalisation of 
these governing rationales (and may in turn also reinforce them). At the same time, the 
Basin-wide planning and impact assessment techniques and the capabilities for data 
collection and analysis on a Basin scale have been given institutional durability. 
Article II demonstrates that the attempts of rendering the Basin governable involve two 
forms of anti-politics: developing expert knowledge about the Mekong’s development 
potential and opening part of the knowledge production and planning to participation. As 
Rose (1993: 292) has stated, there are two sources of authority that promise indisputability 
and legitimacy within liberal arts of governing: scientific expertise and democracy. The 
role of the MRC’s knowledge production has been, on the one hand, to provide expertise 
that can turn the detrimental effects of hydraulic development questioning the legitimacy 
of large-scale dams into calculable impacts and risks that can be efficiently managed. Via 
its expertise in modelling and impact assessments, the MRC has aimed to produce 
closures over the development potential of the Mekong that can be harnessed 
‘sustainably’. On the other hand, the MRC has attempted to close down critique of 
exclusionary, unaccountable and undemocratic expertise and planning. The more it is 
recognised that assessment agendas and processes are shaped by values and power 
relations, the more expertise needs to take recourse in democratisation of knowledge 
production to gain legitimacy. This is often, as in the case of the MRC, enacted by 
enhancing participation. Article II thus analyses the making of a sort of anti-politics 
machine via expert knowledge and participation to produce and guarantee a realm for 
Basin-wide development planning beyond disputes, closed-off from controversies and 
thus rendered technical. 
The attempted depoliticisation through expertise is examined in Article II by looking at 
the processes involved in assessments of Basin-wide development scenarios developed 
within the Commission’s Decision Support Framework (DSF). The article analyses the 
first instance that these assessments produced results and studies how these results were 
brought to the public domain and how they were used and debated by different actors. 
This time period importantly coincided with increasing discussions about the MRCS being 
too donor-driven and too focused on knowledge production and environmental 
sustainability. There was impatience over getting closures on the sustainable development 
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potential of the Mekong and the results from the hydrological models were interpreted as 
delivering this. The work on linking the hydrological information with ecological and 
fisheries assessments had not yet been attempted, and yet the models were interpreted by 
many as sufficient to estimate the scope of relevant environmental and livelihood-related 
impacts. Within the MRC the results were received with a certain kind of relief, as now, 
for the first time, there was evidence that most water-use interests of member states did 
not necessarily conflict as anticipated. The hydropower plants with reservoirs seemed to 
level the peak flow in the wet season and provide ‘excess’ water in dry season. For long 
there had been fears that, for example, Thailand’s massive water diversion plans for 
irrigation combined with the irrigation aspirations in Laos and Cambodia would mean 
serious saline water intrusion in the Vietnamese Delta, but now it seemed that 
hydropower development could bring new synergies for the countries: increased 
opportunities for irrigation and navigation in the dry season and flood mitigation in the 
wet season. The implications for fisheries received less consideration.  
According to the MRC, the hydrological assessments helped to define a ‘development 
space’ (MRC 2005), a concept that later evolved into a ‘development opportunity space’, 
both of which terms have been reiterated many times since. The World Bank and ADB 
used the modelling results as evidence of the ‘potential’ and ‘tolerance’ of the Mekong to 
accommodate major hydraulic interventions, such as large dams and irrigation schemes, 
without major risks or detrimental impacts. Several civil society groups, however, 
contested these interpretations in which narrowly hydrological results were used to back 
up bold estimations of development potential, and significant environmental and social 
effects were underestimated. Article II examines this political shaping of interpretations 
and also highlights how the experts closer to policy-making tended to be more eager to 
downplay the uncertainties related to the models, if the results served their agenda; the 
appreciation of uncertainties increased with the motivation to explore the basis of 
knowledge claims critically. Even later, when other assessments, more appreciative of 
complex fluvial relationalities, have found the impacts and risks of major hydraulic 
development interventions much more serious – also paying more attention to the losses 
in fisheries – these have not become powerful facts within the MRC in the sense of 
enrolling or mobilising (Callon 1986) powerful policy-influencing or policy-making 
constituencies around them (Keskinen et al. 2012) that would disrupt or curb the 
accelerating large-scale damming and infrastructuring of the Mekong.  
The initial plan for the knowledge-making framework was not unproblematic either. This 
remained somewhat implicit in the Article II, but it is worth explicating here as it is a 
relevant aspect of the technoscientific resource-making at stake. The targeted, integrated 
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approach was to consist of separate assessments of water flows, river ecology, fisheries 
and livelihoods, compartmentalising the river system into separate units. Although it was 
intended they would eventually be connected, this was to be done mainly through rigid 
causal chains, only accounting for commensurable numeric values. This approach also 
entailed a certain hierarchical and temporal order of the physical over natural and social 
assessments,13 which explains why the first significant findings were related to hydrology. 
Hydrological assessments are more capable of delivering the results expected by hydraulic 
planners and developers because of the superior capacity of hydrological models for 
decontextualisation and abstractability.14 Hydrological models use as inputs certain 
measurement data but they are, importantly, based on universal mathematical equations 
related to hydrology. This means that compared with more context-specific ecological and 
fisheries-related assessments, they are able to code and inscribe rather quickly, and with a 
limited amount of empirical data, divergent river basins with their particular fluvial 
hydrosocial environments in terms that are legible to river planners and developers and 
amenable to interventions, regulation and control. The compartementalising approach to 
knowledge making, the unrealistic expectations of integrative assessments, the inability of 
ecological and fisheries assessments to produce fast results and the impatience of policy-
makers to get expert facts on ‘sustainable’ development potential together formed the 
preconditions for the dominance of hydrological knowledge examined in Article II. 
The article illuminates hydrological models as critical tools for water resourcification. 
Through their use the river is reduced to flows of H2O, and the water flows are 
derelationalised, that is to say, stripped of their formative relationalities with sediments, 
algae, fisheries and the livelihoods of riverine people. The models produce hydrographs 
that are effective simplifications of fluvial environments that assist in organising the Basin 
in powerful ways, enacting it as an object of governing, and its water flows as a resource 
that can be managed and allocated to different uses. In this sense the models have also 
been effectively generative. The hydrographs strengthened the imaginary of a Mekong 
consisting primarily of regimes of water flows and reinforced the prevailing allocation 
paradigm of the Commission, according to which the member states should be enabled to 
allocate water to their prioritised uses. The modelled results in the form of hydrographs 
also provided powerful visualisations of the ‘robustness’ of the flow regimes that are not 
easily altered by hydraulic interventions, at least, if they are developed in a coordinated 
way. As a result, a certain number of hydropower projects shifted from risks into desirable 
 
13 This hierarchy of the physical sciences over natural and social has been common in integration endeavors globally (Taylor 
1997). 
14 These are key qualities of ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour 1990) and of ‘global forms’ (Collier and Ong 2005). 
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ingredients of responsible river Basin development and were thus normalised as part of 
eco-modern river basin control.  
Article II demonstrates that, in addition to the production of expert knowledge and fact-
based closures, the establishment of a realm for apolitical hydrosocial ordering beyond 
disputes has been advanced in the MRC through the so-called participatory turn. This has 
been the response to pressure raised by civil society organisations for MRC to open up its 
expertise by diversifying and broadening the groups of people shaping the development 
plans and related knowledge-production processes. This response has been especially 
promoted by the donor agencies, and is a path common for institutions in the 
development domain (Cooke and Kothari 2001, Mosse 2005). The article shows that the 
programme in the MRCS that had taken the most significant steps towards more inclusive 
knowledge production was the Fisheries Programme which, however, was eventually side-
lined from the core activities of the Commission; in other programmes participation was 
little more than ‘tokenism’. Participation was found to be at best partial, and marginal in 
practices but still importantly present in the Commission’s public transcripts. Article II 
also looks beyond the ‘failures’ to foster participation in MRCS practices, examining the 
broader rationale of ‘the participatory turn’ and how it has become a way of securing the 
Commission’s mechanisms of governing. It argues that as long as the fostering of 
participation is situated within the conventional science-policy order in which science is 
expected to provide an indisputable guide for policy making, attempts to enhance 
participation supports the anti-politics of knowledge production and forms an additional 
technique for rendering the Basin apolitically governable.  
The main effects of the processes analysed in Article II could be summarised as follows. 
The first results of the DSF-scenario assessments contributed to constituting a field fit for 
depoliticised hydro-social ordering and thus produced and supported apolitical 
governmental power formations. Although the results were contested and thus were not 
entirely successful in producing a closure, they were effective enough to perform as a 
justification for MRC’s own strategical shift from mere knowledge production to 
investment facilitation, along with the World Bank and ADB’s new assistance strategies 
supportive of new initiatives in large-scale hydraulic infrastructuring. In other words, a 
‘development space’ for the Lower Mekong Basin was constituted, which has contributed 
to constructing the Mekong as a frontier for ‘sustainable’ hydraulic projects that could 
sustainably accommodate projects such as the Nam Then 2 discussed in the next section. 
The hydrological models were identified as powerful tools of water resourcification by 
enabling the planning and optimisation of fluvial flows at a Basin scale with the aim of 
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enhancing the affordances of water to selected uses of which electricity production and 
agriculture have been prioritised. 
At the same time the basin scale has been enacted into being. According to authoritative 
interpretations within the Commission, the balancing effects of different infrastructuring 
efforts are only achievable through integrated planning at a Basin scale. This is one of the 
important ways that the MRC has upheld the notion that large-scale dams and river-basin 
development should be intimately linked, and also a new variation in the continuum of 
making acclimatised water uses possible. This, in turn, adds to the continuum of 
overlooking the importance of seasonal flow fluctuations, and especially the flood-pulse-
based hydroecology of the Tonle Sap and the rich fisheries it sustains. Another important 
exclusion from this Basin-scale field of vision in which ‘acceptable changes’ are evaluated 
through aggregate calculations according to which large-scale dams seem to engineer out 
the main flow alterations caused by potential irrigation schemes, are the more local effects 
– for example, on the scale of the dammed tributaries – that may not be at all ‘accepted’ 
by those most adversely affected. Many unpredictabilities regarding dam operations are 
also downplayed. 
A key power effect relates to how the very problematisation of impacts driving MRC 
knowledge production, including in its more participatory forms, leaves unchallenged the 
governing rationales and developmentalist aspirations shaping hydraulic infrastructuring 
and damming. The main point here is that an overtly focus on ‘downstream’ risks and 
’impacts’ problematically diverts the discussion away from the purposes and reasons that 
are driving the development with its adverse effects in the first place. If discussion gets 
narrowed down to endless debates on the scientific validity of the estimated impacts, or to 
issues of remediation and mitigation of negative impacts, the ’upstream’ energy plans 
remain unchallenged, the governing rationales fostering damming and alternative ways of 
relating with rivers remain undebated, and the possibilities of social choice get obscured. 
At the same time, ‘acceptable changes’ and sustainability are constructed and reinforced as 
objects of scientific discovery rather than epistemologically, ethically, and one could also 
say ontologically, multisided and indeterminate – and hence inherently political – concepts 
of sense making (Swyngedouw 2010, Wynne 2010). This strengthens the plausibility of 
governing water according to an eco-modern rationale as one of its core assumptions is 
that with sufficient knowledge many of the risks previously externalised can be 
successfully internalised. 
It is important to note that, during the time focus of Article II, even the scenario of ‘high 
development’ did not include mainstream dams in the Lower Mekong or all of the 
tributary dams that are now under planning or consideration. So the MRC as well as the 
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World Bank and ADB did retain caution with regard to many of the projects with higher 
environmental and social imprint that are now moving forward. Furthermore, the 
enclavistic way in which the hydropower projects have eventually been pushed through, 
examined in the following sections, has increasingly marginalised the rationale of 
integrated water resourcification held up by the MRC. The Commission continues to lack 
mechanisms through which its polices would be transposed into riparian national 
legislation aggravating its disconnectedness from actual dam development (Suhardiman, 
Giordano and Molle 2012). Even in the case of mainstream dams, which should be at the 
core of the MRC’s relevance and authority, the notification and consultation processes 
required by the MRC ultimately did not really influence the projects; Laos moved forward 
with the Xayabury and Don Sahong mainstream dams unilaterally (Biba 2018) and has 
continued to do so with Pak Beng, Pak Lay and possibly also with the Luang Prabang dam 
that is now under the consultation process. Thus, while the MRC has been successful in 
opening up possibilities for new hydraulic infrastructuring it has been unsuccessful in its 
attempts to uphold the approach of integrating hydropower projects into coordinated and 
broader Basin-wide planning of development schemes and in preventing the most harmful 
projects.  
Another timely note is that the most recent assessments of MRC such as the Council 
Study (2017) now account more thoroughly for the fisheries and sediment losses at stake 
with the current dam development and articulate more clearly how seriously they may 
harm the riverine ecologies, riverine people and the economies of the Lower Mekong 
countries. But even the Council Study has been accused for understatements and also for 
not recognising the unjustly differential distribution of adversities (IR 2019). There is also 
a continuation from the past in that the critical findings are still not well reflected in the 
MRC core programmes nor have they mobilised decision-making that would curb the 
current development. Also the ‘downstream’ focus seems to continue keeping attention 
away from challenging the ‘upstream’ of the energy plans and from forming alternate ways 
of relating with rivers and visioning riverine relationalities.   
4.3 THE WILL TO FIX LARGE DAMS: THE MAKING OF INVESTABLE AND 
‘SUSTAINABLE’ HYDROPOWER IN LAOS 
After examining water resourcification on the Mekong Basin scale through the lens of 
techno-scientific knowledge production I now shift attention to efforts aimed at rendering 
rivers investable in Laos. As discussed, the Mekong River Commission has contributed to 
constituting the Mekong as a frontier for ecomodernisation and ‘sustainable’ water 
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resourcification via establishing facts on the development potential of Mekong; here I 
demonstrate how the World Bank has accelerated the dam rush in Laos by its support of 
the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) hydropower project and the inventory assessments and 
legislative reforms that preceded it. In the latter case a concern for sustainability is not 
articulated as a matter of integrated river basin management but as one of making 
individual hydropower projects simultaneously investable and sustainable via architecting 
new financial, social and environmental safeguards on project-scale. At the same time, 
NT2 was meant to be much more than just a single element of infrastructure; it was also a 
vehicle for facilitating new investment projects and for intervening in how new 
hydropower and other extractive investments are governed in Laos. Furthermore, it was 
supposed to provide a model for how hydropower projects should be governed elsewhere 
in the world; thus, Nam Theun 2 has facilitated not only the opening of hydropower 
frontier in Laos but also opened new opportunities for ‘sustainable hydropower’ globally.  
Large dams were fiercely opposed in the 1980s and 1990s in different parts of the world. 
The mounting critique, culminating in the work of the World Commission on Dams, 
made the World Bank temporarily cease its support for hydropower. However, instead of 
giving up on large dams or following recommendations by the World Commission on 
Dams for avoiding dam-induced adversities, the Bank chose to try and contain the critique 
in its own, more pro-corporate way. It decided to re-enter the world of hydropower 
production by supporting the Nam Theun 2 project, which can be conceived of as an 
attempted anti-politics device designed to close down debate on the unjust distribution of 
benefits and adversity caused by dams. In fact, it has been formative of a new 
governmental assemblage (Li 2007b) of ‘sustainable hydropower’ that consists not only of 
discursive elements but, importantly, also of very material practices and techniques, such 
as newly designed assessment, consultation, revenue management and environmental and 
social compensation techniques. Its central proposition is that damages caused by 
hydropower can be either prevented or fixed with the right kind of expertise and 
techniques. Laos offered an expedient environment for testing and validating the new 
hydropower model, as the formation of strong domestic constituencies to oppose the 
project was likely to be effectively pre-empted or suppressed by the authoritarian one-
party government.  
The efforts to re-legitimise hydropower overlap with the rise of the climate change 
agenda. Article III discusses the World Bank’s broader energy support in Laos, 
demonstrating that it has responded to the critique of its energy support for its anti-poor, 
environmentally destructive and climate-change accelerating aspects with a new stabilising 
policy discourse of pro-poor and climate friendly renewable energy, as well as with new 
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model projects such as the Nam Theun 2. Here I discuss the Bank’s efforts to prove that 
pro-poor ‘sustainable hydropower’ is possible and credible through the example of the 
Nam Theun 2 project. I also examine more retrospectively how the project has enabled 
hydropower development in Laos and globally. The climate change-related aspects of 
Nam Theun 2 and the World Bank’s energy-related support in Laos are discussed in the 
next section.  
The World Bank had considered involvement in Nam Theun 2 project since the 
beginning of 1990s but final funding approval was only made in 2005. The project aligns 
with the World Bank’s long-term commitment to advance physical infrastructures that 
further regional connectivity and markets, especially in energy, as well as juridico-
institutional infrastructures that are conducive to foreign investors and their access to the 
country’s resources. Closer to funding approval these objectives were amended. Nam 
Theun 2 was not only supposed to open the country to investors, it was also supposed to 
make such investments green and sustainable. The NT2-imposed changes in the country’s 
legal and regulatory framework were designed to establish a rule of law that would be both 
favourable to private profit-seeking investors and restrictive in the sense of constraining 
the most harmful effects of the investments in extractive projects (Goldman 2005). Nam 
Theun 2 was thus accompanied, for example, by a Decree on Compensation and 
Resettlement of the Development Project and a National Policy on the Environmental 
and Social Sustainability of the Hydropower Sector (Middleton et al. 2009).  
The Nam Theun 2 project itself pulled together a remarkably vast array of investors, 
developers, experts, consultants, legislative reforms, knowledge-making processes and 
assessments, monitoring procedures, and compensatory mechanisms, as well as different 
goals, such as investment returns, state foreign currency earnings, poverty alleviation, the 
greening of extractive infrastructure projects and climate change mitigation. It brought not 
only state officials, international experts, conservationists and consultants but also 
transnational advocacy groups and media to the Nakai Plateau, making this previously 
remote area one of the most transnationally exposed in Laos. The project is shaped by 
various governing rationales and techniques but I would argue that most importantly the 
form the project eventually took is as result of shapings by an amalgamation of neoliberal 
and eco-modern rationales of governing: the neoliberal manifesting in the concessionary 
governing mode with financial safeguards that secure profits for the investors, the eco-
modern in the social and environmental safeguards and compensatory mechanisms aiming 
at internalising externalities.  
World Bank involvement meant that the Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC), to 
whom the project was concessioned, was obliged to mitigate and compensate for losses 
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on a scale not seen in previous hydropower projects in the global South. The company 
itself is formed by shareholders from France and Thailand together with a state-owned 
Lao company holding 25 per cent of the shares, and its financiers consist of 27 distinct 
parties including multiple Thai and OECD commercial banks; it was the latter group for 
whom the World Bank provided political risk guarantees (Merme et al. 2014). It was not 
only that greater effort was put into resettlement but, for the first time, those experiencing 
downstream impacts were also programmed to receive compensation - probably because 
of the pressure transnational advocacy groups had brought to bear in this respect on the 
preceding ADB-funded and nearby Theun Hinboun project (Whitington 2012, Baird et al. 
2018). In addition, the World Bank provided not only its expertise but also additional 
funds for the compensatory programs.15 It also succeeded in incorporating previously 
critical development and conservation organisations into the consultation process and 
when establishing the watershed conservation area (Goldman 2005). Other novelties 
included new monitoring and revenue management mechanisms. Consequently, as Article 
III notes, NT2 resulted in a more benign and sustainable dam than those preceding it. 
Nonetheless, it remains highly contested whether it can actually be called a sustainable 
dam.  
Article III points out some of the main gaps between what was promised and what was 
actually delivered. Firstly, Nam Theun 2 is not primarily about the alleviation of energy 
poverty, which could have helped the project to qualify more readily as pro-poor. Instead, 
the project exports 95% of its electricity to Thailand. In fact, it seems evident now that 
Nam Theun 2 serves as a supplier of variable peak power largely caused by the daily, 
weekly and seasonally heightening demand for air-conditioning in the affluent parts of 
Thailand (Greacen and Greacen 2012, MEE-Net 2012, Baird and Quastel 2015). While in 
some instances the World Bank has attempted, as demonstrated in Article III, to frame its 
support for a regional power trade and Nam Theun 2 as being about increasing electricity 
access for the poor and thus about (energy) poverty alleviation, a closer look proves it to 
be more about furthering consumption among the already highest electricity consumers. 
The pro-poor claims thus rest on how well the project performs in generating revenues 
for nationwide poverty reduction in Laos, as well as in provision of ‘net benefits’ for those 
adversely affected by the project. The second gap Article III highlights relates to problems 
in tracking how the revenues have been allocated and used, problems which seem to 
persist (Shoemaker 2018). In addition, the total revenues of the Government of Laos 
 
15 The World Bank provided a grant of 20 million for compensatory programs. Other donor agencies, such as Agence 
Française de Développement, have supported the livelihood activities of the affected people in the Nakai Plateau. In the 
downstream areas of Xe Bang Fai Basin, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank have supported irrigation and 
rural development programs have been interpreted as supplemental to compensatory activities (Baird et al. 2015). 
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seem much lower than was expected.16 The third gap discussed is that prospects seemed 
low for the Resettlement and Downstream Compensation Programs to succeed in 
generating ‘net benefits’ that would qualify the Nam Theun 2 as a sustainable pro-poor 
project. 
Article III shows that the unprecedented resources and efforts put into resettlement 
resulted in new housing, connected to electricity, along orderly lined roads, as well as 
schools, health centres and related infrastructure, but attempts to restore the livelihoods 
of the resettled seemed much more elusive and disappointing. More recent follow-up 
studies and assessments affirm that the ‘livelihood pillars’ of the resettlement program 
have indeed failed to restore the livelihoods and enhance the income-earning capacities of 
those resettled (Hunt et al. 2018). In fact, to earn an income and sustain their lives, the 
resettled people have ended up resorting to highly unsustainable logging and poaching 
activities triggered by the dam project.17 Moreover, the doubts raised in Article III 
regarding the capability of the Downstream Compensation Program to compensate for 
the livelihood losses for the 155,000 riverine people living in the Xe Bang Fai Basin have 
been proved well-grounded. Ultimately, around 100,000 people have been targeted by 
different efforts to compensate them for the loss of riverbank gardening, access to 
fisheries and harvests of wet season rice, due to the changed flood regime that manifests 
in prolonged inundation periods. While the NT2 project can be credited for at least trying 
to address the downstream effects, recent research (Baird et al. 2015, Manorom et al. 
2017) as well as my own field visits in 2015 and 2016, confirm the compensatory program 
was not only insufficient but also largely inappropriate in terms of meeting its objectives. 
The micro-credit schemes that the program included seem in some cases to have 
furthered indebtedness, thus exacerbating the losses caused by the dam rather than 
mitigating them (Johns 2015, Baird et al. 2015).  
Ultimately important is the fact that Nam Theun 2 is simultaneously more ‘benign’ than 
its predecessors while still falling short of its promises. Because the credentials of the 
dam’s compensatory mechanisms are not entirely deniable, the project has lent the World 
Bank and other hydropower promoters a certain credibility when claiming that lessons 
from the past have been learnt and that dams can be made sustainable with tested, 
 
16 A persistently circulated figure, also presented in the Article III, has been for a long time as high as $2 billion for the 25 
years of the concession period (annually $80 million on average). Critics estimated quite early that $250 million for the 25 
years ($10 million annually on average) would be closer to reality (Watershed 2004, Shoemaker 2018). Recently, the World 
Bank (2019) itself announced that between 2010 and 2017 NT2 has generated $180 million (annually $25 million on 
average) for the Government of Laos.  
17 Thus, any increases in resettlers’ incomes are most likely attributable to their involvement in the illegal trade of valuable 
timber (such as rosewood) and poaching, rather than to the livelihood activities the resettlement program has supported. 




corrective, technical mechanisms. Nam Theun 2 has been thus central not only with 
regard to its construction but also in the attempted validation of a new justificatory 
discourse of ‘sustainable hydropower’ (Middleton 2018). Resonating with Boltanski’s and 
Chiapello’s (2007) take on the relationship between tests and critique, the fact that the 
Nam Theun 2 has been made a test case supposedly revealing the capabilities of 
‘sustainable hydropower’ has also made it vulnerable to critique, and Nam Theun 2 
remains contested.18 A lot remains to be at stake with the project. The more Nam Theun 
2 is perceived as ‘passing’ the test of proving sustainable hydropower possible, the more 
effectively previous critiques of hydropower are contained and the more constitutive the 
project becomes of the emergent discursive power formation of ‘sustainable hydropower’. 
The ‘passing’ of the test would make Nam Theun 2 effective in discursively rendering the 
unavoidable, unjust distributive effects of large dams technically manageable and hence 
apolitical. Furthermore, as suggested by Article III, it would allow the World Bank to 
position itself as a key provider of the proper expertise and techniques to divest dams of 
their unjust distributive effects. Yet the gaps between what the project promised and what 
it has actually delivered identified by Article III and other studies remain relevant when 
exposing the emergent power formations enabled by an unchallenged validation of the 
justificatory discourse of ‘sustainable hydropower’.  
Thus far, however, the Nam Theun 2 seems to have lent substantial credibility to the 
notion of ‘sustainable hydropower’, while the partial incorporation of previous adversaries 
and their goals has enabled the World Bank to close down contestation – not entirely but 
enough to go forward with its re-entry to the field of global hydropower. This is one of 
the key power effects of the project thus far. Nam Theun 2 continues to be used as a 
justificatory reference point for new hydropower projects in Myanmar, Nepal and, more 
globally, by the Bank itself and its sister organisation, the International Financial 
Corporation, by the International Hydropower Association and by other hydropower 
proponents, including those in key international water forums (Middleton 2018). The 
Bank has claimed that the shortcomings they have acknowledged are fixable in future 
projects (Shoemaker and Robichaud 2018); thus, the new discursive storyline presents the 
Nam Theun 2 as potent to ‘succeed forward’. In other words, although it is admitted that 
the Nam Theun 2 is not entirely successful, the new governmental assemblage of 
sustainable hydropower is kept together by presenting the deficiencies as rectifiable (Li 
2007b). Yet this is far from evident. 
 
18 One of the Bank’s key PR efforts, the publication, ’Doing a Dam Better’ (Porter and Shivakumar 2011), has been 
challenged almost argument by argument by scholars and activists in a recent publication, ’Dead in the Water’ (Shoemaker 
and Robichaud 2018). 
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From the new projects in Laos, only the recent ADB-funded Nam Ngiep 1 project has 
applied similar, although now arguably improved, safeguard mechanisms, yet similar 
shortcomings to Nam Theun 2 have already been reported (Shoemaker and Robichaud 
2018). Overall, instead of succeeding forward the Nam Theun 2 has more evidently failed 
forward (Johns 2015, Boer et al. 2016, Peck 2010). It has certainly paved the way for new 
hydropower projects by building up investor confidence in Laos, demonstrating that the 
Government of Laos is capable of handling complex concessionary agreements, providing 
encouraging formative experience for EGAT and Thai investors and proving that, with 
the right kind of concessionary agreements, dams in Laos can be profitable to their 
developers and investors. This facilitation of future projects is perhaps the most 
significant effect of Nam Theun 2 in Laos. Yet, except for the aforementioned Nam 
Ngiep 1, all of the ensuing concessionary agreements have been stripped of Nam Theun 
2’s extensive compensatory obligations. The new Thai, Vietnamese and Chinese investors, 
who are less exposed to reputational risks, seem to have considered the additional costs of 
extensive compensation too profit inhibitive. For its part, the Government of Laos seems 
reluctant to risk curbing its increased investor attractiveness. Illustratively, out of the 
legislative reforms that the World Bank supported while making conditions for Nam 
Theun 2, the elements supposedly guaranteeing more sustainable projects have lacked 
enforcement or been watered down since its completion (Singh 2018), while the investor-
friendly elements have remained effective. Unlike the sustainability mechanisms, the 
discursive elements of sustainable hydropower have, however, been embraced by the 
Government of Laos and used in attempts to justify the new, mostly more exploitative 
dams (Olson and Gareau 2018). At the same time, restricting sustainability considerations 
to individual dams risks losing sight of the cascading effects of the dams the World Bank 
and Nam Theun 2 have helped to set in motion.  
What the failure to set sustainability standards for new dams in Laos means is that Nam 
Theun 2 ended up forming a distinct and exceptional space of hydrosocial governing, a 
sustainability enclave (Whitington 2012) with higher sustainability standards and more 
effective regulatory mechanisms than other preceding or ensuing projects, except for 
those with direct World Bank or ADB involvement, like Theun Hinboun and Nam Ngiep 
1. It was also, notably, the World Bank that acted as the environmental regulator of the 
project not the Lao State (Merme et al. 2014) which also underlines its regulatory 
exceptionality or enclavity. This is perhaps not surprising, as the mobilisations and 
processes of condemnation that animated and were formative of Nam Theun 2 did not, 
for the most part19, take place in connection with dams in Laos in general, or even Nam 
 
19 The Theun Hinboun contestations did influence the Nam Theun 2 project, but in both cases the sustainability standards 
were raised because of pressure from transnational activist groups, not from local mobilisations (Whitington 2012). 
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Theun 2, but with dams in other parts of the world and through transnational advocacy 
networks. From the beginning of the Nam Theun 2 project, the World Bank prioritised 
international public relations over serious engagement in the Lao context, rather 
addressing the transnational than the Lao public debate, which, in any case, has been 
severely suppressed (Singh 2018: 221). In a way, Nam Theun 2 was enclavistic from the 
onset, forming a zone of transnationalised accountability primarily addressing the 
concerns of a transnational public rather than those of the adjacent or other riverine 
people in Laos. The majority of the later dam projects in Laos, especially if situated in the 
tributaries, are progressing without such transnational exposure, with much less ambitious 
safeguard policies.  
Thus, the case of Nam Theun 2 does not validate the feasibility of sustainable hydropower 
but quite the contrary. As Article III highlights even the Nam Theun 2 with its higher 
sustainability standards and compensatory budgets, augmented by additional public funds 
was still dispossessionary, only partially succeeding in internalising externalities. The more 
retrospective analysis, in turn, reveals that the subsequent hydropower investors and 
developers have deemed even this kind of partial internalisation too profit inhibitive. 
These findings prove the fixability of large dams as highly questionable. More specifically, 
the case of the forward failing Nam Theun 2 suggests that the governing mode assembled 
around Nam Theun 2, which amalgamates investor-friendly concessionary agreements 
with the internalisation of externalities, is highly problematic and inherently too 
contradictory to reach the sustainability it supposedly seeks. It seems to form yet another 
example that proves that the neoliberal eco-modern rationale proposing the internalisation 
of externalities is unlikely without more profound change in the key governing logic 
geared at profit maximisation (Wanner 2015, Fletcher and Rammelt 2017). Furthermore, 
even if dam projects were less profit-driven and the compensatory schemes more 
comprehensive, it would still remain questionable whether all losses and forced changes in 
riverine modes of living are compensationable (Green and Baird 2016). Overall, it is 
relevant to challenge the World Bank not only for the shortcomings of the compensatory 
mechanisms as such, but also for the systemic character of these failures (Johns 2015). 
While the World Bank has been successful in Laos in setting juridico-institutional 
infrastructure for extractive investments it has failed in establishing the governing 
infrastructure of these investments (also Kaisti and Käkönen 2012). An important 
explanation for this is the very modestly constrained (and greened) World Bank core 
governing rationale of continuous expansion in the making of investable resources, 
creating conditions conducive for profit-seeking investors and securing the circulation and 
accumulation of capital.  
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In terms of the overall power effects the concessionary governing mode of dams the Nam 
Theun 2 has most importantly furthered corporate power formations over fluvial 
relationalities. But it should also be noted that the concessionary projects like Nam Theun 
2 have also opened avenues for rather illiberal state power formations (Blake and Barney 
2018, Creak and Barney 2018), something that partially resonates with the findings of 
Article V for dams in Cambodia.  In the case of Nam Theun 2, it seems that state 
authorities have succeeded in gearing the dam’s watershed management (Enfield 2018) 
and resettlement schemes to serve state policies of forming more consolidated and 
governable settlements and thus strengthened territorial state powers.  
4.4 CLIMATE CHANGE ENABLING HYDRAULIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT? 
In this section I synthesise findings from Articles III, IV and V with respect to how the 
hydraulic infrastructuring and the governing of climate change shape and enable one 
another.  I showcase how large dams are being increasingly justified by recourse to climate 
change, how the ways climate change governability is being produced make large scale 
hydraulic infrastructuring seem plausible and desirable, necessary even, and how large 
dams have formed a key technology in climate mitigation in the Mekong Region, just as 
they have in many other parts of the global South. Firstly, I discuss the findings from 
Article III, which reveal that the World Bank has tried to consensualise large dams by 
framing them as climate-friendly, also noting that this has influenced how hydropower is 
justified by the government of Laos. Secondly, based on Article IV but in connection with 
Articles III and V, I show that, in Cambodia, climate change approaches are themselves 
rendered technical and consensual in a way that creates space for large-scale hydraulic 
infrastructure projects. Lastly, I continue with a closer examination of the connection 
between climate change mitigation initiatives and hydropower development through the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) dams in Cambodia, drawing mostly from Article 
V, but also from Article IV.   
Framing hydropower as climate-friendly energy 
The increasing importance of the climate change agenda has created an opportunity for 
the resurge of hydropower. Article III points out that the mobilisation of climate change 
concerns in support of hydropower has been particularly important for the World Bank’s 
return to dams. The Nam Theun 2 has provoked a number of studies, but Article III is 
one of the few to examine the project as an illustrative case of the World Bank’s broader 
energy policy, in which rationalising hydropower as climate-friendly has been central. It 
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shows how the World Bank deploys the Nam Theun 2 to respond to three lines of 
condemnation: the anti-dam movement culminating in the World Commission on Dams 
report (2000); the critique of the Bank’s anti-poor privatisation policies in the power 
sector; and the anti-extractivist movement that put the Bank’s support of fossil fuel and 
mining projects in the spotlight – and which it countered by commissioning a review 
process of its work in the extractive sector. The findings from Article III on how the 
World Bank has tried to contain the critique of the anti-dam movement through the 
governmental assemblage of ‘sustainable hydropower’ – constituted essentially through 
the Nam Theun 2 – were discussed in the previous section. Here I highlight findings from 
Article III on the less examined yet relevant connection between the Nam Theun 2 and 
the World Bank’s attempts to respond to the critique of its support for climate-change-
accelerating energy.   
One of the recommendations of the Bank-commissioned Extractive Industries Review 
Report (2003) was that the World Bank should stop funding oil and gas projects. Article 
III drew attention to one of the World Bank’s own responses to the review, the so-called 
Bonn Commitment, whereby the Bank declared it was committed to nothing less than a 
revolution in renewables. At first, large-scale hydropower had no part in this ‘revolution’, 
but it was not long before it was not only included, but made the most central element. 
Article III argues that the World Bank’s so-called revolution in renewables has, in fact, 
consisted of stabilising win-win policy narratives on poverty alleviation and climate change 
mitigation that make two types of solutions in particular appear necessary: large-scale 
hydropower as the main on-grid solution and solar home systems as the main off-grid 
solution. Article III suggests that, with this agenda, the World Bank has followed a sui 
generis framing approach that is common to development agencies (Ferguson 1994, Li 
2007a, Leach 2008). By foregrounding solutions that already fell within its repertoire, the 
Bank rapidly positioned itself as a key, potent, climate agent with immediate capacity to 
provide the expertise, resources and technologies most needed. Large hydro and solar 
home systems also comprise the central pillars of the World Bank’s energy support in 
Laos, making Laos an illustrative case of the Bank’s new energy agenda. 
The message sent by the World Bank’s support of the Nam Theun 2 is not only that large 
dams are fixable with its expertise and assistance, but also that, in their fixed form, large-
scale hydropower dams provide a key solution to climate change. On the one hand, the 
justificatory affordances of climate-friendliness seem restricted or conditioned by the 
‘sustainability’ test of hydropower. Thus, at least in the eyes of the Bank’s adversaries, the 
attempt to make hydropower a key climate solution depends on the Bank’s ability to 
prove that it has learnt the lessons taught by harmful large dams in the past. This has 
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added to the critical importance of the Bank’s maintaining the success narrative of the 
Nam Theun 2, and for opponents to be particularly vigilant on the project. On the other 
hand, the climate frames seem to be perceived by many dam proponents as a potent tool 
in marginalising concerns about the adverse externalities of large dams. Article III notes 
that some World Bank documents and representatives have framed not only the Nam 
Theun 2 but the whole model of Laos’ production of hydroelectricity for Thailand and its 
other neighbours as clean and green, an approach that has been effectively adopted by the 
Government of Laos (Olson and Gareau 2018). The Government of Cambodia also 
justifies its hydropower-dominated development of the power sector with reference to 
climate change, as noted in Article IV. 
The framing of hydropower as climate-friendly is thus problematic: firstly, because even 
the most ‘sustainable’ dams, such as the Nam Theun 2, have only fixed their dispossessive 
and unjustly distributed effects to a very limited extent; and secondly, because the climate 
frames have been used to side-line concerns on these effects. Yet there is also a third 
reason: the ‘low carbon’ attribute of large dams in itself can be problematised. In Article 
III the huge and greatly fluctuating reservoir of the Nam Theun 2 was considered a potent 
source of greenhouse gas. Currently, there is even more evidence that tropical reservoirs 
can be significant emitters (Fearnside and Pueyo 2012, de Faria et al. 2015, Kumar and 
Sharma 2016). A recent analysis (T. Räsänen et al. 2018) suggests that in the Mekong 
Region the dams with the highest emissions may even equal those of fossil fuel plants; it 
also estimates that the Nam Theun 2 could be amongst them.  
A fourth point problematising the climate-friendliness of Lao dams relates to the way they 
side-line other more sustainable and climate-friendly options. As highlighted in Article III, 
the World Bank has presented the rationalisation that Nam Theun 2 and other 
hydroelectricity export projects in Laos are needed to displace ‘dirty’ energy, such as coal 
power projects in Thailand. The claim that the imported Lao hydroelectricity is the only 
viable alternative to new fossil fuel projects is, however, challengeable. Demonstrably, 
viable alternatives in Thailand could have included more climate-friendly options of 
demand-side management and energy efficiency, as well as an increase in new, small 
producers of more sustainable renewable energy (du Pont 2004, Greacen and Greacen 
2012, MEE Net 2012, Ryder and Permpongsacharoen 2018). These options have been 
marginalised by the decision to import large amounts of hydroelectricity from Laos and, in 
future, increasingly from Myanmar.  
As for Laos, Article III established that the energy sector support that materialised in the 
combination of the Nam Theun 2 and solar home systems has also impeded rather than 
fostered a ‘revolution’ in more sustainable and climate-friendly renewables. The Nam 
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Theun 2 appears to have facilitated the locking of Lao’s future energy pathway (Leach et 
al. 2010) into the hydroelectricity export model. Article III, however, does not solely 
address fostered hydropower preferences, but also how the prioritisation of solar home 
systems as the next preferred renewable energy form has furthered the centrality of large-
scale hydropower. The solar home-system program swiftly produced high installation 
figures, but a closer look revealed that, because of its technical and institutional 
arrangements, the program was less an alternative way of providing electricity than a 
temporary pre-electrification phase. A more ’revolutionary’ approach would have been 
supportive of more permanent small-scale renewable energy producers with attention paid 
to how these producers could be integrated into the expanding national grid. 
Problematically, the approach excluded considerations on how to support and foster 
institutional arrangements conducive to small-scale, distributed power generation. Instead, 
the World Bank energy support in Laos has strengthened socio-technical and socio-
political arrangements that are conducive to centralised power generation through large 
power plants and thus likely to impede (Sovacool 2006) the development of more 
distributed, climate-friendly and environmentally sustainable power generation. 
Article III observed that in some cases the World Bank’s climate-friendly framing of 
hydropower referred not only to the mitigation but also to the adaptation potential of 
hydropower, although this was not carefully problematised apart from highlighting 
adverse effects of the Nam Theun 2 dam that could diminish people’s capacities to cope 
with changing climate. Based on my post-Article III fieldwork in the Xe Bang Fai Basin 
(A. Räsänen et al. 2018), as well as recent research by others (Baird and Quastel 2015, 
Manorom et al. 2017), some further reflections can be added that augment the doubt that 
Nam Theun 2-type dams facilitate climate adaptation. Xe Bang Fai has been identified as 
one of the ‘flood hotspots’ of Laos (MRC 2009) where climate change is expected to 
increase the frequency of exceptionally high and long-lasting floods that destroy harvests, 
cattle and human settlements. Thus far, however, it is effectively the Nam Theun 2 that 
has transformed the floods from ‘beneficial’ to devastating. Before the dam, the 
affordances of floods in terms of ‘free’ alluvium and pest management had made the Xe 
Bang Fai one of the most fertile rice-growing areas in Laos and enabled the area to 
become the ‘rice basket’ of the country. Since 2010 the additional water discharge from 
the dam reservoir has prolonged the floods in many areas just enough to transform the 
floods from a force that is beneficial to harvests to one that is destructive. The kinds of 
floods the engineered waterscape and the changing climate will co-produce in the future is 
highly uncertain. While the hydropower company is obliged to shut off water discharge 
into the Xe Bang Fai River if a certain, pre-determined, critical water level is reached, this 
is rather far from flood mitigation and enhanced adaptation; however, at least there are 
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rules for avoiding the amplification of the effects of ‘exceptional’ floods. It remains to be 
seen how the dam’s overall operation regime – fixed for the maximisation of electricity 
sales for at least the next 25 years by the concession and power purchase agreements – 
will perform in relation to ‘exceptional’ floods, likely to become more frequent in future. 
Most probably the current concessionary governing mode is not easily reconcilable with 
flood mitigation objectives.20 
Externalising and consensualising climate change: plausibility for 
large-scale hydraulic infrastructuring 
In Article IV I analyse the policy discourses and governing technologies through which 
climate change has been rendered governable in Cambodia, showing them to stem from, 
and align effectively with, the weak version of ecological modernisation (Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand 2006; 2016). The article demonstrates the centrality of consensualising policy 
discourses in the production of climate governability. It shows how they have tended to 
stabilise key tensions between climate and economy as well as between North and South 
by attempts to make mutually adversarial goals complementary in order to render climate 
change actions uncontentious for all parties. Synergistic policy formulations in which 
climate mitigation and adaptation are presented as compatible with sustained economic 
growth – or with sustainable development – as well as with each other, are shown to be 
vital in enrolling key actors to climate action and forging alignment between international 
development organisations and national governments in countries like Cambodia. What 
has also facilitated the mainstreaming of climate change into Cambodian development 
policies is the technoscientific framing of climate change as an external threat to society 
against which development must be secured, together with depoliticising assumptions of 
how science is linearly translated into policies and transferrable technologies. Article IV 
also analyses certain governing technologies, such as the carbon accounting and 
monitoring techniques of the CDM projects and the techniques of vulnerability 
assessments. It argues that these, together with synergistic, consensualising climate policy 
discourses and framing climate change as an external threat, have co-constituted climate 
change in Cambodia as a technical domain of governance in which large-scale 
infrastructural solutions, including dams and irrigation schemes, are foregrounded in ways 
detailed below.  
 
20 The experience of the exceptionally devastating flood of 2011 provides an example of the problems that may lay ahead. 
The company claims it fulfilled its obligations and refrained from releasing water when the river had reached the pre-
determined maximum level and denies being responsible for worsening conditions. Others have suggested, however, that it 
is possible that the dam was operated in ways that added to the intensity and duration of flooding (Baird and Quastel 2015, 
Manorom et al. 2017).  
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In Article IV I highlight that Cambodia has been a frontrunner amongst the so called 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in several adaptation and mitigation initiatives and in 
mainstreaming the issue of climate change into national policies. I show how the donor-
driven policy narratives of co-benefits, multiple benefits and ‘triple wins’ — as, for 
example, in the conceptualisation of ‘climate compatible development’ that emphasises 
the possibility of simultaneously producing adaptation, mitigation and development 
benefits — have had a ‘buy-in’ in the country. By analysing key national policy texts like 
the Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan, Article IV also demonstrates that climate 
change is discussed as an external threat to the recent growth performance of Cambodia 
and, consequently, that solutions are sought which rather secure current development 
priorities and projects from climate change than challenge them. In other words, the 
externalisation of climate change enables its governance to be operationalised in the form 
of status quo-enhancing rather than status quo-challenging activities. The article suggests 
that the seeming ease with which international climate policy discourses and governing 
mechanisms are appropriated by the Cambodian government can be understood by virtue 
of the apolitical framing of climate change, which excludes from consideration key 
underlying causes of climate and environmental vulnerability. It shows, for example, that 
governmental climate policy strategies are silent about the concentration of land 
ownership due to massive economic land concessions, the associated high rates of 
deforestation and the expansion of other resource-extractive activities with their 
centralising relations of resource control. Yet these processes have dispossessed a high 
proportion of rural residents and are also likely to influence their abilities to cope with 
further changes in their environment. 
In relation to water resourcification, the analysed mode of rendering climate governable 
seems to foster large-scale hydraulic infrastructuring. Article IV notes that large-scale 
hydropower is presented unproblematically as a key climate solution in the Cambodia 
Climate Change Strategic Plan.21 The framing is similar to the World Bank policy narrative 
of hydropower as a solution to climate change, as discussed in Article III, with the 
exception that the negative effects of the dams are given even less attention. The framing 
of climate change as an external threat to development side-lines considerations of how 
the development patterns themselves might be ‘maladaptive’ or vulnerabilising, an 
externalisation that upholds a separation between mitigation and adaptation which is not 
allayed by policy narratives that assume easy synergies between them. Within the frames of 
externalised climate change the synergistic climate discourse seems, in fact, to obfuscate 
critical discussion of possible conflicts between mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
 
21 Most recently hydropower is included in Cambodia’s nationally determined contributions under the new Paris Agreement, 
illustrating the centrality hydropower is given in the country’s climate change mitigation strategy (Baird and Green 2020).  
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Accordingly, in the case of hydropower, it seems that certain vital considerations – how 
decisions on water development coupled with climate change may amplify or co-produce 
climate vulnerabilities, and how dam-induced livelihood losses likely diminish the capacity 
of riverine people to cope with unexpected floods or draughts – are bracketed. Even the 
Lower Sesan 2 has been included within the ‘climate-friendly’ framing by the government, 
despite being the most destructive of Mekong tributary dams (Baird 2016) that alone has 
been predicted to do away with 9.3% of Mekong fisheries (Ziv et al. 2012) and seriously 
affect the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands riverine people in Cambodia but also in 
other parts of the Mekong Basin (Baird and Green 2020). Meanwhile, the mitigation 
potential of large dams offers causes for scepticism which are similar to those in 
connection with dams in Laos. Some of the dams are likely to entail highly emitting 
reservoirs (T. Räsänen et al. 2018) and, although the Cambodian energy sector is more 
diverse and domestically oriented than in Laos, the decision to let hydropower dominate 
has made the development of more sustainable and climate friendly options less viable. 
Article IV together with Article V further explains that the climate change mitigation 
initiative of CDM in Cambodia has strengthened hydropower dominance, reinforced its 
climate-friendly framings and upheld the synergistic climate policy discourse. Amongst the 
LDC countries, Cambodia has been a forerunner in global carbon markets, hosting one of 
the highest number of CDM projects, four of which are large hydropower dams 
producing 90% of the supposed annual emission reductions (UNEP DTU 2016). This 
means that, except for the Lower Sesan 2, all the other large Cambodian dams produce 
not only hydroelectricity but also carbon offset credits. The fact that they form part of a 
mitigation mechanism supervised by the UNFCCC has added credibility to justificatory 
attempts to portray Cambodian dams as part of the combat against climate change. Article 
IV explains how the dominance of large-scale hydropower amongst the Cambodian CDM 
projects relates to the governing rationales and techniques of the CDM. 
In Article IV (as in Article V) the CDM is approached as an embodiment of the 
neoliberal, eco-modern rationale that combines the assumption that, rather than being 
regulated in a heavy-handed manner by the state, the private sector should operate flexibly 
through market-based solutions, in the belief that the internalisation of environmental 
externalities can and should be made profitable. Article IV explains how the costly 
upfront technical methodologies of CDM and the profit-maximising logic of carbon 
markets effectively restrict the possibilities of smaller scale and potentially more pro-poor 
rural energy projects becoming CDM projects and favour instead large-scale industrial 
84 
 
solutions, including hydropower.22 The price collapse of CDM credits since 2012 has also 
added to the problems of many non-hydropower projects already registered or 
considering the CDM process. Furthermore, although the CDM is supposed to deliver 
not only carbon offsets but also sustainable development, its governing techniques are 
largely carbon reductionist, which allows for slack accounting, verification and monitoring 
methodologies in terms of environmental and social benefits and other non-carbon 
elements of supposedly sustainable development contributions.  
This is how adverse dam effects are rendered invisible and hydropower projects enabled 
to advance in the CDM project pipeline. In contradiction of the co-benefit rationale of the 
CDM and the broader synergistic climate policy discourse, the findings from Articles IV 
and V demonstrate that the CDM hydropower projects in Cambodia result not only in 
rather unsustainable development but also in the exacerbation of climate vulnerabilities. 
Meanwhile, because CDM governing techniques obscure these contradicting outcomes, 
the projects may easily be used to support co-benefit narratives and the broader 
synergistic eco-modern climate policy discourse.  
Article IV also demonstrates that, in terms of adaptation, the rationales and techniques of 
climate governing are co-generative and supportive of further water resourcification and 
hydraulic infrastructuring. It notes that, thus far, most of the resources directed to 
adaptation have gone to World Bank- and ADB-supported programmes that approach 
adaptation as a matter of climate-proofing standard development projects through 
infrastructural fixes, especially in roads and irrigation schemes. Article IV also discusses 
how the externalisation of climate change has shaped knowledge production on climate 
vulnerability and how the rationale of climate proofing development, in turn, has been 
reinforced by the ways vulnerability has been rendered assessable. Predominant 
vulnerability assessments build on downscaled outputs from the global-scale General 
Circulation Model which emphasises features of external bio-physical hazards such as sea-
level and depth of flood water. Meanwhile, the often used adaptive capacity index in 
Cambodia is shown to account for only rather limited socio-economic, technological and 
infrastructural elements, while many elements creating the capacity to face disastrous 
manifestations of climate change are not taken into account. The index is unable to grasp 
how representative the governing systems are, how systems of social protection are 
organised or how relations of access to and exclusion from land, forests, wetlands, water 
and fisheries have changed. The selection of elements that are rendered assessable is 
generative of the kind of responses that are prioritised. Article IV suggests that the 
 
22 Some of these might appear small-scale in a global context, but in Cambodia only the largest and commercially most 
influential actors in their respective sectors of hydropower, cement, cassava, rice and pork production have considered the 
complex CDM process worthwhile. (Käkönen 2013). 
85 
 
analysed and commonly used adaptive capacity index in Cambodia foregrounds 
infrastructural measures and fixes, including climate-proofed irrigation and flood control 
schemes. Meanwhile, the prevalent assessment techniques do not guide attention to 
measures that would address inequalities and socio-environmental precarity. Ultimately, 
the analysed forms of vulnerability assessment also provide support for the Cambodian 
government’s approach of mainstreaming climate change in the water resources and 
agriculture sectors, with a focus on filling out what are perceived as infrastructural and 
‘development deficits’. This was already present in the analysed Cambodia Climate Change 
Strategic Plan but has become more apparent with the development of sectoral strategies 
for water management and agriculture (Dany et al. 2015).  
Infrastructure is often welcomed by rural residents, and hydraulic schemes for flood 
protection may well be justified in many instances, so they are not to be automatically 
discredited as such. The relevance of Article IV’s findings lies in provoking reflection on 
the limits of the approach that advocates climate-proofing and infrastructural fixing. There 
are also reasons to be cautious when adaptation is mainstreamed, as it increasingly now 
seems to be, with infrastructural fixes being amalgamated with fostering and securing 
agricultural intensification and commercialisation. While this kind of ‘rural development’ 
may make some more secure, it may also produce new vulnerabilities; smallholders who 
are not able to shift to external-input, intensive farming techniques may get pushed into 
indebtedness and more vulnerable positions, flood damages may be shifted to and 
exacerbated in unprotected areas, more climate-friendly and biodiverse agro-ecologies can 
be displaced, the longer term resilience of farming systems undermined and alterations in 
riverine and floodplain ecologies be triggered in ways that vulnerabilise artisan fishers 
(Work et al. 2018 for Cambodia, Taylor 2018 more broadly).  
The main conclusion of Article IV is that the combination of donor-driven policy 
discourses and expert technologies is potent: it externalises and depoliticises climate 
change, rendering it governable through status quo-strengthening responses that 
predominantly take the form of technological fixes. At the same time it leaves 
unaddressed key processes that are currently making large groups of people more 
vulnerable, and the foregrounded responses include solutions that may themselves further 
the vulnerabilisation. The concessionary mode of development, the accompanying 
concentration of resource control and wealth, and related processes of dispossession are 
constitutively excluded from the domain to be governed.  This is striking, because these 
are key processes which affect the possibilities of rural residents to cope with changing 
climate – and in some cases they also amplify the manifestations of climate change. It is 
expedient – because many of these processes, most importantly the economic land 
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concessions and related logging affairs, have formed the wealth base for the country’s 
ruling party-state elite and its crony networks (Hughes and Un 2011, Un and So 2009; 
2011, Milne 2015) – and it is effective. The exclusion of key processes of vulnerabilisation 
from the field of vision forecloses responses that could counter problematic resource-
making processes, address the increasingly unequal access to and control over ‘resources’ 
and provoke broader re-structuring of political-economic and political-ecological relations. 
Further research (e.g. Christoplos and McGinn 2016, Lebel et al. 2018), partly building on 
Article IV, has shown that technoscientific climate framing dominates not only 
government policies but also many donor-led projects and CSO initiatives in Cambodia as 
well as in Laos. As emphasised also by Borras and Franco (2018) such policies marginalise 
responses that would be more access-oriented or generative of redistribution, resistance 
and better recognition of the claims and needs of the most vulnerable groups. 
With regard to water, what is significant is that the way climate change is rendered 
governable makes new hydraulic interventions more plausible in the shape of large-scale 
hydropower dams and irrigation schemes, meanwhile rendering numerous artisan fishers 
and small-holders less able to cope with changing climate, something which gets 
bracketed. What also seems to be happening is that the rationale of acclimatising hydraulic 
infrastructure is being amended with new meanings. It is becoming not only about 
developing and securing stabilised systems of agro-industrial production against 
monsoonal climatic variations, but also about securing the development of these systems 
against the monsoonal variations that are made more unpredictable and volatile by the 
changing climate.  
 
The intersecting commodification of rivers and carbon: Politics of 
visibility 
Here I continue discussion of how the governing of rivers and climate change relate to 
each other by expanding on how the resourcification and commodification of fluvial 
waters intertwine with the making of carbon commodities through the CDM. I focus 
especially on the contributions of Article V to understanding how carbon offset markets 
affect rivers, hydrosocial relations and the governing of hydropower dams. I also take note 
of how CDM hydropower projects in turn affect climate change, which Article V touches 
upon but does not elaborate.  
The relevance of discussing CDM dams relates to the fact that hydropower comprise one, 
if not the most central technology of climate change mitigation in the developing 
countries in the pre-Paris Agreement Period. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM 
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formed the main vehicle for getting the developing countries (non-Annex I countries 
without reduction obligations) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and, by 2019, most of 
the emission reductions through this mechanism came from hydropower projects (UNEP 
DTU 2019). Hydropower has figured centrally in CDM operations almost since the 
mechanism was instigated, with most of the CDM dams being hosted by China, Brazil, 
India and – in the Mekong Region – by Vietnam. Cambodia has been a forerunner in the 
global carbon frontier among the so-called least developed countries (LDCs), to which 
attention has moved since the EU decided to allow credits from projects registered post-
2012 only if they come from LDCs. The findings of Article V related to CDM projects in 
Cambodia are likely also to be relevant to the intersecting production of hydroelectricity 
and emission credits in Laos. In fact, Cambodia has recently been overtaken by Laos 
which now hosts the highest number of CDM projects of the LDCs. In Laos hydropower 
is even more salient than in Cambodia: of the 23 registered projects, 10 are small-scale and 
10 large-scale hydropower dams. The large-scale dams are calculated to produce 86% of 
the projected emission reductions and more large dams are at the validation stage, 
including highly controversial projects that form a cascade of dams on the Nam Ou 
tributary. (UNEP DTU 2018.)  
I start by articulating anticipated central effects which have not materialised, but which are 
of equal importance to those that have. Firstly, the CDM was expected to transform 
hydrosocial relations and hydropower development profoundly by directly accelerating the 
damming of rivers in the global South with the new stream of finance provided by the 
mechanism (Fletcher 2010). It failed, however, to become a decisive source of funding for 
new projects. It has been estimated that most of the hydropower projects, especially if 
large in scale, would have been built even without the revenues from carbon offset sales 
(Erickson et al. 2014). This also seems to be the case in the Mekong Region, at least in 
Vietnam (Smits and Middleton 2014) and Cambodia, as suggested by Article V, and 
probably also in Laos. This means that, thus far, carbon markets have not shaped the 
rivers either in the Mekong Region or more broadly in the global South as dramatically as 
expected. This is good news from the perspective of free flowing rivers but less so from 
the perspective of changing climate – something to which I return at the end of this 
subsection. 
Secondly, the CDM has raised expectations that dams would be governed more 
sustainably. Because of the twin objectives of emission reductions for industrialised 
countries and sustainable development for the host country, the CDM projects were 
expected to be more sustainable than what would be achieved by normal national 
regulatory measures. Indeed, the analysed CDM hydropower projects promised various 
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sustainability benefits, for both the environment and in terms of new employment 
opportunities. Article V, however, demonstrates that instead of forming ‘sustainability 
enclaves’ with higher sustainability standards, they in fact formed rather exploitative 
enclaves with suspended environmental and labour norms. The findings from Article V 
align with Rousseau’s (2017) similarly empirical research, which found that the CDM did 
not add sustainability to hydropower projects. The failing sustainability effects are 
explained by the global governing of CDM credits which are carbon reductionist and, 
therefore, rather indifferent to non-carbon, socioenvironmental aspects. The assessment 
of sustainability criteria is practically limited to the national scale and only to the early 
stages of the projects when the project developers are handing out sustainability promises, 
which subsequently are not monitored. As pointed out in Articles IV and V, in the case of 
Cambodia, the national authorities within the Ministry of Environment designated to 
evaluate whether a project is sustainable enough to receive national approval lack both the 
resources and authority to evaluate the large foreign projects critically, especially when 
they are prioritised by the highest level of authority, as in the case of the Chinese 
concessionary hydropower projects in the Cardamoms.   
Yet, while the CDM has not decisively caused new dams to proliferate in Cambodia, nor 
added to their sustainability, Articles IV and V demonstrate that the CDM has been 
significantly effective in other ways. In the previous subsection it was outlined how 
turning dams into producers of carbon offsets added a new justificatory rationale for 
Cambodian dams, thus more subtly facilitating hydropower development. Another 
relevant effect relates to politics of visibility which also entails certain legitimising effects. 
Article V highlights that the integration of Cambodian dams into the global governing 
space of climate change simultaneously exposed the Cardamom hydropower projects 
internationally and obscured dispossessive alterations in hydrosocial relations induced by 
dams, together with other problematic aspects and effects. Before the CDM documents 
were produced there were practically no official records available on these dams as even 
the EIAs were not made public. More generally, the large dams in Cambodia do not entail 
supporters such as the World Bank or ADB, like some of the dams in Laos, so there are 
no similar enclaves of heightened transnational visibility and accountability. In the case of 
the Cardamom dams, entering the global carbon markets has been the crucial factor in 
terms of visibility. The added visibility that simultaneously brackets adverse effects has 
been convenient for the hydropower concessionaires as well as for the government of 
Cambodia, which has supported the projects. Moreover, new actors at different scales and 
in different locations became involved with the hydropower dams, some of them new 
beneficiaries and all of them in various ways responsible parties in CDM-related politics of 
visibility. They include different kinds of consultants verifying and monitoring the 
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projects, the CDM Executive Board under the UNFCCC certifying the projects, carbon 
traders dealing the credits and the buyers, in this case including high emitters in Sweden, 
Netherlands and Switzerland.  
Article V demonstrates that the governing techniques of dams in the form of 
environmental impact assessments together with the regulatory assessment techniques and 
procedures of the CDM co-produce the obscuring of adverse effects. The EIAs of the 
Cardamom dams produced a very limited zone of impacts in only the most immediate 
areas, and only the most direct losses in terms of biodiversity, and even these inadequately. 
Most of the losses to downstream fisheries were excluded or seriously downplayed, as 
were the damages to the coastal mangrove swamps vital for people’s climate resilience in 
an area considered one of Cambodia’s most vulnerable to climate change. The residents 
excluded from the impact zones were also excluded from consultations, while those 
invited to participate were provided with limited portrayals of impacts combined with un-
kept promises of electrification and compensation; furthermore, critical questions were 
pre-empted by intimidating practices. The EIAs were not made publicly accessible, and – 
against Cambodian legislation – the EIA for Atay Dam was finalised only after 
construction had already started. Together with earlier national approval of the projects, 
narrowly selected parts of seriously limited assessments formed the only basis on which 
the CDM Executive Board evaluated whether sustainability criteria were adequately met. 
Meanwhile, the limited zones of impacts and the problematic claims of local consent were 
reproduced and circulated internationally via the CDM project documents and validation 
reports, while the adverse effects were occluded. This also added legitimacy to the flawed 
EIA processes as there was silence on their inadequacies. 
Because there were no additional assessment procedures, many other effects of the dams 
also went unnoticed. The dams were registered at a time when exploitative labour 
practices at the dam construction sites had already been going on for some time and most 
of the lethal accidents had already been reported. Even the violent, semi-legalised logging 
activities the projects triggered within the vast protected forests around the dams had 
already peaked by the time the projects had advanced to registration stage. The successful 
registration of the projects was a surprise even for some of the interviewed Ministry of 
Environment officials. It seems that while they themselves had been forced to approve 
the projects, they expected that, during the evaluation process, dam-related problems 
would be exposed, if not by the consultants verifying the project then at least by 




After successful project registration, the selling of carbon credit is conditional only on the 
monitoring of carbon reductions; there is no further regulatory accounting for the non-
carbon aspects. This seems to be the case even when large hydropower-based credits enter 
the EU ETS markets. Although the EU decided in 2004 to allow such credits only if they 
are in compliance with the guidelines of the World Commission on Dams, and thus 
assured to be environmentally, socially and economically sustainable, the compliance 
mechanism has remained weak and there are no requirements for proper additional 
assessment processes. Thus, with only emission reductions monitored, after entering 
carbon markets the credits as commodities become further detached from the socio-
ecological relations of their production, and, while the buyers of the credits become 
complicit in the carbon commodification, they may remain, or rather are enabled to 
remain, unaware at what socioenvironmental costs their carbon emitting activities get 
compensated. 
While there is a significant body of CDM-related research, it has been dominated by desk 
studies. More empirical research – especially on the CDM’s contribution to sustainable 
development – has been recommended (Horstmann and Hein 2017), as the future of the 
CDM and certified carbon offset markets are undergoing intense negotiations with the 
Paris Agreement. The empirical CDM cases of Article V contribute to filling this gap with 
relevance to the discussions on future climate mitigation mechanisms. The findings of 
Article V highlight that the carbon reductionist governmental techniques of the CDM 
have been constitutive of a global regulatory space that allows credits to be bought even 
from projects such as the Cardamom dams that have been built by exploited workers, that 
damage biodiversity inside important conservation areas, dispossess thousands of fishers 
and vulnerabilise coastal residents to climate change, and entail broken promises of 
compensations and electrification to those negatively affected. Moreover, these projects 
have triggered massive logging of valuable timber inside protected forests, intimidating 
indigenous forest communities and enriching powerful tycoons who provide part of the 
logging rents to an authoritarian party-state (Milne 2015). Regarding the last point, Article 
V also offers an account on how neoliberal environmental governance mechanisms may 
get entangled with rather illiberal processes of state power consolidation, something that 
has recently raised research interest (e.g. Dunlap and Sullivan 2020).  
Lastly, I turn briefly to the effectiveness of CDM dams in terms of climate mitigation. If 
the revenues from carbon credits are not a decisive factor for project materialisation it 
means, in CDM terminology, that the project is non-additional. Non-additionality 
practically means that no emissions have been mitigated, as high-emitting credit buyers 
have been allowed to continue emitting without any real offsets. Additionality is, thus, the 
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raison d’être of the CDM. Yet it has been suspected that, while small-scale hydropower 
projects are more likely in fact to be additional, the majority of the large CDM projects 
would have been built even in the absence of carbon credits (Haya and Parekh 2011, 
Erickson et al. 2014, Fearnside 2015, Soanes et al. 2016). Thus, the overt attention to, and 
seeming sophistication of, carbon accounting, does not seem to equate with having 
comprehensive and accurate methodologies, even in terms of emission reductions. The 
carbon reductionist governing mechanisms thus seem to not only allow non-carbon 
elements to be disregarded, but also account for only very narrowly selected carbon 
dynamics partly based on problematically constructed ‘baselines’.  
Article V suggests that the Cambodian CDM dams were also based on flawed calculations 
of carbon reductions, although there was no space to explicate this in a detailed manner. 
The construction of the dams was in full swing before CDM processes reached the stage 
of registration and, with the low price of carbon since 2012, CDM revenues are likely to 
be less than 1% of the power sale revenues (Soanes et al. 2016). These facts already 
indicate that the dams would have been built regardless of CDM revenues. Additionally, 
Article V notes that the displacement calculations of fossil fuel ignored the fact that 
Cambodian hydropower dams, including the Cardamom dams, have been accompanied by 
new coal power plants to level seasonal fluctuation in the dams’ power production. It also 
highlights that, while the dams triggered intensive logging of high value timber in large 
areas around the dams on the pretext of salvage logging, the actual clearance of the 
reservoirs was left barely half-done, so the methane emissions from rotting trees in the 
reservoirs were far from optimal.23 Overall, the non-additionality and problematic 
emission calculations of the analysed Cambodian hydropower projects mean that they 
have performed poorly in climate change mitigation. This, in turn, seriously undermines 
the attempt to add legitimacy to the dams with CDM registration by presenting them as 
part of the UNFCCC’s climate change strategies.  
The findings of Article IV and V bring forth some of the key problems related to the 
neoliberal flexibilisation of climate change mitigation through the CDM. Especially the 
detailed account of the actual effects of the CDM dams given in Article V supports a call 
for radically transformed mitigation mechanisms that would need to involve affected 
communities much more effectively in decision-making processes and evaluate much 
more carefully how and at what costs the emission reductions are being produced. The 
new mechanisms currently being designed to replace the CDM should also be more 
 
23 Left out from Article V but still noteworthy is that the calculations of reservoir emissions for all three cases were very 
limited and basically consisted only of a given power density figure that is high enough to be in compliance with CDM 
requirements. Fearnside (2015) has, however, demonstrated that power density can be overtly crude and uncertain measure 
for estimating emissions from reservoirs. So CDM’s own requirements might not be tight enough to exclude dams with 
highly emitting reservoirs although that has been the attempt.  
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effective in accounting for and supporting ‘real’ emission reductions instead of virtual, 
non-existent reductions such as in the case of the Cardamom dams and so many other 
CDM hydropower projects. 
Based on the findings from Articles III, IV and V, a central argument in this section has 
been that, thus far, the governing of climate change has provided new justification and 
impetus for large-scale hydraulic infrastructuring. Climate concerns have tended to 
override other important socio-environmental concerns, especially when it comes to the 
adverse effects of large dams. This has been facilitated by externalised climate change in 
combination with the limitations of the carbon-reductionist governing techniques of the 
climate change mitigation mechanisms, as well as the limited vulnerability assessments. 
Nevertheless, a collision between climate and other hydrosocial concerns seems in many 
cases unnecessary. Unlike the proposals made in many of the analysed policy narratives 
and supported by dam proponents, large-scale hydraulic infrastructuring, especially in the 
form of large hydropower dams, has been shown not to be convincingly compatible, at 
least in the Mekong Region, with the tasks of mitigating climate change and even less with 
reducing climate vulnerabilities. The findings here are supportive of initiatives that call for 
excluding large dams from new forms of climate finance, initiatives such as the Green 
Climate Fund and the new mechanisms being negotiated under Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement (Civil Society Statement 2016, Klemm and Ortúzar 2017, Timpereley 2019).  
4.5 CONCESSIONARY HYDROPOWER DAMS IN OVERLAPPING ZONES OF 
EXCLUSION 
Article V does not only analyse the CDM element of the Cardamom dams but also, more 
broadly, the interplay of different governing rationales and techniques that shape the 
resourcification and commodification of rivers through hydropower development in 
Cambodia. It also addresses how the dams get entangled with other resource control 
schemes and the consequent power effects of this intersecting thereby connecting analysis 
of hydrosocial ordering with broader resource politics, and elaborating a way of analysing 
hydraulic infrastructure projects through a cross-sectoral and multi-resource approach. A 
key contribution of the article to further studies on similar topics is its conceptualisation 
of overlapping zones of exclusion, developed to grasp the complex sociospatial frontier 
dynamics at stake and highlighting how interaction between the heterogeneous spaces of 
governing, including territorially fixed spaces of resource governing and non-territorial 
regulatory spaces, takes places on the basis of the distinct mechanisms of exclusion 
constitutive of each zone.  
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In this section, I synthesise the findings of the article by explaining, firstly, how the 
resourcification of rivers in Cambodia has evolved through a ‘post-neoliberal’ 
concessionary governing mode that materialises in enclaves of Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises’ (SOEs) heightened corporate authority. I also detail, more carefully than in 
the published article, the effects of these enclaves when considered as constitutive parts of 
a broader complex of Sino-Cambodian relations. I then summarise the relevance of 
studying the interaction between the dams and other spaces of resource governing in the 
Cardamoms. Overall, the article finds that enclavistic dams strengthen corporate powers 
over rivers and riverine people but also that, while the dams limit the development of state 
hydraulic powers, certain effects which overflow the enclave boundaries also ultimately 
strengthen other aspects of current, party-state rule. 
Article V argues that the grounds for the concessionary governing mode of dams, were 
established under guidance from the World Bank and the ADB as part of the efforts of 
these global regulatory institutions to steer the re-embedding of Cambodia in regional and 
global circuits of capital after decades of wars, the devastating self-isolationist experiment 
of the Khmer Rouge followed by a period of command economy under Vietnamese 
guidance and years of insurgencies. The Banks’ efforts to ‘open up’ Cambodia have 
entailed assistance in the making of commodifyiable and investable resources, for 
example, through property regime reforms while encouraging regulatory reforms 
supposedly conducive to foreign, private-sector investors. In contrast to Laos, 
hydropower has not been considered to hold out great potential as a key revenue-earning 
opportunity for the government, nor is it regarded as such a strategical sector in the 
overall ‘opening up’ of the country. Yet it has been seen as a key remedy to the problems 
of low domestic electricity-generation capacity and dependence on an expensive 
combination of diesel generators and imported electricity which, in turn, have been 
considered barriers to attracting foreign investment. Like Laos, Cambodia was seen to lack 
domestic finances and other capacities required for the construction of large dams, so the 
guided way forward was similarly to mobilise capital from foreign investors and technical 
capacities from foreign corporations. Unlike in Laos, however – perhaps because of the 
lack of involvement in concrete projects and their attached preconditions – the World 
Bank and the ADB have not been as intensively involved in developing dam-related 
sustainability standards. The most important ‘greening’ part of the neoliberal agendas of 
the Banks has been the EIA regulations which the ADB guided and funded at the end of 
the 1990s (Hensengerth 2017). 
The World Bank pushed forward conditions that would create a private sector-led power 
sector – an important one being concessionary BOT contracts – and also advised on how 
94 
 
to add attractivity to the contracts by, for example, offering tax holidays. Despite the 
neoliberal reforms, however, the profitability prospects of potential dam projects seem 
not to have been clear enough (Middleton 2008), and attracting investors and 
concessionaires has been more challenging in Cambodia than in Laos. In addition to 
concerns over economic viability,24 controversy avoidance might also have played a role in 
making Japanese and more Western-based investors and companies shy away from the 
hydropower projects, as most potential off-the-Mekong sites are situated within important 
protected areas,25 while the Mekong tributary and mainstream dams come with high socio-
ecological effects, especially in terms of fisheries (Lyttleton and Nyíri 2011, Hensengerth 
2017). Instead of being taken up by the foreign private investors and developers for whom 
the neoliberal reforms were meant to carve out the terrain, the hydropower projects have 
attracted Chinese state-owned banks and state-owned companies that are not strictly 
profit oriented.  
An important part of China’s outbound re-orientation through its earlier Going Out 
strategy and current Belt and Roads Initiative is to create new markets for Chinese 
engineering firms, especially in sectors like hydropower that are domestically 
oversaturated, and entail high surplus expertise (Urban et al 2018). This outbound 
infrastructural fixing of domestic problems, importantly spearheaded by the 
internationalisation of hydropower, is also driven by the motivation to secure the value of 
domestic currency by forming outlets for China’s accumulating foreign exchange reserves 
(Matthews and Motta 2015) and ensuring flows of critical resources (e.g. oil) by 
exchanging infrastructure for resource access (Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2019). While the 
Chinese state-owned hydropower companies mostly operate with similar commercial 
considerations as those in the private sector, the state backing they receive allows them to 
carry out less profitable projects as well. Indeed, sometimes they are encouraged to do so 
if the broader packages of aid, investments, trade, resource access and geostrategic deals, 
of which the projects form part, yield opportunities that China’s government considers 
geoeconomically and/or geopolitically important (Lee 2014, Siciliano et al. 2019). In terms 
of controversy concerns, while Chinese hydropower SOEs have encountered opposition 
and increasingly subscribe to international standards on environmental and social 
safeguards to increase their reputation (Kirchherr et al. 2017), this is not yet consistent; 
the main position they still assume is to follow host country laws and law enforcement 
practices, which means that their adherence to environmental regulations depends on the 
host country’s authorities (Hensengerth 2017, Siciliano et al. 2019). Overall, they seem to 
 
24 This is possibly and at least partially related to the fact that most potential sites in Cambodia have a relatively low dry 
season production capacity which reduces the profitability of the dams. 
25 This certainly seems to be the case with investors and developers from Canada in the case of Kamchay (Hensengerth 
2017) and from Japan in the case of the Atay Dam (Lyttleton and Nyíri 2011).  
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still remain less pressurised by international campaigns and thus less preoccupied with 
reputational risks than, for example, the World Bank (Urban et al. 2019), which also 
means that they are less concerned over distancing them from surrounding governing 
practices by adhering to transnational technical zones of governing (Barry 2006). 
Cambodia’s first large-scale dam, Kamchay, became operational in 2012. It formed a 
similar frontier-opener for Cambodia as Nam Theun 2 for Laos. Concessioned in 2005 for 
44 years to a Chinese state-owned enterprise, Sinohydro, it was one of the first overseas 
BOT hydropower project undertaken solely by a Chinese SOE. It thus presented a 
formative experience for the Chinese overseas hydropower industry, which had earlier 
tended to undertake EPC (Engineering, Procurement and Construction) contracts in 
which ownership is handed to host authorities immediately after the construction is 
completed (Urban et al. 2018, Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2019). Kamchay was funded by the 
China Exim Bank as part of an aid package that consisted of loans and grants that were 
tied to the contracting of a Chinese SOE as the dam concessionaire, and separate funds 
for a Cambodian naval patrol craft and a new Council of Ministers building in Phnom 
Penh (Dreher et al. 2017). The Cardamom dams analysed in Article V and the most recent 
Lower Sesan 2, built on a Mekong tributary, soon followed, and have been developed 
through similar tied loan arrangements and concessionary contracts.  
While not necessarily entirely profit-driven, Chinese overseas SOEs often try (and are 
incentivised to do so) to optimise the economic viability of their contracts (Lee 2014). In 
this respect, as Article V points out, the authoritarian powers of the Cambodian ruling 
regime have provided the concessionaires with augmented exploitative opportunities – in 
addition to the already concessionaire-friendly BOT contracts – by guaranteeing highly 
flexible oversight in regard to EIA regulations and labour laws, thus allowing nominal 
internalisation of hydrosocial externalities and minimisation of profit-inhibitive 
construction costs. Moreover, the highest party-state authorities have granted the 
concessionaires exemptions from the Protected Area Law by securing access to rivers 
within conservation zones that is friction-free of regulatory impediments. In response to 
requests by its Chinese counterpart, the government also pushed rather unusual legislative 
guarantees through the National Assembly to secure the agreed electricity purchasing for 
the concessionary periods, regardless of whether Cambodia’s state power company, 
Electricite du Cambodge, is disposed to buy it (Hensengerth 2015, O’Neill 2018). These 
conditions also provide long-term backing for the Chinese concessionaires should a less 
generous government take power in the future.  
Article V thus shows how neoliberal rationales importantly shaped the concessionary 
governing mode of dams, but also that the companies taking advantage of the pro-
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investor and pro-corporate mode of hydraulic infrastructuring do not entirely conform 
with neoliberal reasoning and, further, that the concessions have been facilitated by rather 
illiberal modes of governing on the part of the Cambodian authorities. It also analyses the 
resultant sociospatial power formations, highlighting that the (neoliberal) BOT contracting 
template grants a high degree of autonomy to the corporate concessionaires in conducting 
their dam operations, thereby generating enclaved (hydro)territorial formations. Yet, at the 
same time, concessioning out specifically to Chinese state-corporates strengthens certain 
aspects of the exclusivity and disembeddedness of the Cardamom dam zones, something 
which the authoritarian powers of the party-state have further intensified by granting 
exemptions from national laws and regulations. Furthermore, while enclaved in partially 
unique ways, the Chinese concessionary zones are also networked in distinctive ways, 
which results in various ‘overflows’ that enmesh the pursuit of expanding circulation of 
(Chinese state) capital with the pursuits of the Cambodian state to consolidate its powers. 
In terms of economic enclavism, a specifically Chinese feature is to include the loan 
condition that a Chinese SOE must build and operate the dams, which guarantees that 
‘most of the money never leaves China’ (Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2019: 1374). Another 
enclavistic feature of the Cardamom dams common to Chinese overseas infrastructure 
contracts (Urban et al. 2019) is that equipment, expertise, managers and skilled labour, as 
well as a high proportion of manual labour during the construction phase, come from 
China, which means by-passing the domestic economy. The long-term BOT contracts, the 
use of Chinese managers and the fact that in Cambodia, unlike in Laos, state-owned 
domestic companies do not take shares in hydropower projects, leave very limited 
possibilities for the ’transfer’ of expertise capacities. In more local terms, the promised 
employment remained very limited as most Khmer workers were eventually drawn from 
other parts of the country. The most obvious connection the Cardamom dams have with 
Cambodian society – the electricity they produce – also by-passed adjacent areas, largely 
going to power Phnom Penh and other urban centres, leaving those most negatively 
affected by the dams without the promised access to electricity. The local ’overflows’ that 
the dams did produce, were decidedly negative, including the out bleeding externalities 
that the companies were not responsibilised to limit or compensate and which have 
dispossessed downstream fishers and vulnerabilisised coastal residents. The latter point 
underlines that the hydropower corporates exercise control well beyond project 
boundaries as they have been afforded wide discretion over regulating the fluvial flows of 
the Koh Pao and Tatai Rivers, simultaneously conditioning downstream hydrosocial 
relations and disallowing many other ways of using the rivers. 
97 
 
As the article points out, the de facto corporate authority within the hydropower enclave 
was most intensive during the construction phase when it was exercised over the living 
and labouring conditions of the workers confined to stay within the construction site for 
the duration of their work contracts.  Chinese overseas construction projects not 
uncommonly expect workers to live in on-site dormitories and submit to strict corporate 
control as part of a labour regime that has been interpreted as bearing legacies of the 
socialist work unit model (Nyíri 2013, Lee 2014). Yet the Cardamom hydropower zones’ 
exemption from state oversight, coupled with the workers’ being denied labour union 
protection, seem to have contributed to the rather harsh, incarceral, exploitative and 
dangerous working conditions found by the study (evidenced in the number of lethal 
accidents and injuries), which are not necessarily characteristic of most Chinese overseas 
hydropower projects. The features of extraterritorial authority were manifested most 
concretely in certain violent disputes in which the suspected Chinese offenders were 
apparently sent to China rather than subjected to Cambodian jurisdiction.26 Article V also 
highlights the disconnectedness of the hydropower zones in terms of the minimal 
mechanisms of public information disclosure they are allowed to uphold, even in cases 
when major fluctuations in water levels are produced. 
In many ways the powers of the corporate dam concessionaires have been strengthened 
by and at the expense of the Cambodian state authority. As Article V notes, concessionary 
hydraulic infrastructuring does not offer direct avenues for developing hydraulic state 
capacities; neither does it offer opportunities for ‘hydro-territorialisation’ like the Mekong 
Delta’s hydraulic infrastructuring schemes, examined in Article I. Through the contract 
agreements the state has given away the now centralised governing powers over the 
dammed rivers and the effects of the dams for several decades. Even some of the 
hydroelectricity transmission lines have been concessioned out to Chinese SOEs which, in 
addition to the concessioned dams, means that a significant share of vital Cambodian 
energy infrastructure is now in the hands of Chinese state-private entities. Article V 
discusses the discursive strategies through which the highest state authorities such as the 
Prime Minister Hun Sen have attempted to smooth out the tension between the nearly 
extraterritorial concessional spaces of Chinese hydropower enclaves and the Cambodian 
state’s endeavours of its own power consolidation by developing narratives that 
incorporate the out-concessioned hydraulic infrastructures as part of the achievements of 
the ruling regime and showpieces of national pride. But more importantly, as the article 
suggests, the opportunities generated by the larger complex of bilateral affairs of which 
the dams are part are what make the concessions of state power acceptable. 
 
26 The discussion of these cases was left out of the final version of the Article V because of length constraints. 
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Unique to the Chinese enclavistic projects is that they are not just separate unipurpose 
dam concessions set to turn rivers into hydroelectricity but, instead, constitutive 
components of multipurpose bilateral affairs containing a wide variety of more or less 
bundled aid, investment, trade and diplomatic deals. It is through this complex that the 
Chinese dams produce their distinctive ’overflowing’ effects. Most of these seem 
asymmetrically geared towards the benefit of the Chinese. Despite China’s official rhetoric 
of no-strings-attached, often praised by the Prime Minister Hun Sen, and in addition to 
the very direct loan conditionality of using Chinese contractors, there are also other, more 
diffuse ties and debts of obligation attached to projects such as the Cardamom dams. On 
the one hand, the large-scale, state-backed projects are expected to perform as frontier 
openers for other types of Chinese investors, services and goods, thus advancing more 
fluid globalising circuits for Chinese capital and expertise and establishing a China-
dominated trading regime (Lyttleton and Nyíri 2011, Verver 2019). On the other hand, the 
aid and investment packages to which the dam projects are attached are also geopolitically 
motivated, entailing China’s attempts to territorialise its (geo)political powers in Southeast 
Asia. These packages oblige Cambodia to support China’s territorial claims over Taiwan 
and in the South China Sea (Siciliano et al. 2018, Urban et al. 2019, Mohan and Tan-
Mullins 2019), support which Cambodia has been providing in UN contexts and more 
influentially within ASEAN (O’Neill 2018). It has also been claimed that China has gained 
territorial foothold by positioning naval and air bases along the Cambodian coast within 
strategic military reach of the South China Sea and South Asia, possibly to enable future 
secure routes for transport, especially important for critical resources such as oil (Dahles 
and Pheakday 2017, Yamada 2019). Furthermore, while the Cardamom dams are off-the-
Mekong, they possibly connect to Mekong transboundary hydropolitical relations because 
the Chinese dams and other major infrastructure investments, together with generous aid, 
may have pre-empted Cambodia’s criticism of China’s upstream dams (Dahles and 
Pheakday 2017), which, along with the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, dramatically affect 
Cambodia’s riverine people. 
While the multidimensional, bilateral relations entail constrained diplomatic positions and 
zones of surrendered state authority for Cambodia, which in addition to dam enclaves also 
include Special Economic Zones and possibly military bases, they also yield opportunities 
whereby state power considered vital by the current regime may be strengthened. In the 
continuing absence of a functional tax system, Cambodia remains dependant on external 
grants and loans and China has been increasingly generous in this respect (Sato et al. 2011, 
Ear 2013, Yamada 2019), even supplying military assistance (Dahles and Pheakday 2017). 
Above all, the ruling party leaders prefer the Chinese ‘strings’ over the more Western 
conditionalities as they are more accommodating of Cambodian domestic pursuits and are 
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not accompanied by pressure to alter or conceal authoritarian and neo-patrimonial modes 
of governing (Sullivan 2015, Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2019). Chinese involvement in 
Cambodia does not involve external fiscal oversight and even when neoliberal governing 
techniques are adopted, such as BOT contracts, they can be applied without the exigencies 
of rule-of-law and ‘good governance’ reforms. Importantly, increased Chinese assistance 
and investments offer new opportunities and resources for state patronage, in both elite 
and mass patronage forms (Nyíri 2017, Verver 2019), which continue to be important in 
the efforts of the party-state to consolidate its sovereign powers (Hughes and Un 2011, 
Milne and Mahanty 2015). Not all of the dam enclave-produced overflows which play into 
domestic statecraft are, however, related to the Chinese engagement; a number are also 
related to the ways hydropower zones interact with other spaces of resource governing.  
The Cardamom range is not approached in the article solely as a frontier for 
hydroelectricity. The area not only encompasses rivers with hydropower potential but also 
some of the largest remaining forests in mainland Southeast Asia. Until the end of the 
1990s the Cardamoms were the last refuge of the Khmer Rouge and in the following 
decade remained one of the regions of Cambodia least tightly connected to the space of 
state rule. They are, therefore, discussed in Article V as a frontier for hydroelectricity, 
timber and carbon commodities, as well as state control that has attracted agents operating 
on different scales and with divergent governing rationales. The most important of these 
include 1) the rationales that facilitate market expansion by turning investable resources 
into a ‘tap’ (hydroelectricity and timber) or a ‘sink’ (carbon markets); 2) preservationist 
rationales of resource-making that further the expansion of conserved areas within which 
forests are rendered governable resources while the opportunities for their extraction are 
mostly closed down; and 3) state rationales for pursuing the territorialisation and 
strengthening of its powers, importantly through authoritarian and neo-patrimonial modes 
of governing. The article discusses how this co-presence of various governing rationales 
materialises in distinct, yet overlapping, spaces of governing. In addition to the enclavistic 
hydropower zones (discussed above), and the technical CDM zone of global climate 
governing, these spaces include conservation zones co-governed by international NGOs – 
operating according to a preservationist logic – and by national authorities whose 
motivations include the strengthening of state rule over the Cardamoms. They also 
include semi-official logging zones governed, de-facto, by okhnyas, well-connected 
domestic tycoons to whom most logging revenues accrue and who, in turn, make 
generous contributions to the party-state. A key argument of the article is that the four 
zones of resource(-making and) governing not only overlap but also interact with each 
other in ways that are consequential, as summarised below.  
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Firstly, despite their differing purposes, the interaction between the zones create situations 
where one zone provides enabling conditions for another. The article suggests that the 
conservation zones facilitate the hydropower concessions by halting in-migration and pre-
empting the need for dam-related evictions that could give rise to strong resistance. The 
hydropower dams, in turn, trigger selective logging of high value timber within the 
protected forests, while the initial contracts for salvage logging grant these activities an 
appearance of legality even when carried out well beyond the reservoir boundaries. 
Meanwhile, cooperation with conservation patrols and surveillance posts facilitates the 
exclusion of competing loggers and brokers. The exclusionary mechanisms of the 
conservation zones are thus re-purposed to serve controlled extraction and the 
monopolisation of timber revenue. The highly exclusive logging not only enables 
maximised wealth generation for the okhnyas but also ensures that maximum shares of the 
timber rents are efficiently channelled to the party-state. While not consistently studied, 
the hydropower and timber logging connections seem to be similar in the more recently 
constructed Lower Sesan 2 dam and are also relevant to Lao dams, although with 
distinctive patronage and state power entanglements (Singh 2012) and also, for example, 
particular connection with the financing of rural infrastructure, especially roads27 (Dwyer 
pers. comm. 2018).  
Secondly, the interconnections between the zones are relevant in terms of the politics of 
visibility. As already discussed in section 5.4, dam-related governing techniques in the 
form of EIAs produce seriously limited zones of impact which, together with the carbon 
reductionist CDM regulatory zone, exclude most detrimental dam effects from the ‘field 
of vision’. The interacting, technical EIA and CDM zones, together with the high 
exclusivity of the hydropower and logging territories, contribute to obscuring dam-related, 
dispossessive, socio-ecological effects and exploitative labour relations. They also shield 
from international attention the ways Cardamom CDM dams have entangled with 
authoritarian and neopatrimonial resource politics.  
Thirdly, the article explains how the overlaps and interplay between the zones are 
important in terms of power effects as they invoke a partly unintentional convergence of 
Chinese investors and concessionaires, carbon markets, international conservation 
organisations, domestic tycoons and party-state authorities that has entrenched crony 
networks through which the powers of the party-state are consolidated. This convergence 
has implied significantly centralised control over the Cardamoms rivers and forests, 
circumscribing more autonomous hydrosocial and forest relations while limiting livelihood 
 
27 According to Dywer the timber-hydropower nexus in Laos aligns with a mode of de facto budgeting for rural public 
infrastructure such as roads through timber quotas that has been prevalent up until quite recent times.   
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options for riverine and coastal people in Koh Kong and increasing their dependency on 
labour markets. The article also discusses how the combined effects of the different zones 
of exclusion pre-empt concerted resistance.  
Overall, the analysis of the Cardamom hydropower enclaves and their relations with other 
zones of exclusion Article V contributes to studies that try to account how divergent 
forms of sociospatial organisation may interconnect (Jessop et al. 2008). The corporate 
enclaves were approached as forms of global territoriality and thus in themselves 
‘polymorphic’, simultaneously manifesting the global and the territorial, which, although 
often regarded as opposites, are increasingly understood as interconnected, even co-
constitutive (Ferguson 2006, Sassen 2006, Opitz and Tellman 2012, Mohan and Tan-
Mullins 2019). Furthermore, while these forms of global territoriality, in the shape of 
‘postneoliberal’ hydropower enclaves, are primarily formative of global flows of capital 
(and hydraulic expertise) – in this case particularly the production of more China-geared 
global circuits of (state-)capital – and are disconnected from local state rule, they are 
shown to be networked in ways that eventually also play into strengthening Cambodian 
territorial state powers: firstly, as catalytic composites of a broader complex of bilateral 
Sino-Cambodian relations; and secondly, through their interactions with other, rather 
heterogeneous zones. Both findings add understanding to the multidimensionalities of 
sociospatial formations. They also show how the governing rationales of securing global 
circulation and territorial fixation may shape resource control in parallel and interacting 
ways. In more concrete terms the article discusses how the enclavistic hydraulic 
infrastructuring forms part of Cambodia’s broader, concession-based development model, 
which results in territorial fragmentation that partly undermines state power but also 
exerts and extends it, thus resonating with a pattern of graduated (rather than surrendered) 




5. DISCUSSION: PATTERNS OF WATER 
RESOURCIFICATION AND THEIR 
CONSEQUENTIAL POWER EFFECTS 
Two distinct patterns of water resourcification emerge from the analysis and findings of 
the composite articles: one which is more characteristic of the first wave of hydraulic 
infrastructuring, tending to waterscapes with uniform and centrally coordinated 
hydrosocial ordering, and those of the second wave, which tend to exhibit more dispersed, 
corporate-led modes of hydrosocial ordering. The first wave of hydraulic infrastructuring 
was largely animated by a high-modern governing rationale and took shape through large-
scale master plans of riverine control through which riverine affordances were to be 
optimised in terms of a limited range of water uses. An important site where these 
schemes materialised in physical hydraulic infrastructures was the Mekong Delta of 
Vietnam where hydrosocial relations and riverine livelihoods were to be acclimatised and 
terrestrialised to enable intensive, industrial agriculture (Article I). The delta-wide 
infrastructure schemes produced new nodes for hydrosocial ordering and re-scaled power 
relations, which provided opportunities for North Vietnamese state agencies to strengthen 
their hydraulic capacities, fusing the delta’s Southern waterscapes with the regulative 
powers of the Northern ruling regime. Most of the hydroelectric dams planned by the 
Basin-wide development schemes were shelved (indefinitely or for good), however, while 
others were constructed off-the-Mekong. All were built and operated by state agencies, 
albeit with external support shaped by Cold War allegiances. This first wave of water 
resourcification in the Mekong Region was thus rather congruent with the paradigm of 
‘state hydraulic mission’ (Molle et al. 2009) and developmentalist statecraft, with its 
aspirations for a homogenously governed state space. It is noteworthy that the Delta’s 
infrastructuring efforts did not result in the envisioned hydrosocial legibility and 
governability but, rather, in new complexities and endless fixing efforts; nonetheless, they 
generated powerful entanglements of technoscientific and state capacities, as well as 
waterscapes that were more or less uniformly under a state system of rule and regulations.  
Currently, the legacies of rational, Basin-wide planning are perhaps most intensively 
present in the work of the MRC, albeit morphed into an even more ambitious form as the 
riverine aspects that are to be rendered knowable and manageable have become more 
numerous (Article II). The earlier simplifications have been complicated by environmental 
assessments and more comprehensive fisheries studies, for example, but there is 
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continuity in perceiving and enacting riverine flows primarily as a controllable resource 
that should be centrally managed and allocated to different uses in a centrally coordinated 
manner. The mission of modernising Mekong has evolved into one of ecomodernisation 
pursuing ‘sustainable’ infrastructuring and damming. This is thought to be accomplished 
via more integrative basin planning through which dams might serve as technologies for 
various purposes; cumulative impacts receive consideration and the least harmful projects 
prioritised, which some (e.g. Sabo et al. 2017) optimistically suggest will eventually enable 
rationally coordinated operation of the built dams. Instead of problematising a dam-
centred approach to organising river-society relations, the MRC has upheld a socio-
technical imaginary (Jasanoff 2015) of large dams as fixable with the right kind of planning 
and expertise. This conditional legitimacy has created space for many tributary projects, 
such as the Nam Theun 2, while the MRC’s attempts to temper development it perceives 
as unsustainable, such as mainstream damming, have proved unsuccessful.  
While the MRC’s attempts to merge dam development with integrated river basin 
planning maintains continuity with the past, this amalgamation is increasingly disjointed 
outside its technoscientific sphere. China’s recent effort to launch a new Basin-wide 
cooperation mechanism seems not to have curbed this trend. The Lancang-Mekong 
Cooperation framework enmeshes basin cooperation with geopolitical aspirations (Biba 
2018), as did the early Mekong Committee, only that now US Cold War technopolitics 
have been replaced by China’s new infrastructural foreign policy (Bach 2016, Mohan and 
Tan-Mullins 2019). Yet it is still not effecting the development of individual dam projects, 
and overall it seems most concerned with streamlining dam operation in order to optimise 
electricity production; thus, it is more interested in producing an efficiently operating 
‘energyscape’ (Kaisti and Käkönen 2012) or ‘powershed’ – especially from the perspective 
of the increasing number of Chinese dam concessionaires – than a waterscape produced 
through the more multipurpose basin planning that is the goal of the increasingly side-
lined MRC (Middleton and Allouche 2016). 
Overall, the most powerfully lingering effect of the first wave’s technoscientific 
inscriptions (Sneddon 2015) seems to be the fuelling of aspirations to release the 
Mekong’s untapped hydroelectricity potential. The recent proliferation of hydropower 
projects has little to do with centrally coordinated, eco-modern, river-basin management; 
rather, it has evolved through separate concessionary arrangements in which rivers are 
approached rather exclusively as potential producers of hydroelectricity. Here we can also 
observe a certain tension between the more technoscientific tenets of eco-modern 
rationales and the neoliberal rationales of water resourcification. On a project level, 
however, the two were shown to be more easily aligned, as discussed in the case of the 
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Nam Theun 2 (Article III), a project which has been formative for the new governmental 
assemblage (Li 2007b) and discourse of ‘sustainable hydropower’ (Middleton 2018). Yet 
even in this case it was shown that their alignment has been built on a constitutive 
exclusion of deeper contradictions between them, and that ‘sustainable hydropower’ dams 
fail forward because internalisation of externalities is unlikely without fundamental 
changes in the logics of profit maximisation. Overall, in this study I have tried to show 
how both IWRM-guided basin planning and project-specific sustainability standards have 
problematically provided an aura of legitimacy for large dams deemed fixable, under the 
umbrella of which an astounding number of (mostly less rather than more fixed) dams 
have gone forward with detrimental and drastically cascading effects.  
What has also facilitated the resurgence of large dams, as well as other forms of large-scale 
hydraulic infrastructure, is the anti-politics of climate change. As I have demonstrated, 
climate change-related justifications figure centrally in attempts to re-legitimise and 
consensualise large dams, facilitated by the ways that climate change itself has been 
rendered governable. Rationalisation of climate change efforts through technomanagerial 
and neoliberal variants of ecomodernism, both based on the externalisation of climate 
change, has enabled the enrolling of powerful agencies and made the climate change 
agenda powerful – so powerful that it is liable to override other important environmental 
concerns, such as the adverse socioenvironmental effects of large dams. At the same time, 
the credo of technofixes and the adaptation frames that provoke technical status-quo 
responses have situated large-scale hydraulic infrastructuring at the centre of climate 
responses, despite the fact that they may, particularly in the case of large dams, often 
augment climate vulnerabilities. I have also shown how the carbon-reductionist governing 
techniques of climate change mitigation mechanisms, such as CDM, have facilitated the 
climate-friendly framings of large dams by obscuring the adversities they generate. In 
some cases, such as the downstream areas of the Nam Theun 2 dam in Xe Bang Fai Basin, 
the worsening floods are more readily discussed within the frame of climate change, 
thereby deflecting attention from how it has, importantly, been dam operations that have 
transformed the floods from ‘beneficial’ to devastating. 
The concessionary governing mode through which the enclavistic, water-resourcification 
pattern of second wave dams has evolved was shown to be importantly animated by 
neoliberal governing rationales but also shaped by illiberal governing logic (Article V). As 
Schindler et al. (2019) have noted of other contemporary megaprojects, the second wave 
dams entail more diffuse and varied forms of planning, authority and responsibility than 
the first. Enclavistic dams also generate much more ambiguous spaces of rule that are 
often exempted from state authority to the benefit of corporate powers. An important 
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caveat in this generalisation is the seemingly different situation of the current expansion of 
large-scale irrigation schemes in Laos and in Cambodia which more directly involve state 
agents and lend more directly to statecraft, including the strengthening of state hydraulic 
capacities (Blake and Barney 2018, Blake 2019). It is possible to say of recent large dam 
projects in Laos and Cambodia, however, that all form enclaves of heightened corporate 
authority (Merme et al. 2014, Middleton et al. 2015). Their (neoliberal) BOT templates 
have been designed to secure profits for the concessionaires by allowing them a high 
degree of autonomy in altering riverine flows to optimise electricity sales. This means that 
the hydrosocial relations of riverine people are increasingly conditioned by corporate 
decisions as well as by the patterns of electricity consumption in far-away urban centres, 
principally Bangkok and other Thai cities in the case of Lao dams (Article III, Baird and 
Quastel 2015, Marks and Zhang 2019), and domestic capital in Cambodia (Article V, 
Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2019). Riverine flows are thus increasingly operationalised to 
secure urban electricity affluence while fluvial relationalities that have secured rural, 
riverine livelihoods are disrupted.  
At the same time, because of the high degree of autonomy granted to the concessionaires, 
many other aspects of hydrosocial ordering vary significantly depending on the 
composition of the companies and financiers involved. There is variation, for example, in 
rules governing workers within the hydropower enclaves and in consultative processes, 
resettlement practices and compensatory schemes for affected people outside the dam 
site. The Mekong corporate hydropower enclaves range from ‘sustainability enclaves’ 
epitomised by the Nam Theun 2 (Article III) to ‘enclaves of added exploitative 
opportunities’ epitomised in this study by the Cardamom dams (Article IV). The 
concessionary governing mode of dams thus allows for differential treatment of riverine 
residents in the waterscapes produced by the dams, something resonating with post-
developmental spatial formations and graduated citizenship (Ong 2006, Bach 2011).  
The dam-produced waterscapes are also variegated in the sense that the hydropower 
zones are divergently networked and unevenly transnationalised. The involvement of 
international development banks connects a project like the Nam Theun 2 to transnational 
spaces of governing emerging from attempts to re-legitimise hydropower through new 
sustainability standards; these are, importantly, shaped by disputes over earlier projects 
elsewhere, and address the concerns of international policy networks rather than the 
adjacent affected people themselves. CDM status, in turn, connects many of the Mekong 
dam projects, such as the Cardamom dams, to global carbon markets and the international 
regulatory spaces of climate change mitigation. In the case of the Cardamom dams the 
carbon markets also forge connections between vulnerabilised downstream and coastal 
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Koh Kong fishers, and high-emitting corporations in Sweden, Switzerland and 
Netherlands. Meanwhile, the increasing involvement of Chinese developers enmeshes 
many of the Mekong projects in China’s broader geopolitical-geoeconomic attempts to 
create re-geared regional and global connectivity in the Mekong. Thus, while the projects 
are not the result of multipurpose basin planning and, in terms of riverine ordering, are 
unipurposely designed for electricity production, they do emerge from and foster further 
broader, bilateral, multipurpose investment-aid-trade packages that are also structured to 
conjure up new infrastructure corridors. While Article V only discussed Chinese projects 
in Cambodia, a similar pattern with both Chinese and Vietnamese state-owned 
hydropower companies is also found in Laos (Matthews and Motta 2015, Tan 2015).  
The differing assemblages of involved parties and determinations gathered around and 
shaping the projects also translate into different dynamics in the politics of visibility: the 
highest transnational exposure follows from the involvement of the World Bank or Asian 
Development Bank, while the CDM exposes many projects that might otherwise remain 
without international attention, albeit in a carbon-reductionist way that brackets many 
detrimental, dam-related hydrosocial effects. An important addition to this is that 
mainstream projects, due to their marked transboundary character and submission to the 
MRC’s prior consultation and notification processes, tend to receive more international 
attention than tributary projects. Overall, the heterogeneity of dam enclaves is more 
pronounced within Laos than within Cambodia as there is much more variation in the 
involved parties, and the projects include both mainstream and tributary projects. 
The converse side of the global connectivities of the dam enclaves is their 
disconnectedness from the regulatory space of the host state. After the concession 
agreements have been sealed, state authorities have very little to say about what goes on 
within the enclaves. Furthermore, while large dams have centralised control over riverine 
flows and hydrosocial relations, these powers do not accrue to state authorities but instead 
get transferred between different corporate concessionaires for several decades. Neither 
do the technoscientific competences nor hydraulic capacities evolving through the 
damming accumulate to state bureaucracies as straightforwardly as would be the case for 
state-owned hydropower projects. Thus the avenues for hydraulic statecraft are narrower 
than, for example, in the case of the Mekong Delta’s hydraulic infrastructuring. 
Surrendered state powers over riverine flows, however, is not the whole story of the 
Mekong’s second wave dams, as even when the projects are enclavistic they create 
avenues for strengthening other aspects of state power.  
One link in this respect is rather direct: state revenues. This is particularly important in 
Laos where the number of large concessionary dams is almost ten times greater than in 
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Cambodia, and where the dams export electricity and minor shares of the concession 
consortiums are held by Lao state-owned companies. The dams thus produce significant 
resources in Laos that can be converted into strengthening the ruling capacity of the 
party-state (Creak and Barney 2018). In Cambodia, direct revenues are lower but Article V 
described how the dam projects open up significant opportunities for timber extraction, 
from which rents, through elite patronage relations, are channelled into consolidating the 
sovereign powers of the party-state. The dam-timber nexus is also relevant in Laos but 
connections with processes of state formation, while relevant, are not entirely similar 
(Singh 2012). In Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, also in Laos (Tan 2015, Pang 2017), the 
dam projects concessioned to state-owned Chinese companies facilitate broader 
constellations of bilateral affairs with China, which, on the one hand, further new political-
economic dependencies on China but, on the other, provide opportunities and resources 
for domestic statecraft without external pressure being placed on situated authoritarian 
and neo-patrimonial modes of governing (Article V).  
Furthermore, in Laos and Cambodia large dams with associated roads and resettlement 
schemes provide state accessibility to previously remote areas. This, however, seems more 
relevant for Laos, where the resettlement schemes accompanying the dams appear to be 
perceived as welcome external resources to the state’s long term objectives of 
sedentarising upland, semi-nomadic, swidden agriculturalists and, overall, of consolidating 
small and dispersed rural settlements into bigger and more readily governable units 
(Evrard and Goudineau 2004, Ovesen 2008, Syladeth and Guoqing 2016, Blake and 
Barney 2018). The compensatory livelihood projects accompanying dams also offer 
opportunities to state authorities to intervene in how people organise their lives and 
livelihoods. Here, in fact, the projects with higher sustainability standards and involvement 
from the Asian Development Bank or World Bank, also have more ample resources for 
this, which is why the ordering valence of ‘sustainability enclaves’ may be more intensively 
geared at state territorialisation than projects with fewer resources allocated to 
compensation schemes (Blake and Barney 2018). Blake and Barney (2018) also highlight 
that in the case of the Theun-Hinboun and its extension project the state agencies have 
advanced irrigation schemes in the resettlement and affected areas. Thus, the projects 
have also augmented the state hydrosocial ordering capacities. 
Thus, while the concessionary deals facilitate the access of foreign investors to the 
Mekong’s commodified rivers and the expansion of the global circulation and 
accumulation of capital, the dam projects also entail elements which may be geared to 
fixating territorial state power. This, together with the variegated aspects of the resulting 
waterscapes (discussed above), illuminates that, in frontier sites where both resources and 
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states are in the making, concessionary dams shaped by neoliberal and authoritarian 
governing logics may generate highly multidimensional sociospatial formations. These are, 
at the same time, locally territorialised and globally networked in highly divergent ways 
and, while primarily designed to secure global circulation increasingly favouring China’s 
orbit, may also become intensively enmeshed with state territorialisation.  
From the perspective of the affected riverine people, the mutually supportive 
entanglements of neoliberal and authoritarian governing modes amount to disruptions in 
previous hydrosocial relations and livelihood practices and in narrowed opportunities for 
more autonomous modes of living (Articles III and V, Barney 2009, Baird et al. 2015, 
Blake and Barney 2018). The imposed changes do not assign the same, determining 
constraints to all, however; indeed, they are interwoven with local socio-ecological and 
political relations and thus differentially experienced (for Lao dams Katus et al. 2016, 
more broadly Taylor 2015). It is also often not only large dams that bring about drastic 
changes; rather, the effects of hydropower are often encountered in combination with 
other resource extraction projects, like large-scale, agro-industrial plantations and mines 
(Lagerqvist et al. 2014, Baird and Barney 2017), and/or how the dams intersect with such 
schemes (Article V). This kind of ‘development squeeze’ is something that project-by-
project assessment and the fragmented knowledge-production regime (Baird and Barney 
2017) generated by the concessionary development model to which Cambodia and Laos 
have subscribed tend to render invisible. 
While the effects of dams and those cascading from various large-scale concessionary 
extraction projects are differentially experienced, there is a pattern of increased rural 
inequality, vulnerability and incapacity to cope with environmental change (e.g. Lagerqvist 
et al. 2014). The people most hard hit seem to be those whose livelihood mosaics ‘stretch 
across’ aquatic and terrestrial systems, who are more subsistence-oriented and more reliant 
on direct fluvial or forest affordances such as fisheries, fluvial sediment-nourished 
farmlands and forest produce (Baird and Barney 2017). While the comparative invisibility 
of the dispossession of these small holders and artisan fishers perhaps facilitates the 
proliferation of extraction projects, it also seems that many of the losses are, in fact, 
understood; indeed, for the state authorities, they may not represent unfortunate 
externalities but, rather, forceful catalysts for more market-dependent and -oriented 
modes of production (Whitington 2019: 194), which, in turn, will enable the development 
of more export-oriented commercial agriculture, the goal of official development 
strategies in both Laos and Cambodia. Albeit unstated in official policies, this suggests a 
biopolitical reasoning (Foucault 2003, Li 2010) whereby the modes of living of peasant 
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small-holders and artisan fishers are deemed disposable and something to ‘let die’ rather 





6. CONCLUSION: VARIEGATED WATERSCAPES 
WITH SIMILAR DISRUPTIONS OF FLUVIAL 
RELATIONALITIES 
In this study I have analysed a range of attempts to intervene, rearrange and fix 
hydrosocial relations in order to augment understandings of the ends, means and 
implications of accelerating hydraulic infrastructuring in the Mekong Region as epitomised 
by large dams. One of the key arguments of the thesis is that there is no single rationale to 
explain the current dynamics but, rather, an interplay of different rationales, practices and 
techniques. I have also highlighted the importance of the legacies of past hydraulic 
endeavours, their infrastructural power and that of fluvial waters, and how processes of 
water resourcification have generated new power formations and drastically altered 
hydrosocial relations. Moreover, the study examined how attempts to control and attain 
stability through schemes of ecological simplification and large-scale hydraulic 
infrastructuring are prone to producing volatile ecologies and new complexities and 
indeterminacies. Another contribution it has made has been to bridge water and climate 
studies by highlighting how the dominant attempts to govern rivers and climate change 
relate to each other in increasingly problematic ways. 
The composite cases have also allowed me to identify important continuities and changes 
in the Mekong Region’s hydrosocial ordering efforts. I have shown how the high-modern 
rationales of resourcification have morphed into eco-modern versions which are currently 
especially relevant to attempts to re-legitimise large dams, either in terms of expert 
knowledge production (Article II), sustainability standards (Article III) or climate change 
mitigation and adaptation efforts (Article IV). At the same time, this study brings to the 
fore a major rupture in hydraulic infrastructuring in terms of the increasing disjointedness 
between damming and river basin planning due to the proliferation of concessionary 
hydropower projects. It is a situation that presents one of the major contradictions in the 
current resurge of hydropower: while large dams are being justified with multiple and 
ever-increasing purposes, from poverty alleviation to better governing of climate change, 
the concessionary dams are, in fact, geared almost solely towards optimising riverine 
affordances in terms of their hydroelectricity production, while most other riverine 
affordances are disallowed. 
Importantly, the synthesis of the composite articles demonstrates the differences between 
the large-scale, hydraulic infrastructure assemblages in terms of agents, rationales and 
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techniques. The synthesis of the composite articles demonstrates how, on the one hand, 
the assemblages of different agents, rationales and techniques around the various large-
scale hydraulic infrastructuring efforts differ, and how the waterscapes produced are 
variegated: variously networked and with divergent power formations. One the other 
hand, it makes apparent that the implications of these efforts in terms of disruptions of 
fluvial relationalities and the centralisation of resource control bear resemblance. There is 
variation in the magnitude of the effects and also in the mechanisms of how the benefits 
and adversities of the projects are distributed; however, whether in the form of the 
integrated systems of high dikes in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam or large dams in 
Cambodia and Laos – including ‘sustainable’ dams with eco-modern safeguard policies – 
they generate comparable effects: radically disrupting fluvial relationalities; halting the 
possibilities of alternate hydrosocial relations for very long periods of times if not 
irreversibly; diminishing opportunities for diverse and decentralised river uses; supporting 
intensified monocultures while foreclosing on biodiverse agroecologies; tending toward 
more centralised control of hydrosocial relations; and vulnerabilising those with the most 
intimate riverine connections. Yet, despite these resemblances, a nuanced analysis of the 
assemblages of agents, rationales and techniques constituting each attempt to fix the fluid 
is important. While the effects of these assemblages are not reducible to any of the 
component parts, nor controllable by any of the single agents involved, their analysis 
enables more detailed reflection on their distributed responsibilities. The research 
undertaken for this study hopefully provides new directions for exploring them further.  
On a more future-oriented note, this study calls for radical transformations in the 
governing rationales, institutions and infrastructures for more liveable and just 
waterscapes in the Mekong Region: waterscapes that could sustain a just, socionatural 
abundance (Collard et al. 2014). The findings of this study challenge and question the eco-
modern assumptions of technical fixes for large-scale hydraulic infrastructures, such as 
large dams. Instead of intensifying efforts at fixing the fluid and keeping doors open for 
more damming, the findings call for the incorporation of more amphibious approaches 
(Jensen 2017) to environment-making. Unlike the large-scale dams and terrestrialising 
hydraulic infrastructures that fracture fluvial relationalities, destroy fisheries, strip fluvial 
waters of their delta-making powers and role in rendering lands fertile, with greater 
appreciation of the fluid agencies of fluvial waters and the generative powers of fluvial 
relationalities, more amphibious environment-making approaches could engender longer-
term hydrosocial prosperity for riverine and deltaic people.  
With the term ‘engender’ I partly paraphrase Latour’s (2017) recent call for a terrestrial 
turn, which implies a transition from systems of extractivist production on the basis of 
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externalising nature as a resource, to systems of engendering based on cultivation of 
attachments and dependencies amongst animate beings – but perhaps with an added 
emphasis that being terrestrial and earthbound inevitably entails the watery relationalities 
discussed here. Adopting more amphibious approaches would also mean working with the 
seasonal changes rather than against them, as in the past acclimatising efforts discussed in 
this thesis. While climate change presents new volatilities from which protection can be 
warranted, in some cases also in infrastructural forms, current climate change responses 
continue on the path of acclimatisation through large hydraulic infrastructures that 
purport to secure infrastructures and development schemes from climate change, 
meanwhile causing new vulnerabilities. Responses should, rather, address socio-
environmental precarity (Ribot 2014) through various societal measures including 
redistributive processes that would reverse the dispossessive concentrations of resource 
control and wealth (Borras and Franco 2018) of the current development path, particularly 
in Cambodia and Laos. When infrastructural measures are needed, it should be ensured 
that they do not provoke unjustly re-distributed socio-ecological adversities and new 
volatilities. Overall, the call for more just and amphibious approaches entails radically 
altered hydropolitics in which the different groups of the Mekong’s riverine people would 
have more say over what kind of hydrosocial relations and riverine affordances should be 
fostered: how, for whom and on whose terms; as well as the kind of watery adversities 
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